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Antidiscrimination Law and
the Perils of Mindreading
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PHILIP E. TETLOCK**
Recent legal scholarship challenges the default psychological assumption in
antidiscrimination law that discrimination is a function of psychological
processes under the conscious control of the discriminator, and replaces it
with the assumption that discrimination is the result of unconscious, or
implicit, psychological processes that operate automatically, beyond
conscious control. This challenge is, however, only as persuasive as the
research on which it is predicated, and we document that this research fails
to satisfy key scientific tests of validity. We conclude that implicit prejudice
research should be accepted as neither legislative authority nor litigation
evidence until there is more: (1) rigorous investigation of the error rates of
the new implicit measures of prejudice (and of how investigators balance
Type I errors of false accusations against Type II errors of failing to
identify prejudice); (2) thorough analysis of how well implicit measures of
prejudice predict discriminatory behavior under realistic workplace
conditions; and (3) open debate about the societal consequences of setting
thresholds of proof for calling people prejudiced so low that the vast
majority of the population qualifies as prejudiced.
I. INTRODUCTION
The shape of the next generation of antidiscrimination law hinges on
how legislators and judges respond to the argument that prejudice in America
has mutated into new insidious forms-that prejudice, once overt, is now
largely covert, indeed, so covert that possessors of the new prejudice are
themselves unaware both of the contents of their own minds and of how
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these contents bias their judgments of protected-category groups.' Those
advancing this argument warn us that survey evidence of declines in
prejudice are misleading: prejudice and stereotyping are as robust as ever but
now operate more surreptitiously, via unconscious, or implicit, associations
among mental categories (White + good/Black + bad, old + feeble/young +
healthy) that lead to subtle and not-so-subtle acts of discrimination. 2 Were
these insidious associations limited to a small percentage of the population,
then wholesale changes to the psychological assumptions of
antidiscrimination law would be unwarranted. But if recent claims are to be
believed, unconscious processes of discrimination operate pervasively: under
this emerging view, most, if not all, of us are implicit bigots most, if not all,
of the time.3
ISee Lu-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT 135, 135 (2006) ("[L]egal
prohibitions against discrimination are inadequate to redress the largest share of modem
discrimination, particularly under the dominant model of intentional discrimination.");
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 ("Unconscious bias, interacting with today's increasingly 'boundaryless
workplace,' generates inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not well-
equipped to solve." (footnote omitted)); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal
Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747,
753 (2001) ("[A]ntidiscrimination law is inadequate because it targets mainly intentional
discrimination, missing the more prevalent contemporary forms of bias that are often
nondeliberate or unconscious." (footnote omitted)); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 460
(2001) ("Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction have
replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued inequality."
(footnote omitted)); Audrey J. Lee, Comment, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment
Discrimination, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 481, 482 (2005) ("The nature of
discrimination today is dramatically different from the pernicious, overt discrimination
that existed prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (footnote omitted)).
2 See, e.g., Margo J. Monteith et al., Taking a Look Underground: Detecting,
Interpreting, and Reacting to Implicit Racial Biases, 19 SOC. COGNITION 395, 396 (2001)
("[W]ith little intent or conscious awareness, negative racial associations that are
consciously disavowed can be activated and used as a basis for responding to members of
stereotyped groups."); Darren Seiji Teshima, A "Hardy Handshake Sort of Guy": The
Model Minority and Implicit Bias about Asian Americans in Chin v. Runnels, 11 ASIAN
PAC. AM. L.J. 122, 139-40 (2006) ("The notion that racism no longer infects society as a
whole, but is rather the intentional act of an anomalous bigot is 'the Big Lie.' ... Social
cognition research has demonstrated that stereotypes affect all of us, even without our
awareness of this cognitive process." (footnote omitted)).
3 Consider, for instance, recent statements to this effect by Jerry Kang & Mahzarin
Banaji, who are, respectively, the leading legal and psychological proponents of the
implicit prejudice view:
[B]y a conservative estimate, around ninety percent of Americans (and others
in the western world), mentally associate negative concepts with the social group
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An explosion of research into the unconscious processes of social
cognition provides the empirical foundation for this "implicit prejudice"
view.4 Using new methods that purportedly tap into the subconscious, most
prominent among them the Implicit Association Test ("IAT"), 5 some
psychologists now claim that the vast majority of the population-including
many victims of discrimination-implicitly associate disadvantaged groups
"elderly"; only about ten percent show the opposite effect associating elderly with
positive concepts. Seventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of Blacks) show
anti-Black bias, and seventy-five percent of men and women do not associate female
with career as easily as they associate female to family .... These data, as well as
the findings in dozens of experiments that meet the criteria of replicability and peer-
review, demonstrate that we are not color or gender blind, and perhaps that we
cannot be.
Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
"Affirmative Action", 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063, 1072 (2006). Kang & Banaji contend
further that the new tools of this implicit prejudice research "can measure threats to fair
treatment-threats that lie in every mind." Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).
4 See Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are
They? Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757, 757
(2001) ("In recent years, there has been a veritable explosion of work on the nature and
assessment of implicit components of prejudice and stereotyping. Over the last decade or
so, a great many studies have revealed that prejudice and stereotypes can operate without
the conscious intent or awareness of social perceivers."). Unless we specify otherwise,
when we refer to the "implicit prejudice" line of work, we mean to refer generally to
research into unconscious, or implicit, biases toward different social groups, either in the
form of implicit prejudicial evaluative attitudes toward these groups or implicit
stereotypic beliefs about these groups.
5 The IAT is one of several devices in social psychology designed to capture
attitudes without asking people what views they consciously endorse. For a review of
these implicit measures, see Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in
Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003);
see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464,
1473-74 (1998) (describing the original race IAT). Essentially, the IAT measures
millisecond differences in reaction times to pairings of concepts that vary in their putative
stereotypic or prejudicial connotations. For instance, if a subject responds more quickly
to the pairing of photographs of African-American faces with negative character trait
words than to the pairing of photographs of European-American faces with the same
negative character trait words, then the subject is said to exhibit an implicit negative
stereotype toward African-Americans. Or if a subject responds more quickly to the
pairing of "White-sounding" names with the term "pleasant" than to the pairing of
"Black-sounding" names with the term "pleasant," then the subject is said to exhibit an
implicit negative attitude (or prejudice) toward African-Americans. For a detailed
discussion of the IAT procedure and IAT research, see infra Part II.B; for a detailed
critique of this research, see infra Part III.
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with negative attributes and advantaged groups with positive attributes.6
Because these implicit associations are said to arise from basic psychological
processes common to all, this new research ostensibly reveals a deep
reservoir of prejudice beneath the surface of even seemingly civil intergroup
relations. 7 Even more troubling, these implicit associations are said to
manifest themselves in acts of discrimination, 8 and good intentions can do
little to stop this automatic and unconscious discriminatory process.9
Antidiscrimination law scholars have seized on this new research to
argue for changes in the legal landscape.' 0 Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji,
6 See Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 101,
112 (2002) ("From young to old, male to female, Black to White, and conservative to
liberal, implicit biases are not held by a select few but are readily observed among all
social groups."); see also John T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious Forms of System
Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586, 598 (2002) ("[I]t appears that members of
disadvantaged groups internalize negative stereotypes and evaluations of their own
group, to at least some degree.").
7 See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Social Psychology of
Ordinary Ethical Failures, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 111, 111 (2004) ("These ordinary
unethical behaviors are conceived to be ordinary because they are assumed to be rooted
in the basic mechanics of the mind's abilities and constraints. They are also ordinary in
that such unethical behaviors are not characteristic of a special group of unethical
people.., but rather of all of us." (citation omitted)).
8 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 4, 7 (1995) ("[A]ttitudes of
which the actor is not conscious at the moment of action (implicit attitudes) are also
strongly predictive of behavior."); Monteith et al., supra note 2, at 396 ("[W]ith little
intent or conscious awareness, negative racial associations that are consciously
disavowed can be activated and used as a basis for responding to members of stereotyped
groups.").
9 See Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272, 280 (1993) ("Implicit stereotyping critically
compromises the efficacy of 'good intention' in avoiding stereotyping and points to the
importance of efforts to change the material conditions within which (psychological)
stereotyping processes emerge and thrive."); Devine, supra note 4, at 757 ("Even those
who consciously renounce prejudice have been shown to have implicit or automatic
biases that conflict with their nonprejudiced values that may disadvantage the targets of
these biases.").
10 The California Law Review will soon publish a symposium issue devoted to
"behavioral realism," with legal implications of implicit prejudice research being a
primary topic of discussion, see Symposium, 94 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
Further, despite the youth of the Implicit Association Test, at least forty-four law journal
articles discuss IAT research in a legal context (as found through a search conducted on
Feb. 22, 2006, for "implicit association test" in Westlaw's Journals and Law Reviews
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for instance, call for greater use of affirmative action programs and other
"fair measures" to counter and change implicit biases against women and
minorities. I" Antony Page calls for new procedures to combat the implicit
racial and gender biases likely to influence the exercise of peremptory
challenges or, alternatively, outright elimination of the peremptory
challenge. 12 And in perhaps the boldest legal application of implicit prejudice
research to date, Saujani proposes that the IAT be used to read the minds of
legislators for evidence of unconscious discriminatory intent in their
enactments.
13
These specific examples are but a small part of an ambitious project to
(JLR) database). We discuss legal scholarship on the IAT in more detail below. See infra
Part II.C.
11 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1080 ("[W]e need a new model of
discrimination for implicit bias-one based on a more accurate model of human
cognition and emotion, especially its constraints. This new model must promote proactive
structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential individual
litigation." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1116 ("Fair measures that are race- or gender-
conscious will become presumptively unnecessary when the nation's implicit bias against
those social categories goes to zero or its negligible behavioral equivalent." (footnotes
omitted)). The specific "fair measures" Kang and Banaji propose include legal use of tie-
breaking in favor of women and minorities in hiring, the hiring of counter-stereotypical
women and minorities to serve as "debiasing agents" in organizations, raising self-
awareness about implicit biases by having employees take the IAT and other
psychological tests of implicit bias, and cloaking social category information in
employment decision-making processes. See id. at 1101- 15.
12 See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 156 (2005) ("[T]he Batson peremptory
challenge framework is woefully ill-suited to address the problem of race and gender
discrimination in jury selection. Current reform proposals are hit or miss, because they do
not directly address this source of injustice. Although abolishing the peremptory
challenge would be optimal, in the alternative this article recommends several steps that
lawyers and judges should take to reduce the impact of unconscious bias on jury
selection."). Justice Breyer recently invoked the implicit prejudice view to support his
argument for abolition of the peremptory challenge. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("And most importantly, at step three, Batson
asks judges to engage in the awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a
prosecutor's instinctive judgment-the underlying basis for which may be invisible even
to the prosecutor exercising the challenge. In such circumstances, it may be impossible
for trial courts to discern if a 'seat-of-the-pants' peremptory challenge reflects a 'seat-of-
the-pants' racial stereotype." (citations omitted)).
13 See Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Association Test": A Measure of
Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395, 396
(2003) ("The IAT could 'smoke out' illegitimate purposes by demonstrating that the
[racially-neutral] classification does not in fact serve its stated purpose."); id. at 413
("The IAT (or psychological testing more generally) should be added to the non-
exclusive list enumerated in Arlington Heights for determining racial intent.").
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use implicit prejudice research to remake the law. A group of prominent law
professors and social psychologists recently joined forces "to use the energy
generated by research on unconscious forms of prejudice to understand and
challenge the notion of intentionality in the law."' 14 The first target is
antidiscrimination law's emphasis on intentional discrimination, which these
scholars claim "runs afoul of the psychologists' research on implicit
prejudice,"' 15 but the larger target is "the role of intent in all bodies of law.' 16
This empirical updating of the legal significance of the subconscious raises a
host of controversial possibilities, 17 including using the results of implicit
association tests in Article III confirmations, developing re-conditioning
programs for schools and media campaigns to change the unconscious
associations we make to the categories of women and minorities, ordering
"debiasing screensavers" as an equitable remedy in discrimination lawsuits,
and taking measures to reduce the unconscious influence of defendants'
Afrocentric facial features in sentencing decisions. 18
This movement for major changes in the legal understandings of
intentionality and discrimination proceeds from the premise that implicit
14 Beth Potier, Making Case for Concept of 'Implicit Prejudice': Extending the
Legal Definition of Discrimination, HARV. U. GAZETTE (Dec. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/12.16/09-prejudice.html (quoting Dr.
Mahzarin Banaji). The Russell Sage Foundation is providing funding for an
interdisciplinary group of scholars to develop legal applications of the implicit prejudice
research. See The Legal Design of Equality Based on the Science of Ordinary Prejudice,
http://www.russellsage.org/ (type title into search box, then follow hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 14, 2006) (project description). The project is headed by the psychologist Mahzarin
Banaji and Katherine Newman, Dean of Social Science at the Radcliffe Institute for
Advanced Study. See id. Participants in the California Law Review symposium on
implicit prejudice research include the psychologists Mahzarin Banaji, Jennifer
Eberhardt, Susan Fiske, Anthony Greenwald, John Jost, and Lee Ross and the legal
scholars Richard Banks, Gary Blasi, Jerry Kang, and Linda Hamilton Krieger.
15 Potier, supra note 14.
16 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1536 (2005).
17 In 1987, Professor Lawrence authored an influential paper on unconscious
discrimination from a psychodynamic perspective, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317 (1987), but his Freudian language was unfashionable among psychological theorists
even before it hit the press and subsequent work has been dominated by cognitive
approaches to unconscious discrimination. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr.
Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REv. 89 (1990); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995);
Mary R. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990).
18 See Kang, supra note 16, at 1536-37.
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prejudice research is reliable science with clear real-world implications.
Bestowing scientific credibility on this research is essential to the implicit
prejudice project, for it insulates the project from charges of value-driven
legal prescriptions. If the "science of implicit social cognition" 19 reveals that
all individuals exhibit unconscious biases toward women and minorities, then
surely the law should take notice if it is committed to equal protection of all
persons. Only those suffering from "hypocrisy and self-deception" 20 could
cling to a legal regime based on intentional discrimination in the face of
scientific research showing the importance of unintentional discrimination.
21
Accordingly, implicit prejudice scholars work hard to claim the mantle of
science as they advance their agenda.22
It is easy to be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of laboratory studies
that implicit prejudice advocates cite, by the moral certitude with which they
apply psychological generalizations to the real world, and by the impressive
credentials they bring to the courtroom. But this would be a big mistake. On
closer inspection, we shall discover that the scientific rhetoric accompanying
legal applications of this research is-to use Susan Haack's distinction-
more honorific than descriptive:
So successful have the natural sciences been that the words "science,"
"scientific," and "scientifically" are often used as generic terms of
epistemological praise, meaning vaguely "strong, reliable, good"-as, in
television advertisements, actors in white coats urge viewers to get their
clothes cleaner with new "scientific" Wizzo .... If "scientific" is used
honorifically, it is a tautology that "scientific" equals "reliable"; but this
tautology, obviously, is of no help to a judge trying to screen proffered
19 Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1064.
20 Id. at 1065.
21 Kang and Banaji challenge the legal establishment to explain its neglect of this
"science": "The law views itself as achieving just, fair, or at least reasonable results. If
science reveals that the law is failing to do so because it is predicated on erroneous
models of human behavior, then the law must transparently account for the gap instead of
ignoring its existence." Id.
22 For example, Professors Kang and Banaji refer to the implicit bias research as
"science" or "scientific" at least fifteen times, see Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, passim,
yet they offer no discussion of the many challenges to this "science" presently being
made within psychology. Professor Kang, in his earlier Harvard Law Review article
promoting the implicit prejudice research, calls the work "remarkable science," Kang,
supra note 16, at 1490, 1592, "jaw-dropping" science, id. at 1497, and "the best science
known to us," id. at 1586. Interestingly, Kang often referred to the work interchangeably
as "science" and "social science" in his Harvard article, but Kang and Banaji drop the
"social" adjective and treat the work just as "science" in general in their California Law
Review article. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, passim.
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scientific testimony.2 3
We shall document in detail that if implicit prejudice researchers were
explicit about the scientific problems underlying key knowledge claims, their
extraordinarily ambitious legal-reform project would lose much of its allure.
To this end of pulling back the curtain to reveal the messy facts behind neat
normative pronouncements, 24 we describe precisely the many ways in which
the research behind implicit prejudice claims proves far weaker than its
proponents acknowledge. It is worth stressing, though, that our focus is
confined to work on implicit prejudice and that our aims are remedial in
intent. We do not dispute that the broader implicit social cognition research
program has yielded intriguing data bearing on unconscious correlates of
judgment under laboratory conditions. Furthermore, we endorse the
"behavioral realism" project of subjecting law's behavioral theories to
empirical scrutiny,25 but endorsement of this project does not compel
agreement with the conclusions of the implicit prejudice behavioral realists-
indeed, acceptance of those conclusions would cast into doubt the scientific
bona fides of the project. We simply seek to correct the growing
misconceptions that if influential psychologists declare that a measure taps
into unconscious prejudice, we are obliged to accept that characterization
and, if we accept that characterization, we are further obliged--on pain of
being labeled self-deceiving hypocrites-to accept that unconscious
prejudice causes legally actionable discriminatory behavior in realistic
settings.
We document four major scientific shortcomings of implicit prejudice
scholarship:
(a) Problems of Construct Validity and Metric Meaning: Researchers
jump the inferential gun in labeling measures of implicit associations
measures of unconscious propensity to discriminate.
Although rarely acknowledged in law review discussions of implicit
23 Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S66, S68 (2005).
24 E.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1080 ("[W]e need a new model of
discrimination for implicit bias-one based on a more accurate model of human
cognition and emotion, especially its constraints. This new model must promote proactive
structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential individual
litigation." (footnote omitted)).
25 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias & Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REv.
997, 1000 (explaining that "behavioral realism ... holds that as judges develop and
elaborate substantive legal theories, they should guard against basing their analysis on
inaccurate conceptions of relevant, real-world phenomena").
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prejudice, sharp dispute exists over what psychological processes the IAT
actually measures. IAT proponents claim that the IAT taps into hidden
reservoirs of unconscious positive and negative affect toward different social
groups, but many studies question this interpretation and indicate that the
IAT measures a host of alternative processes that do not involve implicit
negative bias toward social groups. For instance, variations in the mere
familiarity of the group categories activated by the IAT can lead to scores
indistinguishable from those motivated by animus toward those groups;26 so
too can egalitarian empathy for disadvantaged social groups;2 7 so too can
performance anxiety linked to the fear of being labeled a bigot;28 so too can
mere awareness of cultural stereotypes and depressing socio-demographic
facts. 29
It is unfortunate that so many implicit prejudice scholars fail to discuss
evidence casting doubt on the implicit prejudice hypothesis-indeed, some
not only ignore this debate but claim a presumption of correctness in their
interpretations of this ambiguous evidence by attaching the label "science" to
their views.30 Compounding the problem, these scholars assign social
26 See Sachiko Kinoshita & Marie Peek-O'Leary, Does the Compatibility Effect in
the Race Implicit Association Test Reflect Familiarity or Affect?, 12 PsYCHONOMIC BULL.
& REV. 442 (2005). These researchers also call their counter-interpretation "salience
asymmetry." Id. at 444.
27 See Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., Are Members of Low Status Groups Perceived as
Bad, or Badly Off? Egalitarian Negative Associations and Automatic Prejudice, 42 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (2006).
28 See Cynthia M. Frantz et al., A. Threat in the Computer: The Race Implicit
Association Test as a Stereotype Threat Experience, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1611 (2004).
29 See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or
"Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test?," 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257,
268-74 (2004); Philip E. Tetlock & Hal R. Arkes, The Implicit Prejudice Exchange:
Islands of Consensus in a Sea of Controversy, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 311, 316 (2004).
One of the few points of agreement in a recent exchange involving one of the co-authors
of the present paper and proponents of the IAT is that, within the implicit prejudice
research program, it is perfectly possible for a citizen to be a Bayesian bigot-a bigot by
virtue of simply rationally processing available information in his or her society about
depressing patterns of covariation between race and socioeconomic outcomes. See
Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Commentary, No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response
to Arkes and Tetlock, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 279, 283-85 (2004); Tetlock & Arkes,
supra, at 319.
30 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1076 ("First, responding to discrimination
should be a constitutionally compelling interest regardless of whether explicit or implicit
bias actuates the discrimination. Those who argue otherwise must confront the science
that demonstrates the existence and real-world consequences of implicit bias. Given this
evidence, they bear the burden to show why these harms ... should be categorically
2006] 1031
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meaning to scores on the IAT that lack empirical justification. The IAT is an
arbitrary metric that sorts people along a dimension-reaction time-that
looks objective but lacks any objective connections to legally actionable
behavior. Thus, even if we grant that the IAT is a valid measure of implicit
associations between group categories and evaluative attitudes, IAT scores
remain meaningless until empirical studies link specific ranges of scores to
specific acts that objectively (or consensually) represent discrimination. To
date, this essential mapping task has not been undertaken. Yet, when claims
about the meaning of IAT studies are unpacked, they invariably imply that
particular scores on this arbitrary metric hold non-arbitrary social meaning
(e.g., IAT studies show strong implicit bias against the elderly or high levels
of implicit racism).
Scholars who blur this distinction violate a canonical scientific norm: the
injunction to separate factual from value judgments. Attributions of prejudice
inevitably rest on complex amalgams of factual and value assumptions, and it
is a mistake to suppose that, just because a select group of social
psychologists and law professors-with a self-declared agenda to transform
American law-announce the discovery of a new form of prejudice, the rest
of society is obliged to defer to their judgment. This is particularly true when
these academics have set their threshold for declaring people prejudiced so
low that the vast majority of the American population qualifies as bigoted by
blinking more frequently in the presence of a minority or by associating
elderly persons with positive traits milliseconds slower than they associate
young persons with positive traits.31 These social psychologists and legal
scholars are claiming, in effect, not only scientific expertise on factors that
sway human judgment but also the moral authority to determine where
society should draw the line between extremely subtle forms of "prejudice"
and behaviors that warrant no censure.
(b) Problems of Internal Validity: Researchers ignore alternative
explanations for alleged discriminatory behavior that conflict with the
implicit-prejudice hypothesis.
Implicit prejudice researchers rely entirely on correlational evidence to
find a relationship between implicit prejudice (as supposedly measured by
the IAT) and discrimination (as broadly defined by these researchers to
include awkward social interactions), and these correlational studies rarely
disregarded simply because their causes operate beneath our self-awareness." (footnotes
omitted)).
31 For a full description of the methods used in implicit prejudice research, see infra
Part II.B. For instructive comparisons of how sharp a departure this approach represents
from traditional prejudice research, as well as from common sense, see GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); RUPERT BROWN, PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1995); Peter Suedfeld, Commentary, Racism in the Brain; or is it Racism
on the Brain?, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 298 (2004).
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control for a variety of confounding factors that could explain the pattern of
results without assuming implicit prejudice or stereotypes at work. Indeed,
these studies fail to control for variables that, if causing the results reported,
would radically transform the moral meaning of test scores, raising the
possibility that, far from feeling deep-seated animus toward minorities,
subjects feel guilty about America's history of discrimination-feelings that
lead them to act in ways that are signs not of discrimination but rather
discomfort and shame.
(c) Problems of Statistical-Conclusion Validity: The IAT has serious
psychometric flaws and an alarmingly high false alarm rate.
Simple Bayesian analysis reveals that the modest correlation coefficients
that implicit prejudice researchers invoke to support their claims about the
pervasiveness of prejudice, coupled with the high failure rate on the test, are
bound to lead to many false accusations of implicit bigotry. This result is also
not surprising in view of the complex determinants of performance on the
IAT. IAT scores depend on reaction times to shifting combinations of stimuli
(e.g., Black + unpleasant, White + pleasant), with quicker reactions taken as
evidence of stronger associations between the stimuli, and these presumed
associations then treated as evidence of implicit biases for or against the
different groups represented by the stimuli. Psychometric studies have shown
that a host of factors other than association strength can affect reaction time
(e.g., cognitive flexibility, asymmetries in stimuli familiarity, and evaluation
apprehension), yet IAT researchers assume that different reaction times
signify only different attitudes and biases toward the stimuli.
(d) Problems of External Validity: Researchers suspend disbelief in
judging the real-world implications of laboratory results on implicit
prejudice.
Even if there were no doubt that implicit measures of prejudice capture
what they purport to measure and reliably predicted discriminatory behavior
in experimental studies, those eager to import this research into the law still
must establish that the correlations between IAT scores and discriminatory
conduct found in artificial laboratory settings reliably predict behavior in
real-world settings that often have institutionalized layers of safeguards
against the expression of prejudice. 32 Empirical tests validate these
32 See, e.g., Winfred Arthur, Jr. & Dennis Doverspike, Achieving Diversity and
Reducing Discrimination in the Workplace Through Human Resource Management
Practices: Implications of Research and Theory for Staffing, Training, and Rewarding
Performance, in DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
BASES 305 (Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella eds., 2005) (reviewing human
resources practices aimed at reducing discrimination); Sturm, supra note 1, at 489-522
(discussing organizational innovations to fight discrimination); U.S. Equal Employment
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safeguards as effective antidiscrimination measures, and, given the weak
relationships between IAT scores and discriminatory behavior under even
"ideal" laboratory conditions for eliciting discrimination, there is no reason
to believe that these safeguards will not be effective against discrimination
motivated by implicit biases.
In Part III, we flesh out these criticisms. But first, in Part II, we provide a
fuller description of psychological research on implicit prejudice and legal
scholarship that relies on this research. We then detail the numerous
problems of scientific validity that plague the research program and discuss
the conceptual confusions within this body of work that undercut its credence
both as legislative authority and litigation evidence. We conclude by
addressing the severe fact-value problems inherent in implicit prejudice
research and discussing how implicit extra-scientific values can blind
research communities to scientific questions that cast doubt on both factual
claims and policy recommendations.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE ACADEMIC MOVE FROM CONSCIOUS TO
UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. Terminology
To avoid unnecessary confusion, we pause to specify our intended
meanings for a variety of terms employed in legal and social scientific
discussions of discrimination. Although we provide common definitions of
the relevant psychological constructs and legal concepts, we claim no special
authority for our definitions. Most importantly, none of our criticisms of the
implicit prejudice research depends on the reader's acceptance of our
definitions. In our explication of the key psychological constructs, we follow
the lead of others who distinguish among the cognitive, affective, and
behavioral components of discrimination.
33
Opportunity Commission, Best Practices of Private Sector Employees,
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task-reports/prac2.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2006).
33 See John Duckitt, Prejudice and Intergroup Hostility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 559, 559 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2003) ("Social
psychologists have distinguished three distinct components of prejudice, or ways in
which negative intergroup attitudes can be expressed. These are negative stereotypes
(cognitive component), negative feelings (affective component), and negative behavioral
inclinations (behavioral component) toward outgroups."); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping,
Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357
(Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998) ("Following
one traditional division of attitudes, stereotyping is taken as the most cognitive
component, prejudice as the most affective component, and discrimination as the most
behavioral component of category-based reactions .... (citations omitted)).
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First, "bias" refers to systematic variation in judgmental tendencies
elicited by some attribute or property of a stimulus, such as a person's
membership in a particular group. For instance, memory for faces exhibits a
same-race bias: eyewitnesses more accurately recall same-race faces than
cross-race faces. 34
Bias may be implicit, in which case people do not recognize the biasing
influence of a stimulus on their judgment at the time of its operation, or
explicit, in which case people do recognize the biasing influence. 35 An
implicit cognitive bias, so defined, operates automatically, because it falls at
the time of judgment beyond conscious awareness or intentional control. 36
However, the antecedent conditions must be right for an implicit bias to be
automatically activated and then, in turn, to influence outward behavior. And
an implicit bias can suddenly become explicit if the social context alerts
people to the direction and magnitude of the bias, thereby making self-
correction possible. 37 Failure to appreciate these triggering and moderating
conditions can lead to alarming but ultimately groundless claims about the
prevalence and power of implicit biases. 38
Bias may be elicited by an objective attribute of a stimulus, such as the
physiognomy of a human face in the case of the same-race bias for facial
memory, or by inferences about the attributes of a stimulus drawn from
related stimuli, such as when group stereotypes influence judgments about
34 See Christian Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 3 (2001).
35 We mean here to track Greenwald's two definitions of unconscious: (1) processes
or stimuli outside of attention and (2) mental processes or events that escape accurate
introspection. See Anthony G. Greenwald, New Look 3: Unconscious Cognition
Reclaimed, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 766, 767 (1992).
36 See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being,
54 AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 463-64 (1999) (contrasting conscious and automatic mental
processes); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144 n.2 (2004) ("Typically,
psychological responses measured in research studies have been called 'implicit,'
'automatic,' or 'nonconscious' to the extent that at least one of the primary criteria-lack
of awareness, intention, or control-has been operational.").
37 See, e.g., Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles
for Persuasion Variables, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 323, 330-31 (Daniel
T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998); Philip E. Tetlock,
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on
the Political Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 293 (2000).
38 See infra Part III.
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individuals (e.g., this Republican will act like other Republicans). 39 Although
reliance on stereotypes can lead to biased beliefs and biased attributions
about members of social groups,40 such reliance can also sometimes satisfy
technical definitions of individual rationality (that is, stereotypes may have
predictive value, and stereotype-driven bias should not be conflated with
irrationality or animus).4
39 See Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella, An Introduction, in DISCRIMINATION
AT WORK, supra note 32, at 1 ("Stereotyping is used to refer to the cognitive biases
against outgroup members and includes not only attributions of traits to members of these
groups but also beliefs about these individuals."); Eliot R. Smith, Mental Representation
and Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 37, at 400
("Stereotypes have often been conceptualized as associative links between a node
representing a social group and various traits and/or evaluations."). The traditional
definition of stereotype emphasizes assimilation effects: the individual is assimilated to
the group. Recent work emphasizes that stereotypes may serve more generally as
standards for comparing individuals to groups; under this view, stereotypes can also lead
to contrast effects that generate counter-stereotypical responses to an individual. See
Monica Biemat, Toward a Broader View of Social Stereotyping, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1019
(2003).
40 See, e.g., Celina M. Chatman & William von Hippel, Attributional Mediation of
In-Group Bias, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 271 (2001) ("[W]e have shown
that Blacks and Whites are subject to in-group biases in their attributions for the behavior
of other Blacks and Whites and these attributions at least partially account for biased
evaluations of in-group and out-group members."); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1989) ("[M]any classic and contemporary theorists have suggested that
prejudice is an inevitable consequence of ordinary categorization (stereotyping)
processes." (citations omitted)).
41 The belief that stereotypes generally lead to erroneous judgments about targets
may itself be an erroneous stereotype about stereotypes, for research suggests that
surprisingly often "group stereotypes and perceptions of members of stereotyped groups
can be quite accurate," Clark R. McCauley et al., Stereotype Accuracy: Toward
Appreciating Group Differences, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY 293, 297 (Yueh-Ting Lee et
al. eds., 1995), and stereotype-driven responding can satisfy technical standards of
rationality when the stereotype provides better information than individualized
judgments. See Amy Farmer & Dek Terrell, Crime Versus Justice: Is There a Trade-Off?,
44 J.L. & ECON. 345, 345-46 (2001) ("Models of statistical discrimination show that
imperfect information regarding an individual's characteristics may lead people to use
group membership to assist in decision making."); Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D.
Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q.J. ECON. 767,
801 (2004) ("[W]hile we cannot rule out animus on the part of employers, we fred
evidence supporting a potential productivity-related statistical discrimination motive for
employers to base interview decisions on first names."); see also Fiske, supra note 33, at
375 ("Categorical reactions persist in part because they are cognitively useful. They also
persist because they are socially useful."). For example, using the race of a person
approaching on a dark street in a high crime area to predict that person's criminal
[Vol. 67:10231036
PERILS OF MINDREADING
Second, "prejudice" refers to a systematic affective or evaluative
response to a social group and its members. 42 Traditionally, prejudice
implied a negative attitude toward a particular group, but definitional
fashions change and some researchers have dropped animus as a necessary
feature of prejudice. 43 Thus, "benevolent sexism," a protective, paternalistic
attitude toward women, may be a form of prejudice under this revised
view.44 Prejudice, as we define it, is a special type of attitude reserved for
groups,45 and prejudicial attitudes may be implicit or explicit in the same
propensity may be rational if one's race-based stereotypes reflect true differences in base
rates of criminality across racial groups. Nevertheless, lawmakers may choose to forbid
use of such base rate information on grounds that discrimination contributed to these base
rates or that the law favors particularized judgments about people, or that the costs of
using stereotypes outweigh the benefits. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 781, 790-96 (1994). A sizable segment of the citizenry directs moral outrage at
those who use forbidden (race-charged) base rates and display signs of guilt and desire to
engage in moral cleansing when they discover that they have inadvertently used such
base rates by relying on predictor variables that later prove to be correlated with, and thus
contaminated by, the base rates. See Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the
Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals,
78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 853, 863-64 (2000).
42 Cf Dipboye & Colella, supra note 39, at 1 ("We refer to prejudice as the
attitudinal and especially the affective biases that exist with regard to members of groups
other than those to which one belongs."); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 829, 829 (2001) ("Prejudice
is commonly defined as an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person
perceived to be a member of that group.").
43 See Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-Suppression Model of
the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 414-15 (2003)
(noting that positive prejudice may exist but that negative prejudice remains dominant
and more problematic); see also JOHN DUCKITr, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE
17 (1992) ("Because the idea of prejudice as a bad and unjustified attitude has always
been an essentially subjective value judgment, prejudice has never actually been
operationalized and measured in that way."). In addition, the current view is that
prejudice need not arise from false or inaccurate beliefs about a social group. See
Crandall & Eshleman, supra, at 414; see also BROWN, supra note 31, at 6-8.
44See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and
Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM.
PSYCHOL. 109, 116 (2001) ("Although sexist antipathy is the most obvious form of
prejudice against women, our evidence suggests that sexist benevolence may also play a
significant role in justifying gender inequality.").
45 We define attitude as a "psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a
particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor." Alice H. Eagly & Shelly
Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 37, at 269; accord Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A Unified Theory of Implicit
Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept, 109 PSYCHOL. REv. 3, 5 (2002)
("An attitude is the association of a social object or social group concept with a valence
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way that cognitive bias may be implicit or explicit.
Third, "discrimination" refers to the behavioral consequences of a group
bias (typically in the form of a group stereotype) or a prejudice toward a
particular group.46 Under this expansive psychological definition, any
behavioral consequence of group bias or prejudice counts as discrimination.
It is worth noting though that the current legal definition of discrimination is
much narrower. 47 Courts typically require that the adverse action against the
plaintiff rise above what Dean White calls "de minimis" discrimination.48
attribute concept."); see also Eagly & Chaiken, supra, at 270 ("[A]ttitudes toward
minority groups are often called prejudice, especially if these attitudes are negative.").
46 Cf Dipboye & Colella, supra note 39, at 2 ("Discrimination refers to the unfair
behavioral biases demonstrated against [outgroup members]."); Fiske, supra note 33, at
374-75 ("In all likelihood, there are two kinds of discrimination to document .... [These
include] 'hot discrimination,' based on disgust, resentment, hostility, and anger. .. [and]
'cold discrimination,' based on stereotypes of an outgroup's interests, knowledge, and
motivations.").
47 In addition to law's narrower definition of discrimination, constitutional and
statutory limits on the scope of protection provided by antidiscrimination law further
shrink the class of acts that qualify as illegal discrimination compared to the class of acts
that qualify as psychological discrimination. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)
(defining covered employers to be persons "engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year").
We recognize that legal conceptions of discrimination vary, see generally George
Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117 (1995), but we
employ here fairly standard definitions from employment law. Arguably, under current
law, disparate treatment claims can encompass acts of discrimination caused by
conscious and unconscious influences of a target's protected characteristic(s). See, e.g.,
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 294 (1997) ("In defining intentional discrimination, the
question is not what the particular decisionmaker subjectively intended, but whether the
record allows for an inference that an impermissible factor such as race served as the
impetus for the challenged action." (footnote omitted)); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as
Accident, 74 INn. L.J. 1129, 1138-39 (1999) (Disparate treatment can "narrowly denote a
form of scienter-an actor's conscious awareness of his reasons for acting. But it can also
be used more broadly to refer to a causal link between a mental influence ... and the
outcome of a decision." (footnote omitted)).
48 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Workplace Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 623, 655 (2005) ("To prevail on a claim of disparate treatment, a plaintiff typically
must identify a particular decision maker who has taken a 'materially adverse'
employment action against her, and she must prove intent to discriminate, frequently
construed as conscious bias or animus, on the part of the decision maker." (footnotes
omitted)). For a critical analysis of the "de minimis discrimination" concept as it has
developed within employment discrimination law, see Rebecca Harmer White, De
Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998). White argues that, in cases of direct
employer liability, "[e]mployer policies that distinguish between and among workers
based on race or sex are within the scope of [Title VII], regardless of how trivial or de
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Thus, many subtle acts by managers or co-workers that psychologists would
label discriminatory do not rise to the level of illegal discrimination unless
accompanied by some tangible effect or unless they cumulatively create a
hostile work environment. 49
minimis such discrimination may seem. But when vicarious, not direct, liability is at
issue, there is a de minimis threshold." Id. at 1191. As Dean White notes, however, many
courts do not follow her prescription and, indeed, the trend seems to be toward expansion
of the de minimis exclusion. See id. at 1122, 1143; see also Rosalie Berger Levinson,
Parsing the Meaning of "Adverse Employment Action" in Title VII Disparate Treatment,
Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?,
56 OKLA. L. REv. 623, 623 n.3 (2003) ("The cases discussed in this Article suggest that
courts, even within the so-called 'expansive' and 'intermediate' circuits, are issuing
decisions that reflect a restrictive view as to what harms are actionable both in the context
of retaliation and disparate treatment claims."). For examples from the case law, see
Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Congress did not intend Title VII
to provide redress for trivial discomforts endemic to employment."); Holt v. Morgan, 79
F. App'x 139, 141 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A performance evaluation that is lower than an
employee feels is warranted is not an adverse employment action sufficient to state a
claim of discrimination."); Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Ministry, 98 F. App'x
8, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Neither declining to discipline a support-staff member nor
depriving someone of office supplies is a 'tangible employment action evidenced by
firing, failing to promote, a considerable change in benefits, or reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities."' (citation omitted)); see also Keeton v. Flying J,
Inc., 429 F.3d 259, 263 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The terms 'tangible employment action' and
'adverse employment action' are interchangeable.").
Subjecting a plaintiff to a hostile work environment constitutes discrimination even
if it does not result in other, tangible changes in employment conditions. See Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (holding that severe or pervasive sexual
harassment may constitute an actionable change in employment conditions under Title
VII). However, employers can invoke the affirmative defense set out in Ellerth if the
harassment does not result in tangible employment action against the harassed employee.
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). And not all harassment
creates an illegal, hostile work environment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 788 (1998) ("A recurring point in [our] opinions is that 'simple teasing,'
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment."' (citation omitted)).
49 See Dolly Chugh, Societal and Managerial Implications of Implicit Social
Cognition: Why Milliseconds Matter, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 203, 209 (2004) ("[A]n almost
uncountable number of micro-behaviors may affect the actual fairness of how an
individual is treated after being granted the opportunity to be employed, or be schooled,
or be treated, or be tried."). To be sure, some legal scholars have argued for a broadening
of the legal definition of discrimination, see, e.g., Green, supra note 48, at 684 ("I have
purposefully pushed our conception of law beyond legal rights to explore alternatives for
combating some of the more subtle, ongoing forms of discrimination that operate
alongside those that are traditionally recognized."), but courts remain "reluctant to define
subtle discrimination as unlawful discrimination .... " Michael Selmi, Subtle
Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 657, 659 (2003). Cf Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 17-18 ("These features of disparate
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In our view, bias, prejudice, and discrimination are best treated as
distinct psychological constructs: one may process information about a
member of an out-group in a cognitively biased manner, but this biased
processing need not definitively determine one's personal attitude or
behavior toward the target. For instance, sex stereotypes may lead an
employer to assume that a woman is more likely than a man to have an
interest in child-rearing, but this belief bias does not necessarily have
positive or negative attitudinal or behavioral implications. The employer
might conclude that women are more emotionally supportive and better team
players or that women are more easily distracted by family demands.
Likewise, prejudice toward a group may operate independently of one's
stereotype about that group.50 Finally, a target's membership in a particular
group may trigger cognitive bias and prejudice but not discriminatory
behavior if other psychological processes or situational conditions override
the bias and prejudice. Of course, although these constructs can be logically
separated, they remain empirically connected: stereotypes can, and
sometimes do, reinforce prejudicial attitudes; prejudices can, and sometimes
do, prevent interactions with out-group members that could falsify
stereotypic beliefs and thereby facilitate biased assimilation of new
information to existing stereotypes; and stereotypes and prejudices can, and
sometimes do, have discriminatory behavioral consequences. 51 These
connections are, however, far from automatic. Much hinges, as we shall see,
on the organizational context within which the actors are embedded. 52
impact doctrine make it a poor tool for addressing discrimination that does its work
through an accumulation of small moments of perception and evaluation." (footnote
omitted)).
50 See Fiske, supra note 33, at 372-74 (discussing the role of intergroup relations,
threat, and emotion in prejudice).
51 See Brad J. Bushman & Angelica M. Bonacci, You've Got Mail: Using E-Mail to
Examine the Effect of Prejudiced Attitudes on Discrimination Against Arabs, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 753, 754 (2004) ("Once social categorization occurs,
prejudice, and discrimination are more likely to follow."); Scott Plous, The Psychology of
Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination: An Overview, in UNDERSTANDING
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 3, 5 (Scott Plous ed., 2003) ("[P]rejudice, stereotyping,
and discrimination are distinct from one another, even though in daily life they often
occur together."); Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Prejudice and Stereotype Maintenance
Processes: Attention, Attribution, and Individuation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 607, 607 (2005) ( "[A] central theme in social psychological theory has been
that stereotyping promotes prejudice and that prejudice reduction depends on stereotype
change.").
52 See infra Part III.D.
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B. The Implicit Prejudice Research Program
Two themes dominate the history of social psychological research on
intergroup conflict: (a) continual adjustment of measures and standards for
assessing the prevalence of intergroup hostility53 and (b) constant revision of
the psychological explanations for the sources of intergroup hostility. For the
second theme, the focus has shifted with prevailing intellectual fashions from
psychodynamic theories to social-identity theories to cognitive-bias theories
to the recent fascination with reaction-time-based associationist theories. 54
The implicit prejudice research program falls into the reaction-time-based
associationist theoretical camp.
Following passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, overt
expressions of racism declined significantly, but large disparities in group
outcomes persisted. 55 This disjunction led many racism researchers to
suspect that intergroup hostility persisted but had begun manifesting itself in
more disguised, socially acceptable, forms. 56  Accordingly, these
53 See Markus Brauer et al., Implicit and Explicit Components of Prejudice, 4 REv.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 79, 79 (2000) ("For more than 70 years, social psychologists have been
concerned with the measurement of prejudice toward out-groups .... Although the basic
goal has remained the same, measurement techniques have changed considerably over the
years."); see also Suedfeld, supra note 31, at 298-300 (providing a historical summary of
measurement techniques used in prejudice research).
54 See DUCIrTT, supra note 43, at 43 ("Many theories have been proposed to explain
the causation of prejudice .... Unfortunately, these developments have not brought
much clarification to the overall question of the causation of prejudice. The list of
possible causes, and the complexity of the problem, seems to have increased rather than
decreased."); see also Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought
and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 117, 118-23 (2004)
(discussing the evolution of psychological explanations for prejudice).
55 See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection
Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Sci. 315, 315 (2000) ("In part because of
changing norms and the Civil Rights Act and other legislative interventions that have
made discrimination not simply immoral but also illegal, overt expressions of prejudice
have declined significantly over the past 35 years." (citation omitted)).
56 See id. ("Discrimination, however, continues to exist and affect the lives of people
of color and women in significant ways. What accounts for this discrepancy? One
possibility is that it represents a change in the nature of racial prejudice. Contemporary
forms of prejudice may be less conscious and more subtle than the overt, traditional
form." (citations omitted)); David 0. Sears & P.J. Henry, Over Thirty Years Later: A
Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism, 37 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
95 (2005) ("This is the problem that has animated our own research agenda: how to
understand White's continuing resistance to efforts to increase racial equality despite
much evidence that in some measurable ways their racial attitudes have become
substantially liberalized.").
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psychologists developed less obtrusive methods for measuring racism and
reconsidered the psychological mechanisms that lead to discrimination. 57
The first wave of research into new forms of racism employed indirect
measures that inferred racism from the policies and practices that people
supported, on the theory that subtle racism was most likely to be expressed in
situations where a nonracial justification was available. 58 Much of this new
work using less obtrusive methods was taken to confirm the researchers'
suspicions that racism remained widespread, if less obvious in its expression,
and that racism was "rooted in normal, often adaptive, psychological
processes, ' 59 rather than abnormal psychological processes.
This first wave of research into modem racism proved controversial,
however, because many of these indirect measures of racism equated
endorsement of a conservative ideology with racist opposition to various
liberal policies.60 For instance, opposition to affirmative action and school
busing for integration purposes were originally taken as evidence of
"symbolic racism," without first eliminating conservative, non-racist
principles and values as the true motivation.61 Also, because these indirect
57 See BROWN, supra note 31, at 217 ("The observation that levels of overt prejudice
were falling whilst other forms of discrimination were continuing has stimulated a
number of new conceptualizations of prejudice over the past 20 years.").
58 See Dovidio, supra note 42, at 835 ("Because aversive racists consciously endorse
egalitarian values, they will not discriminate directly and openly in ways that can be
attributed to racism; however, because of their negative feelings they will discriminate,
often unintentionally, when their behavior can be justified on the basis of some factor
other than race (e.g., questionable qualifications for a position).").
59 Id. at 834.
60 For a full discussion of this problem and others with indirect measures of racism,
see generally Paul M. Sniderman & Philip E. Tetlock, Symbolic Racism: Problems of
Motive Attribution in Political Analysis, 42 J. Soc. ISSUES 129 (1986) [hereinafter
Sniderman & Tetlock, Symbolic Racism]; Paul M. Sniderman & Philip E. Tetlock,
Reflections on American Racism, 42 J. Soc. ISSUES 173 (1986); Philip E. Tetlock,
Political Psychology or Politicized Psychology: Is the Road to Scientific Hell Paved with
Good Moral Intentions?, 15 POL. PSYCHOL. 509 (1994). But see generally Sears &
Henry, supra note 56 (responding to these criticisms).
61 In partial recognition of the validity of this criticism, items confounding possible
conservative opposition to government action with racism have been dropped from the
latest version of the symbolic racism scale. Sears & Henry, supra note 56, at 115. Even
these revised scales are still bedeviled, however, by the "Bill Cosby" problem: one can
get high scores by virtue of endorsing the well-known African-American actor's concerns
about the decline of traditional family and work values in Black communities. For
example, strong agreement with the first two items in the scale ((1)"It's really a matter of
some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as
well off as whites[,]" and (2) "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same") is scored as evidence of
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measures still required public acts or self-reports of conscious attitudes and
beliefs with racial overtones, some remained skeptical that these new
techniques could accurately measure underlying racial hostilities--either
because of impression management or lack of conscious access to the
thought processes that may drive intergroup hostility.62 Accordingly,
researchers sought ever more ingenious ways of measuring racism that would
avoid the problems of social-desirability contamination and unreliable
introspection.63
symbolic racism. See David 0. Sears & P.J. Henry, Symbolic Racism Scale,
http://condor.depaul.edu/-phenryl/SR2Kinstructions.htm (providing the Symbolic
Racism 2000 scale and scoring instructions) (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); see also
Vincent L. Hutchings & Nicholas A. Valentino, The Centrality of Race in American
Politics, 6-7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 383, 391-92 (2004). When prominent civil rights
advocates are logically fated to fail alleged tests of racism, it is not unreasonable to
suspect the problem may lie with the tests.
62 See Brauer et al., supra note 53, at 80 ("Even these more subtle measures,
however, seemed to many researchers too vulnerable to self-presentation."); T. ANDREW
POEHLMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST: Il. META-
ANALYSIS OF PREDICTIVE VALIDITY 6 (2005) (manuscript on file with authors) ("Many
researchers have argued that subjects' desire to provide socially desirable responses
results in inaccurate answers on self-report questionnaires .... In contrast, because IAT
measures resist faking, they may be able to predict criterion measures equally well in
socially sensitive and non-sensitive domains." (citations omitted)).
63 Another popular approach in the first wave of research on "modem racism" was
the "bogus pipeline." In these studies, subjects are led to believe that they are to be
hooked up to a machine that can take physiological measurements that will reveal their
true attitudes toward minorities. In the guise of providing responses that can be used to
validate the machine's operation, subjects are then given the key measures of racial
attitudes, on the theory that subjects will have a motive to be truthful or their deception
will be revealed by the machine's measurements (hence, the ruse was thought to provide
a "bogus pipeline" into true thoughts). The responses of these treatment subjects are then
compared to the responses of a control group, with any negative difference in racial
attitudes in the treatment group being taken as evidence of racism. See Edward E. Jones
& Harold Sigall, The Bogus Pipeline: A New Paradigm for Measuring Affect and
Attitude, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 349 (1971) (first presenting the methodology). For a review
and evaluation of this line of research, see Neal J. Roese & David W. Jamieson, Twenty
Years of Bogus Pipeline Research: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 114 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 363 (1993). Fazio and colleagues later went so far as to declare their affective-
priming measure to be "a bona fide pipeline" into subjects' minds superior to explicit
measures of attitudes-a claim that Fazio subsequently amended and admitted had led to
confusion. Compare Russell H. Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation as an
Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013, 1025 (1995) ("The priming procedure appears to provide a bona
fide pipeline for attitude measurement."), with Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 304 n.2
(noting that the claims of Fazio et al. caused confusion about whether implicit or explicit
measures tap into "real attitudes" and stating that by referring to implicit measures as
10432006]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
These efforts culminated in the second, and most recent, wave of
research into modem racism using sophisticated techniques designed to
reveal the subconscious processes that drive racism. These methods seek to
overcome the subject's motivation to obfuscate and inability to report on
mental states by gaining access to the inner workings of the mind via
examination of uncontrolled by-products of mental processes, such as
physiological indicators, micro-movements of the face, and reaction times.64
The two most popular methods of "implicit measurement" of intergroup
attitudes are affective-priming procedures and tests of implicit association,65
with the latter now the dominant method for studying implicit stereotypes
and prejudice. 66 Both methods are designed to examine natural associations
between groups and positively- and negatively-valenced terms to determine
implicit attitudes.67
In the affective-priming approach, subjects are exposed to an attitude
object (the "prime") and then to an evaluative adjective (the "target") that
"bona fide" Fazio et al. meant "to indicate that any automatic attitude activation occurs
farther upstream than the overt response to an explicit measure.").
64 See, e.g., David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signals for the Detection of
Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCl. 88 (2004); Eric J. Vanman et al., Racial
Discrimination by Low-Prejudiced Whites: Facial Movements as Implicit Measures of
Attitudes Related to Behavior, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 711 (2004). Whereas the first wave used
unobtrusive measures "to assess attitudes, beliefs, and values of which people are aware,
but that they may be unwilling to reveal to the investigator," the second wave used
"implicit methods ... to assess attitudes, beliefs, and values of which people are
unaware." John F. Kihlstrom, Implicit Methods in Social Psychology, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 195, 196 (Carol Sansone et al. eds.,
2004). "Response latency measures, which yield evaluations that are unlikely to be
controlled, have been heralded because they override the obvious problem of distortion."
Laurie A. Rudman, Sources ofImplicit Attitudes, 13 CuRRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI.
79, 79 (2004).
Implicit measurement techniques supposedly reveal information about mental
representations of race. In contrast, neuropsychological techniques, such as brain scans,
seek to reveal the physiological bases of psychological and social reactions to racial
stimuli. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181 (2005).
65 "Most of the [implicit measurement] research that has been conducted has
concerned either various forms of priming or the [Implicit Assocation Test]." Fazio &
Olson, supra note 5, at 300.
66 See id. at 298 ("Probably the most well-known implicit measurement technique is
the Implicit Association Test .... ).
67 In studies examining implicit stereotypes, researchers study natural associations
between social groups and stereotypic traits, and, in studies examining implicit
prejudices, researchers study natural associations between social groups and evaluative
terms or affect-laden concepts.
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subjects are to categorize as good or bad as quickly as possible. 68 A subject's
response latency in performing the categorization task is taken as a measure
of strength of association between the prime and the target, with faster
responses indicating stronger association. For instance, in the context of a
racism study, a subject might be primed with pictures of faces of different
races followed by positive and negative target adjectives that must be
categorized as either "good" or "bad." Slower reaction times in labeling
positive adjectives following an African-American prime is taken as
evidence of an implicit negative attitude toward African-Americans; so too is
faster reaction time in labeling negative traits.
69
In the Implicit Association Test, or IAT, subjects must pair target
concepts with evaluatively charged concepts and then categorize stimuli as
falling into one of the competing categories as quickly as possible. As with
the priming approach, response latencies serve as the measure of strength of
association between these paired concepts.70 The guiding idea is that we
should be able to respond more quickly for items that we associate naturally
(e.g., civil procedure + boring, White + pleasant) than those we do not (e.g.,
civil procedure + exciting, Black + pleasant). 71 For example, studies of
68 See, e.g., Fazio et al., supra note 63, at 1013 (describing the basic priming
procedure).
69 Or as Fazio and colleagues explain:
If the face (prime) automatically activated evaluations from memory, responding in
the adjective connotation task should be affected differently for positive versus
negative adjectives. Inferences regarding the participant's attitude toward the
individuals represented in the photographs can be drawn from the pattern of
facilitation. Relatively greater facilitation on negative than positive adjectives when
those adjectives are preceded by Black faces than when they are preceded by White
faces would be indicative of a more negative attitude toward Blacks.
Id. at 1015.
70 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., supra note 5, at 1464-66 (describing the basic
implicit association technique); see also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., supra note 45, at 8
("The usefulness of the IAT in measuring association strength depends on the assumption
that when the two concepts that share a response are strongly associated, the sorting task
is considerably easier than when the two response-sharing concepts are either weakly
associated or bipolar-opposed."). Error rates are also taken into account in judging
performance on the IAT. For detailed instructions on use of the IAT, see Anthony G.
Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: 1. An Improved
Scoring Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003). Demonstration
versions of the IAT can be found online at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last
visited Sept. 28, 2006).
71 See C. Miguel Brendl et al., How Do Indirect Measures of Evaluation Work?
Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice in the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 760, 761 (2001) ("The IAT is an ingenious use of response competition
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implicit racism use some form of the race IAT: subjects first view a set of
stimuli with racial connotations (e.g., faces or names associated with
different races) that they must categorize as "White" or "Black" by pressing
the left or right key on their keyboard as quickly as possible and then view a
set of words with positive or negative connotations (e.g., sickness, death,
freedom, paradise) that they must categorize as "pleasant" or "unpleasant."
Subjects also participate in trials in which they must pair racial and
attitudinal stimuli into composite categories. In one trial, the stimuli must be
sorted between White + pleasant and Black + unpleasant, and in another trial
the stimuli must be sorted between reversed pairings. If subjects take longer
to sort stimuli into the reversed pairings of target and evaluative concepts
(White + unpleasant, Black + pleasant), this greater response latency is taken
to be evidence of pre-existing implicit associations.72
Because the IAT and affective-priming studies test associations between
social groups and terms having positive and negative evaluative content,
researchers contend that these implicit measurements reveal underlying
implicit prejudices and not simply implicit stereotypic associations.73 Thus,
designed to measure attitudes indirectly." (citation omitted)); Marco Perugini, Predictive
Models of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes, 44 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 30 (2005) ("[The
IAT] relies on the assumption that, if a target concept and an attribute dimension are
highly associated (congruent), the task will be easier, and, therefore, quicker when they
share the same response key than when they require a different response key.").
72 Or as Greenwald and colleagues explain:
Black + pleasant should be easier than White + pleasant if there is a stronger
association between Black Americans and pleasant meaning than between White
Americans and pleasant meaning. If the preexisting associations are opposite in
direction-which might be expected for White subjects raised in a culture imbued
with pervasive residues of a history of anti-Black discrimination--the subject should
find White + pleasant to be easier.
Greenwald et al., supra note 5, at 1465; see also Perugini, supra note 71, at 30 ("An IAT
score is computed as a function of the difference of the mean response times between the
two versions of the combined task. Thus, for instance, respondents will generally be
quicker to associate flowers with pleasant, compared to flowers with unpleasant (or,
conversely, will be slower to associate insects with pleasant, compared to insects with
unpleasant), therefore, revealing a positive implicit attitude towards flowers relative to
insects .... (citation omitted)).
73 The studies can be fashioned, however, to test solely for stereotypic associations,
by substituting stereotypic traits for the evaluative concepts. See Laurie A. Rudman et al.,
Measuring the Automatic Components of Prejudice: Flexibility and Generality of the
Implicit Association Test, 17 SOC. COGNITiON 437, 439-40 (1999) ("In prejudice or
stereotyping research, [IAT] subjects categorize ingroup and outgroup tokens (target
concepts), along with stimuli representing the poles of an attribute dimension. To assess
implicit prejudice, the attribute dimension is evaluative and consists of pleasant versus
unpleasant words .... To assess implicit stereotypes, the attribute dimension consists of
stereotypic and nonstereotypic words." (citations omitted)); id. at 440 ("By varying the
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because both the IAT and priming studies employ extremely sensitive
measures of response speed, a differential in response times of just
milliseconds can be taken as proof of an implicit prejudice toward a
particular social group. 74
Four primary findings from the implicit prejudice research program have
energized antidiscrimination law scholars: according to this research: (1)
implicit prejudice is pervasive; (2) implicit prejudice is distinct from explicit
prejudice; (3) implicit prejudice typically operates beyond conscious control;
and (4) implicit prejudice produces discriminatory behavior.75
First, in a short period, a tremendous amount of data has been collected
showing that people generally respond more quickly when pairing referents
to relatively advantaged groups within the U.S. (White, wealthy, healthy,
young, heterosexual, Christian, American) with positive adjective terms and
referents to relatively disadvantaged groups (non-White, poor, overweight,
aged, homosexual, non-Christian, foreign) with negative adjective terms. 76
This pattern holds across social groups: not only do members of dominant
groups show alleged in-group preferences, but members of disadvantaged
ingroup and outgroup identities, the IAT is easily configured to assess a wide variety of
implicit attitudes and stereotypes.").
74 See Chugh, supra note 49, at 208 ("[I]t is worth noting that the difference between
an implicit pro-white bias and an implicit pro-black bias can be as little as 50 ms.").
75 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 7-9 (discussing findings of automatic
implicit prejudice toward several minority groups in even self-identified egalitarians and
experimental research showing linkages between implicit prejudice and behavior); Kang,
supra note 16, at 1512-14 (discussing finding of pervasive bias operating automatically,
dissociation of explicit and implicit bias, and "persuasive evidence that implicit bias
against a social category ... predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to
that category"); Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1071 ("Most fundamental is the
pervasive, replicable, and sometimes large effects of implicit bias .... Implicit bias has
consequences in the daily activities of our lives.").
76 See, e.g., William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism:
Revisiting the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332,
1334 (2004) ("[I]mplicit preferences have been found for White over Black Americans,
straight over gay, Christian over Jewish, young over old, and American over Soviet"
(citations omitted)); Wade C. Rowatt et al., Patterns and Personality Correlates of
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Christians and Muslims, 44 J. FOR ScI. STUDY OF
RELIGION 29, 39 (2005) ("Christians' implicit and explicit evaluations of the in-group
(i.e., Christian) are more favorable than their implicit and explicit evaluations of the out-
group (i.e., Muslim)."); Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and
Society: The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129,
130 (2004) (noting, in addition to race and age prejudice, evidence of "a similar pattern
for prejudices based on religion, physical appearance, and socioeconomic class, as well
as sexual orientation" (citations omitted)). Greenwald and Krieger summarize data from a
wide variety of IATs. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit
Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 957-58 (2006).
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groups allegedly prefer dominant out-groups.77 This widespread pattern of
stronger positive associations with advantaged groups and stronger negative
associations with disadvantaged groups seems to signal alarming levels of
implicit prejudice within the American public, 78 in stark contrast to the
decreasing levels of explicit prejudice found in public opinion surveys.79
It is worth noting, however, that other measures fail to find such
overwhelming implicit prejudice. For instance, the affective-priming
approach "reveals negativity [toward Blacks] in 50 to 60% of White college
students, but prejudiced IAT scores are found in 70 to 90% of Whites." 80
Also, noticeably absent from the list of implicit prejudices revealed by
IAT research is implicit male prejudice against women. Although "women
strongly prefer female gender when response latency techniques are used,
men typically show neutral gender attitudes." 8' Both men and women show a
pro-in-group bias in their stereotypic associations (e.g., both men and women
more strongly associate their in-group with competence as a trait), but for
men these stereotypic associations do not translate into negative implicit
77 Dasgupta, supra note 36, at 149 (noting that "a number of studies reveal outgroup
favoritism (or sometimes, less ingroup favoritism) in the case of disadvantaged groups,
especially when people's attitudes and beliefs are assessed using indirect measures rather
than self-report measures").
78 "Recognition of the pervasiveness of implicit bias lends support to a structural
approach to antidiscrimination law." Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 10.
79 Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 76, at 955 ("[T]he IAT measures consistently
revealed greater bias in favor of the relatively advantaged group (averaging almost three-
quarters of respondents across all the topics) than did the explicit measures (for which an
average of slightly over one-third of respondents showed bias favoring advantaged
groups)."); Rudman, supra note 76, at 130 ("[I]f researchers were to rely solely on self-
report measures, they would be tempted to conclude that prejudice has become, if not
outdated, at least unfashionable .... However, this does not mean that the problem of
bigotry has been solved, for when attitudes are measured using methods that do not rely
on respondents' willingness or ability to report their opinions, the persistence of prejudice
and stereotypes is routinely exposed." (citations omitted)).
80 Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Relations Between Implicit Measures of
Prejudice: What Are We Measuring?, 14 PSYCHOL. Scd. 636, 636 (2003) (citations
omitted).
81 Laurie A. Rudman & Stephanie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic
In-Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More Than Men Like Men?, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 494-95 (2004) (citations omitted). That is, women
are "implicitly sexist," but men are not. Id. at 495. However, Rudman and Kilianski did
find evidence in both men and women of implicit prejudice toward female authorities.
See Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward
Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1315, 1324-26 (2000).
1048 [Vol. 67:1023
PERILS OF MINDREADING
attitudes toward women. 82 "The fact that women show stronger automatic in-
group bias than men is provocative, because it suggests a reversal of sexism
at the implicit level."'83
Second, an individual's scores on implicit and explicit measures of
prejudice often diverge, suggesting that many people who consciously define
and express themselves as egalitarians may nevertheless be implicit bigots.84
It is this disjunction between conscious and unconscious attitudes that often
elicits the most discomfort and disbelief among subjects, causing subjects to
question the validity of the IAT. 85 And i1 is also this disjunction that makes
pervasive implicit prejudice so alarming from a legal perspective, because
implicit prejudice is not just hidden from public view-it is hidden from our
own personal introspection as well. If implicit prejudice operates
independently of explicit prejudice, then we can no longer use direct or
circumstantial evidence of intentional conduct as a good indicator of
prejudice, but we must instead delve into the inner workings of the mind
using the IAT or some other means of implicit measurement. 86
82 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who's in Charge? Effects of
Situational Roles on Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES 493 (2001). Rudman and
Goodwin unconfounded gender attitudes from stereotypic beliefs in a series of IAT
studies and found that men's "in-group bias is surprisingly frail and that women's in-
group bias is particularly strong at the implicit level." Rudman & Goodwin, supra note
81, at 506. "[O]ur experiments suggest that in the absence of specific power
manipulations, women strongly implicitly prefer their own gender, whereas men do not."
Id.
83 Rudman & Goodwin, supra note 81, at 508.
84 See Greenwald et al., supra note 5, at 1477 ("It is clear that these implicit-explicit
correlations should be taken not as evidence for convergence among different methods of
measuring attitudes but as evidence for divergence of the constructs represented by
implicit versus explicit attitude measures."); Rudman et al., supra note 73, at 461
("Consistent with prior research, the IAT and self-report measures ... were weakly or
unreliably related to one another, indicating that the two types of methods assess
independent constructs." (citations omitted)).
85 See Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., The First Ontological Challenge to the IAT:
Attitude or Mere Familiarity?, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 238, 239 (2003) (describing subject
reactions to the racial IAT). This surprising finding may also partially explain the
popularity of the IAT method among researchers. See Allen R. McConnell & Jill M.
Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and
Explicit Measures of Racial Prejudice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 436
(2001) ("Social psychologists who study group prejudice have been drawn to the IAT
because of its large effect size and because even people who know that the IAT assesses
group prejudice still reliably produce the IAT effect, indicating its robustness and
apparent imperviousness." (citations omitted)).
86 See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing the proof problems presented
by implicit bias and prejudice); see also Jason A. Nier, How Dissociated Are Implicit and
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Unfortunately, for purposes of clarity, we shall soon discover that the degree
to which implicit and explicit attitudes overlap remains a point of
considerable uncertainty. 87
Third, and related to the second point, "[i]mplicit attitudes ... are
disengaged from conscious thought and are unlikely to shift in response to
the willful call for change." 88 Nevertheless, even minor alterations in the
implicit association testing situation can lead to significant changes in IAT
response patterns, 89 and implicit attitudes have been shown to change in
response to a variety of interventions.9" In addition, motivation to control
Explicit Racial Attitudes? A Bogus Pipeline Approach, 8 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 39, 49 (2005) (suggesting that the dissociation between implicit
and explicit measures of social group attitudes is due to shortcomings in explicit
measures and that implicit measures more accurately capture these attitudes by avoiding
social desirability response problems).
87 See Kurt A. Boniecki & Julia Zuwerink Jacks, The Elusive Relationship Between
Measures of Implicit and Explicit Prejudice, 26 REPRESENTATIVE RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1,
2 (2002) ("The degree to which implicit and explicit prejudice are related has been a
matter of some debate."); Timothy D. Wilson & Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self-Knowledge: Its
Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 493, 502 (2004)
("[M]any studies have found low correlations between explicit and implicit measures of
attitudes, though some have found higher degrees of correspondence." (citations
omitted)).
88 Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth Is also True: Homage to Koan
#7, in PERSPECTIVISM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 127, 135 (John T. Jost et al. eds., 2004);
see also Robyn K. Mallett et al., What Intergroup Relations Research Can Tell Us About
Coalition Building, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C. R. & SOC. JUST. 5, 10-11 (2005) ("[I]mplicit
prejudice is an attitude that we are often unaware that we hold, we cannot consciously
examine, and that is largely out of our conscious control." (footnote omitted)). For
concerns about the validity of the assumption that conscious knowledge does not
influence implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT, see infra note 236.
89 See Banaji, supra note 88, at 135 ("I was unprepared for data that showed that the
influence that minor variations in social situations, such as the presence or absence of a
person, can play in defining the attitude object itself-the different construals possible of
seemingly the same attitude object."); see also Devine, supra note 4, at 758 ("[I]t is clear
that context manipulations produce replicable patterns of moderation of implicit biases.").
90 See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit
Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837
(2001) ("Five experiments provided compelling evidence for the moderating influence of
mental imagery on implicit stereotypes."); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald,
On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images
of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806
(2001) ("Although automatic attitudes have been previously conceptualized as relatively
immutable, the present research provides new evidence suggesting that automatic
preference and prejudice may indeed be malleable." (citations omitted)); Tiffany A. Ito et
al., The Influence of Facial Feedback on Race Bias, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 256, 259 (2006)
("The present research demonstrates that repeatedly viewing Black faces while being
surreptitiously induced to smile diminishes implicit racial bias."); Laurie A. Rudman et
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prejudice can lead to correction of automatic attitudes,91 and social-cognitive
goals appear to mediate the types of associations automatically brought to
mind.92 As with the relation between explicit and implicit prejudice, we are
not dealing with settled science here: the degree to which implicit attitudes
operate automatically and consistently across contexts is a source of
controversy among researchers and we return to these issues when we
discuss the external validity of implicit-prejudice research.93
Fourth, implicit prejudice manifests itself in acts of discrimination, at
least under some conditions. 94 Although very few studies have examined the
relation between implicit prejudice and "macro-level" behaviors (e.g.,
discrimination in employment decisions), a greater number of studies have
demonstrated a correlation between implicit prejudice and "micro-level"
behaviors (e.g., body posture and other forms of nonverbal conduct in the
presence of a minority). 95 A recent meta-analysis of IAT studies confirmed
al., "Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and
Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 864 (2001) ("These findings
strongly support the hypothesis that people can 'unlearn' both explicit and implicit
prejudice in real-world contexts.").
91 See Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 319 ("In a variety of studies, the more
motivated show evidence of having 'corrected' for their automatically activated
attitudes."). That this research employs scales ostensibly measuring "motivation to
control prejudice" illustrates, again, the alacrity with which social psychologists affix
value-laden labels that obscure instead of illuminate the diverse unobservable processes
that might be engaged. As Tetlock and Arkes note, these scales may tap into a difficult-
to-disentangle mix of competing views on: (a) what constitutes prejudice; (b) what others
think constitutes prejudice; and (c) the appropriateness of engaging in conduct that might
confirm to oneself or others that one is "prejudiced." See Tetlock & Arkes, supra note 29,
at 315. The root misconception here is that prejudice is a natural science construct on
which there is virtual unanimity (e.g., DNA) instead of a social-political construct that
takes on different meanings for different people at different points in history.
92 See Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-
Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SC. 56, 61
(2005) ("Together the experiments show that a stereotyped or prejudiced response to an
out-group member requires, at minimum, that the stimulus (a photo in this case) be
processed deeply enough that it represents a social target .... Most important, the results
show that perceivers can change the social context in which they view a target person and
thereby affect out-group perception measurable in both the brain and reaction time
behavior.").
93 See infra Part III.D.
94 See Dasgupta, supra note 36, at 163 ("[I]t is also clear that people's implicit
attitudes and beliefs toward in- and outgroups affect specific types of behaviors, some of
which may operate without social actors' awareness or control; but it is also evident that
implicit biases do not always result in discriminatory action in an obligatory fashion.").
95 See Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role
of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
553, 553 (2005) ("Although research has documented that these implicit measures
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the moderate predictive value of IAT scores with respect to behaviors
purportedly diagnostic of prejudice or stereotyping-at least in artificial
laboratory settings in which participants believe their judgments to be
unaccountable and hypothetical as opposed to judgments with real
consequences for which they may be accountable.
96
C. Implicit Prejudice as an Emerging Legal Concept
Legal scholars' embrace of implicit prejudice research constitutes the
latest phase in an effort to bring antidiscrimination law's psychological
assumptions into line with empirical reality.97 A primary concern of legal
correlate with other attitudes and predict microlevel behavior, there is currently little
evidence indicating that such implicit attitudes are useful for predicting more macrolevel
behavior, such as discriminatory hiring decisions."); see also id. at 561 ("[llmplicit
racism interacted with a climate for racial bias to predict discrimination .... This is one
of the first studies to demonstrate that the IAT can predict racially biased discriminatory
actions.").
96 See Poehlman et al., supra note 62, at 21 ("This meta-analysis indicates that IAT
measures are significant predictors of criterion measures (average r = .27) .... Explicit
(i.e., self-report) measures were also good predictors of criterion measures, and in fact
performed significantly better overall than IAT measures did (average r = .35)."); id. at
28 ("IAT measures significantly out-predicted explicit measures in the domain of
prejudice and stereotyping."); see also id. at 62 tbl.3 (reporting mean IAT-criterion
correlation for prejudice/stereotyping studies of r = .25). For social science studies,
Cohen characterizes a correlation coefficient (r) of .30 as moderate (r = 10 represents a
small effect and r = .50 represents a large effect). See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 78-81 (2d ed. 1988). With an r = .30, an
independent variable explains 9% of the variance in a dependent variable; an r = .25
explains 6.25% of the variance.
97 See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 25, at 1003 ("[T]here has emerged in the past ten
years a school of legal scholarship exploring the implications of insights emerging from
psychological science for antidiscrimination law and policy" (footnote omitted)); Ann C.
McGinley, !Viva La Evolucirnl: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 491 (2000) ("If Title VII is to fulfill its purpose, it must
define discrimination in accordance with scientific understanding. The law can no longer
limit its definition of discrimination to conscious discriminatory behavior; the definition
should also include behavior that is rooted in unconscious prejudice."); see also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias
in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. Soc. ISSUES 835, 836
(2004) ("One important reason why working mothers often find it difficult to win
meritorious sex discrimination cases is that inaccurate assumptions about the nature of
inter-group perception and judgment still permeate the courts.").
The seminal paper in this effort is Charles Lawrence's The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. See Lawrence, supra note 17. See
Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 6 ("In the past decade, a number of scholars have taken up
Professor Lawrence's project and given added momentum to the notion that unconscious
or subtle bias is a major contributor to today's problems of workplace inequality."). For
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scholars is that the law's requirement of proof of an intentional mental state
as a cause of discrimination, unless broadly construed, fails to capture many
instances of discrimination caused by automatic stereotyping processes and
in-group preferences; hence, proof of a discriminator's conscious awareness
of the causes of discrimination should not be required.98 Implicit prejudice
research heightens concern about the law's emphasis on conscious
discrimination because this new research provides evidence of implicit group
biases that cannot be detected with direct self-report measures of explicit
prejudice, and it suggests that implicit prejudice is widespread and not
dependent on conscious animus toward minorities. 99 The notion of implicit
prejudice thus does triple duty: (1) it explains how inequalities between
advantaged and disadvantaged groups can persist despite the well-
documented decline in overt expressions of racism and sexism;100 (2) it
performs this delicate explanatory task without blaming the victim (indeed, it
expands the set of victims to include those who do not yet realize they have
been victimized by subtle forms of prejudice); and (3) it casts doubt on the
citations to several of the works that followed Lawrence's lead, see Marc R. Poirier, Is
Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
459, at 461 n.9 (2004). Another particularly influential law review paper in this line of
work is Linda Hamilton Krieger's, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995).
98 See, e.g., Krieger & Fiske, supra note 25, at 1004 ("[S]cholars, who include both
lawyers and social psychologist ... generally advocate a causation-based, rather than an
intent-based, understanding of the antidiscrimination principle. They also support an
expansive application of disparate impact theory in cases involving subjective decision-
making systems or other processes or criteria that tend to systematically deprive
historically marginalized groups of employment opportunities" (footnotes omitted));
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 899
(1993) ("[A] theory of discrimination liability that focuses on intentional wrongdoing
will inevitably miss the mark."); Sturm, supra note 1, at 478 ("Problems of gender-based
exclusion and unfairness will persist without external legal regulation, but the first
generation form of regulation is inadequate to address the complexities of second
generation bias."); Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Intent
Matters? Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REv.
495, 498 (2001) ("We believe that Title VII should be interpreted, and the Supreme
Court's decisions can and should be read, as rejecting a requirement of conscious intent."
(footnote omitted)). The main legal prescription drawn from the implicit prejudice
research by the researchers themselves is that the law's intentionality requirement within
antidiscrimination law, and perhaps other areas of the law, should be rescinded. See supra
note 14.
99 See generally Kang, supra note 16, at 1506-14.
100 See, e.g., Dovidio, supra note 42, at 845 ("[A]lthough overt expressions of
prejudice have declined steadily and significantly over time, subtle-often unconscious
and unintentional-forms continue to exist.").
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ability of current antidiscrimination law to further mitigate inequality and
highlights a reformist agenda.
It is difficult to overstate the legal significance of this new research if it
correctly diagnoses the pervasiveness and potency of implicit prejudice and
related discriminatory tendencies. As Professor Kang recently put it, "[a] vast
intellectual agenda opens when we start probing what this new knowledge
might mean for law."'' 1 Measures of implicit prejudice might be used to test
legislators for racial bias,10 2 to screen possible employees, 10 3 and to root out
prejudice among existing employees. 10 4 The threat of implicit prejudice
bolsters the argument for abolition of the peremptory challenge' 0 5 and for
recognition of a disparate-impact claim under Title VI for discriminatory
provision of medical services. 106 Implicit prejudice even provides a rationale
for greater FCC regulation of the media, which broadcasts many crime
stories involving minorities that may strengthen implicit negative attitudes
toward minority groups. 107
Already, implicit prejudice research has been put to practical legal use.
Eisenberg and Johnson, to raise awareness of racial bias in death penalty
cases, used measures of implicit bias to demonstrate that even capital defense
lawyers harbor negative implicit attitudes toward minorities,10 8 and experts
101 Kang, supra note 16, at 1494.
102 See Saujani, supra note 13, at 420.
103 See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? 424 (2001) ("Implicit attitude testing
might also itself be used as a criterion for hiring both governmental and nongovernmental
actors.").
104 See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for
a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV.
913, 915-16 (1999).
105 See Page, supra note 12, at 245-46; see also John J. Francis, Peremptory
Challenges, Grutter, and Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise of Batson,
29 VT. L. REV. 297, 298 (2005) (using implicit prejudice work to support a proposal to
exclude minority criminal defendants from the Batson rule). Page recognizes that
abolition of the peremptory challenge in the near future is unlikely, and so he also calls
for changes in the application of Batson to peremptory challenges. See Page, supra note
12, at 245-61.
106 See Michael S. Shin, Comment, Redressing Wounds: Finding a Legal
Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2081-
82 (2002).
107 See Kang, supra note 16, at 1549-53.
108 Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004); see also Milton D. Jones, The
First Two Seconds: Racial and Gender Bias in Bankruptcy Administration, 2006 No. 02
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 3 (arguing, from the IAT research, that implicit biases
adversely affect trustee treatment of female and minority debtors). Given that the
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have begun incorporating implicit-prejudice research into their testimony to
create a social framework that supports plaintiffs' claims of subtle
discrimination. 109 Most notably, the sociologist William Bielby, who often
testifies on behalf of plaintiffs in employment discrimination class actions,
10
has filed several expert reports with courts in which he opines that the great
majority of White male employees at the defendant organizations suffer from
implicit biases that likely led to discrimination against the plaintiff classes." I
Most of these legal uses rest on disturbingly uncritical assessments of the
psychological arguments advanced by proponents of the IAT. We shall show
in the next sections that it would be a big mistake for the legal community to
accept these claims at face value, so big a mistake that it is necessary to delve
into the scientific controversies surrounding implicit prejudice in greater
detail than has thus far been the case in law-review literature. Much hinges
on how one reads the technical literature that purports to gauge the
psychological processes underlying IAT scores, the robustness of the
prejudicial attitudes supposedly revealed by the IAT, and the reliability of the
connection between these prejudices and discriminatory behavior. Close
inventors of tests of implicit prejudice often fail their own tests and resort to efforts to
debias themselves, we should expect even those with the purest of conscious intentions
often to fall short. In an article for The Harvard University Gazette, William J. Cromie
states:
There's no way to wipe out all the years of evolution during which humans and their
ancestors learned to fear the unfamiliar, to be ready to run or fight at any threat. But
brains are flexible enough to be altered by experience. 'If this were not so, we would
not have seen the reduction of bias in students who worked with a black researcher,'
Banaji points out. We shouldn't expect such changes to last long, but it does cause
Banaji to feel optimistic about making behavioral changes that, though small and
temporary, are real.
William J. Cromie, Brain Shows Unconscious Prejudices: Fear Center Is Activated,
HARV. UNIV. GAZETTE, July 17, 2003, available at
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/archives.html (follow "2003" hyperlink; then
follow "July 17" hyperlink; then follow "Science/Research" hyperlink).
109 See William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using Expert
Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 377, 390 (2003).
110 Michael Orey, White Men Can't Help It, Bus. WK., May 15, 2006, at 54,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_20/b3984081.htm?
campaign_ id=search ("Sociologist William T. Bielby is the leading courtroom proponent
of a simple but powerful theory: 'unconscious bias.' He contends that White men will
inevitably slight women and minorities because they just can't help themselves. So he
tries to convince judges that no evidence of overt discrimination-no smoking gun
memo, for instance-is needed to prove a case.").
111 See id. (noting that Professor Bielby has been an expert witness "in dozens of
major cases, including those currently pending against Wal-Mart, FedEx, Johnson &
Johnson, and Cargill").
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inspection will yield an anti-climactic conclusion: if the goal is application to
the law, implicit prejudice research does not yet pass minimum standards of
reliable science.
III. ExAMiNING THE SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF IMPLICIT PREJUDICE
RESEARCH
Social scientific research has traditionally been evaluated against four
benchmarks of validity: (1) construct validity, which asks whether the
unobservable target of research interest, such as prejudice, has been properly
operationalized or translated into an observable variable that can be either
manipulated or measured for purposes of hypothesis-testing; (2) internal
validity, which asks whether an observed relationship between variables
represents a causal relationship; (3) statistical conclusion validity, which asks
whether observed covariation between variables is real or spurious; and (4)
external validity, which asks whether results obtained in one setting
generalize to other populations, situations, and times.1 12 Invalidity of the first
type renders research results incomplete, unconvincing or, at worst, useless,
because the variables studied do not adequately match the phenomena of
theoretical or practical interest. Invalidity of the second or third type makes it
impossible to draw valid conclusions about causal or correlational linkages.
Invalidity of the fourth type restricts the domains to which valid inductive
inferences may be drawn from the research. 113
Basic research, in which the goal is to test competing theories,
emphasizes construct, internal, and statistical conclusion validity. 1 14 Applied
112 See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION:
DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37-39 (1979).
113 Scientific validity is often a matter of degree, particularly for construct and
external validity, and it is difficult to identify, a priori, the point at which validity
problems or questions become so great that a study or body of work is deemed
scientifically invalid.
114 See COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 112, at 83 ("The priority among validity
types varies with the kind of research being conducted .... For investigators with
theoretical interests our estimate is that the types of validity, in order of importance, are
probably internal, construct, statistical conclusion, and external validity."). Some
methodologists distinguish between internal validity, which can encompass statistical
conclusion validity, and external validity, which can encompass construct validity. See id.
at 80-82. Campbell and Stanley offer the classic statement on internal and external
validity and their relation:
Internal validity is the basic minimum without which any experiment is
uninterpretable: Did in fact the experimental treatments make a difference in this
specific experimental instance? External validity asks the question of
generalizability: To what populations, settings, treatment variables, and
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research, in which the goal is to inform decision-makers about existing
problems, places much greater importance on external validity. 115 Applied
legal research must also contend with the validity requirements imposed by
the Supreme Court in the Daubert trilogy: to be admissible in litigation,
scientific and other forms of expert evidence must be reliable and relevant
and must "fit" the facts of the case. 116
These legal requirements for evidentiary uses of social science research
largely incorporate the four categories of scientific validity, but the fit
requirement places a heavier weight on construct validity and external
validity. 117 Even when psychological research on phenomena labeled bias,
prejudice and discrimination is internally and statistically valid, if the
phenomena so labeled do not correspond to phenomena that judges consider
bias, prejudice, and discrimination, then the psychological research lacks
construct validity as a legal matter and cannot fit the case at hand. Likewise,
if psychologists can only demonstrate implicit prejudice and discrimination
in contrived settings that eliminate complicating factors likely to exist in the
measurement variables can this effect be generalized? Both types of criteria are
obviously important, even though they are frequently at odds in that features
increasing one may jeopardize the other. While internal validity is the sine qua non,
and while the question of external validity, like the question of inductive inference,
is never completely answerable, the selection of designs strong in both types of
validity is obviously our ideal.
DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 5 (1963).
115 See COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 112, at 83 ("The priority ordering for many
applied researchers is something like internal validity, external validity, construct validity
of the effect, statistical conclusion validity, and construct validity of the cause."); see also
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 25, at 44 ("Psychological science is basic research, often
conducted in the laboratory. Meanwhile, legal disputes concern events in the real world.
As such, questions of 'external' or 'field' validity inevitably arise." (footnote omitted)).
116 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589-91 (1993). For a discussion of the impact of Daubert and its progeny on
psychological evidence, see generally David L. Faigman & John Monahan,
Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law's Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
631 (2004).
117 The status of empirical studies vis-A-vis the specific criteria suggested in
Daubert as indicators of scientific validity-testability, error rate, peer review status, and
general acceptance-depend on the status of the empirical studies vis-A-vis the four
categories of scientific validity described in the text. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET
AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 115-49
(2002). Basic research that suffers from flaws of construct, internal, or statistical
conclusion validity is unlikely to satisfy some or all of the Daubert factors, and applied
research that suffers from flaws of construct or external validity is unlikely to "fit" the
case at hand.
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applied domains of interest, then this psychological research will again fail to
fit the case at hand, this time due to lack of external validity."18
In the following sections, we demonstrate that implicit prejudice research
suffers from serious shortcomings within each category of validity.
Unresolved questions exist about how psychologists have chosen to define
and measure implicit prejudice and about how well the results of
psychologists' mindreading efforts generalize beyond the laboratory. Further,
even if we view the implicit prejudice research exclusively as a program of
basic research with no applied aspirations, we find that the claims for
widespread implicit prejudice and concomitant discriminatory behavior being
drawn from the IAT research are much shakier than often reported in the law
reviews and in the media. No scientific consensus yet exists with respect to
the causes or consequences of the "IAT effect" (that is, more time needed by
subjects taking the IAT to respond to pairings of minorities with positive
attributes), and the implicit prejudice explanation for this effect is merely the
least flattering to subjects, and most useful to reformers, of several
competing explanations. 119
118 External validity constraints greatly diminish the ability of an expert to draw
general causation conclusions, much less specific causation conclusions, from social
science research in order to develop a social framework or social fact. See Faigman &
Monahan, supra note 116, at 652 ("If courts treat social frameworks such as the 'battered
woman syndrome' or the 'rape trauma syndrome' the way they treat what might be called
medical frameworks, they should require that both general causation and specific
causation be demonstrated independently under Daubert. Moreover, without adequate
proof of general causation, no testimony at all on specific causation will be permitted.
Even with proof of general causation, proof must still be forthcoming that specific
causation is within the capabilities of the science and the proffered expert. Much of
psychology is likely to struggle to meet these standards, as medicine has struggled as
well." (citation omitted)).
119 William J. Gehring et al., Thinking About Interracial Interactions, 6 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 1241, 1242 (2003) ("[T]here are several alternative explanations for IAT
effects that do not involve unconscious evaluations or prejudice." (footnote omitted)).
Indeed, even leading implicit prejudice researchers have conceded the point as recently as
2001: "Research on alternative theoretical interpretations has not yet progressed enough
to establish any theoretical interpretation of the IAT effect." Anthony Greenwald & Brian
Nosek, Health of the Implicit Association Test at Age 3, 46 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
EXPERIMENTELLE PSYCHOLOGIE, 85, 90 (2001). We show here that the theoretical picture
has only grown murkier since then-raising serious questions about the legal standing of
this entire line of work.
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A. Construct Validity and Metric Meaning: Do Tests of Implicit
Prejudice Measure What They Purport to Measure?
Psychological constructs have always had a shaky ontological status; not
directly observable, they must be inferred from behavior. 120 For instance, we
infer preference from choice, intelligence from ability tests, and, for the IAT,
implicit prejudice from reaction times on word association tests. To close the
gap between psychological construct and observed behavior, psychologists
must provide a theory about how the observed behavior reflects an
underlying mental state or process, and this theory, like any theory, must be
subjected to testing and debate to establish the validity of the psychology-
behavior connection. 121 Given the uncertainties inherent in such gap-filling,
it is not unusual for controversies to stretch over many decades about what
particular psychological measures actually gauge, be they IQ, polygraph, or
Rorschach inkblot tests. The still youthful IAT has already begun to deliver
on the promise of its distinctive measurement controversies.
Dating back to a classic paper by Cronbach and Meehl published in
1955, the standard scientific answer to this conundrum is to invoke the logic
of construct validation. 122 In a nutshell, psychologists are justified in
concluding that a test taps into an unobservable construct to the degree that
construct, and only that construct, can explain the patterns of
intercorrelations between the test and other observable indicators. In more
120 Michell summarizes the basic problem:
The attributes that psychometricians aspire to measure are not directly
observable (i.e. claims made about them can only [at present] be tested by first
observing something else and making inferences). What psychometricians observe
are the responses made to test items. Intellectual abilities, personality traits and
social attitudes are theoretical attributes and test scores are taken to be quantitative
relationships (i.e. functional relationships between quantitative attributes).
Joel Michell, Normal Science, Pathological Science and Psychometrics, 10 THEORY &
PSYCHOL. 639, 648 (2000).
121 See Drew Westen & Robert Rosenthal, Quantifying Construct Validity: Two
Simple Measures, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 608, 609 (2003) ("[C]onstruct
validation is always theory dependent. A statement about the validity of an instrument is
a statement about the extent to which its observed associations with measures of other
variables match theoretical predictions about how it should be associated with those
variables." (citation omitted)). Psychology is not alone, of course, in having to close gaps
between theoretical constructs and empirically observable states or events. The hardest of
the hard sciences, physics, employs numerous theoretical constructs and laws that cannot
be directly observed but must be inferred from observable facts or regularities.
122 Lee J. Cronbach & Paul E. Meehl, Construct Validity in Psychological Tests, 52
PSYCHOL. BULL. 281, 281 (1955).
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technical language, psychological constructs are defined by their location in a
constellation (nomological net) of related constructs. The construct's
theoretical location should lead to predictions about the convergence and
divergence of the measure of the target construct with those of other
constructs: "Researchers typically establish construct validity by presenting
correlations between a measure of a construct and a number of other
measures that should, theoretically, be associated with it (convergent
validity) or vary independently of it (discriminant validity)."'1 23
1. Do Implicit Measures of Prejudice Converge as Theory Says They
Should?
The least controversial method of construct validating implicit measures
of prejudice should be against other implicit measures of prejudice. As a
matter of simple logic, if an implicit measure of prejudice is tapping into a
previously hidden reservoir of hostility toward a minority group, this
measure should both correlate with itself over time (test-retest) as well as
with related measures of the same target construct. 124 The implicit prejudice
research program struggles, however, to pass even these minimalist tests.
Test-retest reliability coefficients for the IAT are at the low end of the
respectable range for measures of ostensibly stable individual-difference
constructs, but even this anemic claim cannot be sustained for other implicit
measures. 125 And the two most popular methods for measuring implicit
123 Westen & Rosenthal, supra note 121, at 608. Some use the term "convergent
validity" in the narrower sense of "associations among alternative measures of the same
(rather than related) constructs." Duane T. Wegener & Leandre R. Fabrigar, Constructing
and Evaluating Quantitative Measures for Social Psychological Research: Conceptual
Challenges and Methodological Solutions, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF METHODS IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 64, at 145, 161.
124 When researchers claim special access to hidden prejudicial states, and claim
that these hidden states have true causal force, while explicit, non-racist explanations for
seemingly discriminatory behavior can be dismissed as nothing more than illusions of
free will or symptoms of a false consciousness, then the best avenue for falsifying
researchers' claims about the existence and power of these hidden psychological states is
to examine alternative measures of these hidden states for convergence. If advocates of
the TAT reject convergence with other existing measures of implicit prejudice as an
essential test of construct validity, then it is unclear how exactly the TAT could ever be
convincingly validated as a measure of the implicit prejudice construct.
125 Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 311 ("Test-retest reliability for the TAT does
tend to reach a respectable level of .6 or higher, as also is true for the name-letter
preference task. However, the few reports regarding test-retest reliability for various
priming measures have ranged from abysmally low to moderate levels of -. 5." (citations
omitted)); Melanie C. Steffens & Axel Buchner, Implicit Association Test: Separating
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prejudice-the IAT and affective priming--do not correlate nearly as highly
as one would expect if the measures were tapping into the same stable,
unitary psychological construct. 126 Are we to believe that there are many
hidden pockets of unconscious prejudice within the mind, unrelated to one
another, and differentially accessed by the IAT and affective priming
(notwithstanding that proponents of the tests claim to tap into similar mental
processes)? 127 Should we accept the measurement error defense that all is
well and that, after we make generous statistical corrections for unreliability,
the modest correlations start looking respectable? 128 Or should we conclude
that psychological processes unrelated to unconscious prejudice are shaping
responses to these tests? 129 This list of unknowns is an early warning sign of
the scientific immaturity of the implicit prejudice research program.
2. Do Implicit and Explicit Measures of Prejudice Co- Vary in
Theoretically Predictable Ways-And Where Is the Theory Anyway?
A second seemingly straightforward strategy of construct validation is to
examine the degree to which self-report scales designed to measure explicit
prejudice correlate with measures of implicit prejudice. But appearances can
Transsituationally Stable and Variable Components of Attitudes Toward Gay Men, 50
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 33, 45 (2003) ("[T]he main finding of our experiments is that
the test-retest correlation of an IAT assessing implicit attitudes, as obtained directly or
estimated in a structural equation model, was rather low (.50 < r < .62), even when the
IAT was replicated immediately."); id. at 34 tbl.1 (summarizing test-retest correlations
across several studies). Most psychometricians agree that the test-retest reliability (the
power of a test to predict itself) sets a plausible upper bound on the power of the test to
predict other criterion variables.
126 Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 311 ("One of the most disturbing trends to
emerge in the literature on implicit measures is the many reports of disappointingly low
correlations among the measures."). But see William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit
Attitude Measures: Consistency, Stability, and Convergent Validity, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI.
163, 167 (2001) (reporting more robust correlations using a latent variable approach that
supposedly controls for substantial measurement error in implicit measures).
127 Crandall and Eshleman distinguish a variety of prejudices that express
themselves to varying degrees depending on the balance of social forces promoting
tolerance or bigotry. See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 43, at 437. Presumably,
however, implicit measures aimed at tapping the same prejudice in the same context
should converge even under this model, ceteris paribus.
128 For the most aggressive affirmation of this defense, see Cunningham et al., supra
note 126, at 167. It is instructive, though, that IAT advocates overlook the complications
created by measurement error when they treat the zero-point on their scale (no
differential reaction times to Whites and Blacks) as the basis for drawing conclusions
about the susceptibility of the majority of the American population to implicit prejudice.
See infra Part III.A.5.
129 For more on this possibility, see infra Part III.B.
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be deceptive. There is nothing straightforward about either the theoretical
logic or the empirical results.
From one theoretical standpoint, one would expect large correlations
between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice. After all, both sets of
measures tap into the same target construct of "prejudice." But, from another
standpoint, one would expect minimal connections. Recall that the original
rationale for the implicit prejudice research program was that there is much
to be learned about prejudice by tapping into attitudes that people either
cannot or will not consciously endorse when responding to traditional self-
report scales. Implicit measures are supposed to be free of social-desirability
response biases and to allow us to escape the limits of human introspection,
giving us an opportunity to discover attitudes that we hide not just from
others but from ourselves. Unfortunately, these opposing theoretical
arguments give researchers logical license to adopt a "heads-we-win-tails-
we-don't-lose" attitude toward data analysis: they can treat high correlations
as evidence for the convergent validity of implicit and explicit measures of
prejudice; 130 they can treat low correlations as evidence for the dissociation
predicted by dual-process models of cognition--or as just the cumulative
result of too much measurement error; they can treat moderate correlations as
evidence for all of the above; and they can treat negative correlations as
evidence of even more dramatic dissociation between conscious and
unconscious cognition, such as repression and reaction formation of the sort
posited by now-out-of-fashion psychodynamic theories.
The empirical evidence does little to resolve these uncertainties. In part,
this is so because the evidence is so mixed. The median result of studies of
the implicit-explicit linkage yield estimates of low positive correlations
130 See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 76, at 1342 ("Current research suggests
that implicit and explicit attitudes may not be as dissociated as once thought. Whereas
initial work showed few correlations between implicit and explicit measures, more recent
studies have found correlations between these types of measures." (citations omitted));
Bertram Gawronski, What Does the Implicit Association Test Measure? A Test of the
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Prejudice-Related IATs, 49 EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 171, 178 (2002) ("In the present study, prejudice-related IATs exhibited not
only convergent validity to corresponding explicit measures of prejudice endorsement,
but also discriminant validity by revealing substantial relations only when the out-group
category in the IAT was identical to that in the explicit measure."). Blanton and Jaccard
point out a particularly stark example of this theoretical inconsistency. In 2001, Banaji
treated low correlations between the IAT and explicit attitude measures as "evidence of
validity, not a challenge to it," on grounds that conscious and unconscious attitudes are
conceptually distinct, yet just two years later Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji treated high
correlations between the IAT and explicit measures as "evidence for the validity of their
new [IAT] scoring algorithm." Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Arbitrary Metrics Redux,
61 AM. PSYCHOL. 62, 66 (2006).
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between measures. 131 The preferred interpretation of these results invokes the
superiority of implicit measures: such measures are free of the self-deception
and self-presentation strategies that contaminate measures of explicit
prejudice. 132 An alternative explanation draws on dual-process models of
cognition to assign implicit attitudes greater weight in the determination of
spontaneous behaviors, such as behavior in reaction-time tests, and to assign
explicit attitudes greater weight in the determination of more deliberative
behaviors, such as voting choices. 133 These delicate efforts to accommodate
131 See Boniecki & Jacks, supra note 87, at 11 ("[O]ur research suggests that
measures of implicit prejudice and measures of explicit prejudice are generally
unrelated."); Brauer et al., supra note 53, at 94 (reporting weak to non-existent
correlations between various implicit and explicit measures of prejudice); Wilhelm
Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between the Implicit Association
Test and Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1369,
1379 (2005) (noting that "we found a small but significant positive mean population
correlation of .24 between self-reported representations and representations assessed with
the IAT" (citation omitted)); Andrew Karpinski & James L. Hilton, Attitudes and the
Implicit Association Test, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 774, 786 (2001)
("[A]cross all three studies, we consistently failed to find any correlations between the
IAT and explicit attitude measures, even when social desirability pressures were
minimized."); Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial
Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 847 (2001) ("Replicating the
generally unreliable relation between implicit and explicit attitudes, results reveal that
automatic prejudice was uncorrelated with all four measures of explicit attitudes."
(citation omitted)); see also Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 303 ("Within the domain of
prejudice and stereotypes, the correlations [between explicit and implicit measures] tend
to be quite low, although there are occasional reports of significant correlations."
(citations omitted)).
132 See, e.g., Michael Dambrun & Serge Guimond, Implicit and Explicit Measures
of Prejudice and Stereotyping: Do They Assess the Same Underlying Knowledge
Structure?, 34 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 663, 673 (2004) ("[A]n absence of relationship or
even a negative relationship between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice is not
necessarily incompatible with the conceptualization which argues that implicit and
explicit measures are two ways of assessing similar underlying knowledge structure.");
id. (suggesting that "an 'over-compensation' self-presentational strategy is responsible
for the negative relationship between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice");
Hofmann et al., supra note 131, at 1369 ("Evidence for the success in assessing
meaningful constructs that are difficult to tap with self-reports is implied by the finding
that implicit measures often show rather low correlations with explicit measures yet
reliably predict behavior." (citations omitted)).
133 See, e.g., Bertram Gawronski et al., It's in the Mind of the Beholder: The Impact
of Stereotypic Associations on Category-Based and Individuating Impression Formation,
39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 16, 28 (2002) ("[A]ssociative strength might be a
good predictor for spontaneous processes in impression formation such as context effects
of category information on the interpretation of ambiguous behavioral cues, whereas
explicitly assessed beliefs should be better in predicting processes of deliberate
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explicit and implicit prejudice within a single nomological network are upset,
however, by the occasional study that finds a substantial correlation between
the two types of measures. 134
The evidence is also inconclusive for a more fundamental reason. The
explicit measures of prejudice used in most construct validation studies are
themselves politically controversial-and open to alternative explanations.
For instance, measures of modern, symbolic, and aversive racism often
include items that could equally easily serve as measures of ideological
conservatism, traditional values, and the Protestant work ethic.135 If there are
conservatives among implicit prejudice researchers (and there are unlikely to
be many in this ideologically-skewed field),136 they could just as plausibly
dispositional inference." (citation omitted)); Andrew Karpinski et al., Attitude Importance
as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measures, 31
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 949, 960-61 (2005) ("If one intends to predict a
conscious, deliberative behavior and participants are willing and able to report their
attitudes on explicit measures, then there is strong evidence that explicit attitudes can
predict the behavior and that IAT scores have little predictive value above and beyond
explicit attitudes. Conversely, if one intends to predict spontaneous, non-conscious
aspects of behavior, then implicit attitudes measures, including the IAT, may be of
greater value in predicting the behavior than explicit attitude measures."); Poehlman et
al., supra note 62, at 27 ("[L]ow correlations between the associations tapped by the IAT
and responses on explicit measures were associated with relatively worse predictive
validity for both IAT and explicit measures. When implicit-explicit correspondence is
low, the associations measured by IAT measures may correlate more weakly with
criterion measures because the person is attempting to intentionally override an unwanted
automatic response."). But see Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 76, at 962 (noting that,
while the predictive validity of explicit measures is greater than implicit measures for
deliberative behaviors, "prediction of behavior by IAT measures was not reduced when
the examined behavior was more deliberative").
134 See Brauer et al., supra note 53, at 84 tbl.3.
135 See Sniderman & Tetlock, Symbolic Racism, supra note 60, at 130; see also
Duckitt, supra note 33, at 568 ("The concept of new racisms has not been without
controversy. Critics have asserted that symbolic racism has been conceptualized and
measured inconsistently over time and that the varying themes identified with it have not
yet been coherently articulated or adequately measured." (citations omitted)); Brad T.
Gomez & J. Matthew Wilson, Rethinking Symbolic Racism: Evidence of Attribution Bias,
68 J. POL. 611, 622-23 (2006) ("Our findings ... suggest that much of the relationship
between political sophistication and symbolic racism stems not from racial animus, but
from differential patterns of attribution that reach well beyond the domain of race....
Since much of the traditional symbolic racism scale is based on respondent attributions of
causality, the general tendency of less sophisticated individuals to seize upon localized
explanations for sociopolitical events can easily be misconstrued as racial hostility.").
136 "It is well documented that, like social scientists in general, both academic and
practicing psychologists are much more liberal than the general population and most
other professionals." Richard E. Redding, Sociopolitical Diversity in Psychology: The
Case for Pluralism, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 205, 205 (2001).
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insist that the IAT taps into tacit knowledge of depressingly real correlations
between race and socioeconomic outcomes in society at large and that the
self-report measures of modem forms of racism tap into historically well-
grounded recognition of how difficult it will be to solve the societal problems
through simple transfer payments. We are not endorsing the conservative
counter-interpretation. We are simply asking: How much certainty do we
gain from documenting low-positive correlations between measures of
dubious validity of one scientifically under-defined construct with measures
of dubious validity of another scientifically under-defined construct?
3. Much Construct Validation Research Employs Weak Criterion
Variables Open to Alternative Psychological Explanations and of
Questionable Legal Relevance137
A third line of construct validation research explores the power of
implicit prejudice measures to predict interpersonal behavior, typically of a
subtle nonverbal sort, toward people from varying ethnic-racial groups.138 As
with the prior two types of validation evidence, evidence in this category is
not nearly as convincing as advocates of swift application of implicit
prejudice research to the law might hope. In fact, one study demonstrated
that African-Americans actually preferred to interact with people classified
as implicit racists by the IAT. 139 Dramatic disconfirmations of this sort
illustrate how easily implicit prejudice researchers can dismiss dissonant
evidence. 140 It is not, however, the occasional effect reversal that renders this
137 A criterion variable is an observable behavior or outcome that should correlate
reasonably well with a psychological test's scores if the test measures what it purports to
measure. For instance, if the LSAT is a good measure of potential for achievement in law
school, then it should correlate significantly with law school GPA. See generally RALPH
L. RoSNOW & ROBERT ROSENTHAL, BEGINNING BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: A CONCEPTUAL
PRIMER 146-47 (3d ed. 1999).
138 See, e.g., McConnell & Leibold, supra note 85, at 438 (noting that subjects who
took the IAT and interacted with White and Black experimenters were coded for a variety
of indicators of "body language" during the interaction).
139 See J. Nicole Shelton et al., Ironic Effects of Racial Bias During Interracial
Interactions, 16 PSYCHOL. SCi. 397, 401 (2005) ("Black participants evaluated Whites
with higher automatic-bias scores more positively than Whites with lower automatic-bias
scores.").
140 The authors of this study note that Black participants rated high-bias IAT scorers
as more engaged. They then argue, with no intended irony, that high-prejudice Whites
created better impressions on Blacks because they had to work harder to suppress their
prejudice whereas low-prejudice Whites, with less to hide, were more relaxed and came
across as disengaged. See id. at 401. Of course, one could use the same explanation to
account for why, in other studies, allegedly high-prejudice Whites create worse
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category of evidence unconvincing for application to the law, for the
majority of the evidence here supports the hypothesis that high scorers on
implicit measures of prejudice are more likely to exhibit criterion behaviors
than low scorers. Rather, most problematic from a legal perspective are the
particular behaviors chosen to serve as criterion variables for implicit
measures of prejudice.
In most of these "predictive validity" studies, the criterion behaviors
involve what Ziegert and Hanges call "micro-level" behaviors, such as
nonverbal indicators of interpersonal discomfort and anxiety in the presence
of members of the groups toward whom one is allegedly prejudiced or initial
impressions about persons of different races. 141 For instance, in one of the
most prominent tests of the relationship between scores on the IAT and
discriminatory behavior, McConnell and Leibold videotaped subjects who
interacted with a White experimenter before taking the IAT and a Black
experimenter afterwards and then coded the subjects' behaviors during the
interactions for friendliness, comfort level, eye contact, body posture, and
other "body language" indicators. 142 They found a significant correlation
impressions: efforts to suppress their prejudice make them look nervous. To escape this
circularity, it is necessary to entertain possibilities that escaped both the authors' and
journal reviewers' attention: (a) all students came from a liberal campus environment and
the low scorers may have been so far to the left that Blacks saw them as phony or
ingratiating; and (b) high IAT scorers have a more realistic view of the challenges
confronting poorer Blacks on largely upper-middle-class campuses and Blacks react
favorably to realism. Readers can no doubt generate more possibilities-an exercise in
political even-handedness that we also urge for results that cast high IAT scorers in a less
flattering light.
141 See Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 95, at 553 ("Although research has
documented that these implicit measures correlate with other attitudes and predict
microlevel behavior, there is currently little evidence indicating that such implicit
attitudes are useful for predicting more macrolevel behavior, such as discriminatory
hiring decisions."). For a summary of the behavioral/outcome measures employed as
criterion variables in the implicit prejudice research, see Dasgupta, supra note 36, at 152-
55 tbl.I.
Proponents of the IAT tout a recent meta-analysis as showing that "in the context of
social group discrimination, implicit attitudes outperform explicit measures in
prediction." Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 282. Two important qualifications attach to
this claim. First, the acts of "social group discrimination" referred to here primarily
involve nonverbal and other micro-level behaviors. See Poehlman, supra note 62, tbl. 1.
Second, both implicit and explicit measures of prejudice were significant predictors of
acts of discrimination in these predictive validity studies, but implicit measures
performed better in this domain (r =.25 versus r =. 13). Id. at 19. However, using Cohen's
effect size standards, the effect size for implicit measures in the discrimination domain
falls between small to moderate. See Kang, supra note 16, at 1593 n. 10. Further, across
all studies, explicit measures of attitudes predicted behavior better than implicit measures
(average r =.35 versus average r =.27). Poehlman et al., supra note 62, at 21.
142 McConnell & Leibold, supra note 85, at 437-38.
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between subjects' IAT scores and ratings of social interaction bias exhibited
by subjects: "as participants' IAT scores reflected relatively more positive
attitudes toward Whites than Blacks, social interactions were more positive
toward the White experimenter than the Black experimenter as assessed both
by trained judges and by the experimenters themselves."'143
Even if we assume for the moment that these differences in interactions
with White and Black experimenters do represent deep-seated, unconscious
prejudice (and researchers rarely test alternative explanations such as
unfamiliarity, guilt, embarrassment, and social anxiety), 144 the legal
implications of this research are not apparent. Unless advocates of the
implicit prejudice viewpoint favor extraordinarily intrusive state regulation
of interpersonal relations-down to eye blinking and postural orientation-as
a policy goal in itself, any legal prescription drawn from this research must
assume that these micro-level "discriminatory" behaviors accumulate into
more consequential discriminatory decisions and actions.145 For instance,
Professor Kang's argument for FCC regulation of news media to alter
depictions of minorities in hopes of lessening implicit prejudice assumes that
this implicit prejudice leads to consequential actions for minorities and
women, in the form of missed job opportunities, poorer educational
outcomes, and, most drastically, being shot by the police. 146 Furthermore, the
143 Id. at 439.
144 For instance, the presence of an African-American experimenter "may simply
have served to enhance the salience of extrapersonal assocations" (that is, the African-
American experimenter may have primed cultural stereotypes or beliefs that were not
personally held by the subject that otherwise would not have come to mind). H. Anna
Han et al., The Influence of Experimentally Created Extrapersonal Associations on the
Implicit Association Test, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 259, 270 (2006); see also
infra Part III.A.4.d. For other potential explanations of the effect found in the McConnell
and Leibold study, see Chugh, supra note 49, at 211-12.
145 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law's Effects on Implicit Bias, in
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 16 (Mitu Gulati & Michael
Yelnosky eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 16, on file with authors) available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/JollsAntidiscriminationLawsEffects on Imp
lictBias.pdf ("[E]vidence linking measures of implicit bias to observed behavior does
not establish any connection between such measures and the types of decisions that
antidiscrimination law polices."). Of course, nonverbal behaviors may be important in
work settings, but to date the courts and Congress have shown little interest in enforcing
civility codes that might reach the level of subtle, nonverbal behaviors. See, e.g., Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (rejecting the view that Title
VII creates a "general civility code for the American workplace").
146 Professor Kang weaves together a set of studies showing the potential behavioral
consequences of implicit prejudice, but, as Kang discloses, in many of these experiments
no measure was taken of participants' implicit bias or implicit prejudice. See Kang, supra
note 16, at 1514-28. Hence, it is pure conjecture that unconscious prejudice caused any
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stranger-stranger interactions employed in most social-psychological
experiments on discrimination do not reflect the types of interactions that
give rise to most employment discrimination lawsuits. 147 Until the
connection between measures of implicit prejudice and discriminatory
behaviors of greater consequence is established, the claimed link between
implicit prejudice and discriminatory behavior as expansively defined by
behaviors in those studies. In the few studies he cites where behavior and scores on tests
of implicit prejudice are linked, the behaviors are nonverbal or involve hypothetical
consequences. Perhaps the most distressing examples Kang cites involve the "shooter
bias" studies. In one of these studies, participants under time pressure who were
subliminally-primed by a picture of a Black face were more likely to identify incorrectly
an ambiguous object as a gun, compared to participants primed by a picture of a White
face. See id. at 1525; see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of
Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 187 (2001). In another of these studies, participants under time
pressure who were playing a police simulation video game were more likely to shoot
unarmed Black targets and refrain from shooting armed White targets. This latter study,
however, did not employ implicit measures of prejudice and found no relationship
between explicit measures of prejudice and this anti-Black shooter bias. See Kang, supra
note 16, at 1526; see also Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using
Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1323 (2002). The tendency of African-Americans to display the
same bias further undercuts a sweeping prejudice explanation and favors a specific-
adaptation-to-local-environments explanation. See id. at 1325 ("Testing both White and
African-American participants, we found that the two groups display equivalent levels of
bias."); id. ("The fact that Shooter Bias in Study 3 was related to perceptions of the
cultural stereotype, rather than prejudice or personally endorsed stereotypes, suggests that
mere knowledge of the stereotype is enough to induce this bias."); see also E. Ashby
Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 151 n.4 (2005)
(reporting the same pattern of bias across race of participants). Also in this connection,
Ashby Plant and her colleagues have shown that repeated exposure to suspects whose
race is unrelated to the presence or absence of a gun significantly decreased this anti-
Black shooter bias in a police simulation game. See id. at 153 (college student
participants); E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for
Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 182 (2005)
(police officer participants).
147 See David Copus, A Lawyer's View: Avoiding Junk Science, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION: BEHAVIORAL, QUANTITATIVE, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
450, 453 (Frank J. Landy ed., 2005) ("I estimate that upward of 90 percent or more of all
employment discrimination lawsuits involve current or former employees, none of whom
are strangers to company decision makers."); id. at 458 ("So, as long as stereotype
research uses stranger-to-stranger interactions in which subjects are given very limited
information under conditions that tightly control extraneous independent variables, that
stereotype research will have no ecological validity, even if lifelike simulations are used
with non-college student participants."); see also infra Part III.D.
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social psychologists holds little legal significance. 148
Accordingly, an important avenue for future predictive validity studies
from a legal perspective concerns the relationship between implicit
associations and subjective evaluations of disadvantaged groups, which may
invoke less deliberation in an unstructured setting, 149 and which may be
subject to fewer social desirability constraints because ambiguity about ideal
qualifications for a position and about the qualifications of a candidate
provide cover for individual variation in evaluations. 150 Replicable
demonstrations that implicit associations predict bias in the subjective work
evaluations of protected groups would bolster legal concerns about subjective
hiring and promotion standards.' 51
148 This is particularly true given ambiguity about what exactly causes these
behaviors and the robustness of these behavioral effects to situational changes. We
consider whether these behaviors unequivocally indicate prejudice or some other social
or psychological process in the section on internal validity. See infra Part III.B. We
consider the generalizability constraints on the relation between implicit prejudice and
interpersonal behavior in the section on external validity. See infra Part III.D. Assuming
these behaviors are the result of whatever psychological process(es) the IAT measures,
however, our concern here is whether these behaviors are sufficiently persuasive
evidence of discrimination for purposes of legal regulation.
149 See, e.g., Allen I. Huffcutt & Philip L. Roth, Racial Group Differences in
Employment Interview Evaluations, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 179, 186 (1998) ("We found
that group differences for structured interviews tended to be relatively low overall and
lower than those for unstructured interviews. One implication of these findings is that
structured interviews do tend to limit the influence of biases and stereotypes."); Joshua
M. Sacco et al., An Investigation of Race and Sex Similarity Effects in Interviews: A
Multilevel Approach to Relational Demography, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 852, 860 (2003)
("Our results suggest that organizations do not have to be concerned about matching
interviewer and interviewee race and sex to avoid potentially biased ratings, at least when
using carefully developed job-analysis-based highly structured interviews like the ones
used here."); Laura Gollub Williamson et al., Employment Interview on Trial: Linking
Interview Structure with Litigation Outcomes, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 900, 908 (1997)
("Past research has shown that structuring the interview can be a key to enhancing its
reliability and validity. The purpose of this study was to test the thesis that structuring can
also be a key to enhancing its legal defensibility. Two approaches were taken to test this
thesis, one conceptual and one empirical. Both were strongly supported.").
150 See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling
Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1013, 1018 (2004) ("[I]ndividuals are most likely to
discriminate in situations in which their behavior is least likely to be viewed as
discriminatory-thereby providing 'cover' for their racially biased conduct." (emphasis
omitted)).
151 See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 748 (2005). Existing evidence, however, casts considerable doubt
on the assumption that subjective measures lead to greater bias in employment actions
than objective measures. See H.W. Hennessey, Jr. & H. John Bernardin, The Relationship
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To date, only studies by Ziegert and Hanges and by Rudman and Glick
directly address this question, and these studies provide far-from-decisive
evidence that implicit associations are pervasive and potent causes of
discrimination in a subjective candidate or employee evaluations. In a
workplace simulation, Ziegert and Hanges found a relation between implicit
racial associations and discriminatory ratings of Black job candidates, but
only when the "boss" explicitly told subjects to engage in racial
discrimination 152 (and, even then, only when the data analysis included a
handful of anti-Black outliers on the dependent variable).' 53 Rudman and
Glick found a relationship between subjective judgments of the social skills
of an "agentic" (as opposed to a "communal") female applicant for a job
requiring social sensitivity and subjects' scores on a version of the IAT
designed to measure gender stereotypes, but not between subjects' subjective
judgments of the "hireability" of this applicant and IAT scores (i.e., there
seemed to be a stronger "backlash" against agentic, counter-stereotype
Between Performance Appraisal Criterion Specificity and Statistical Evidence of
Discrimination, 42 HuM. RES. MGMT. 143, 156 (2003) ("We must conclude that the
burden is certainly on those experts who maintain that there is some causal connection
between a particular deleterious outcome for protected class member(s) and a particular
type of performance appraisal format or system. Our data do not support the argument.");
Philip L. Roth et al., Ethnic Group Differences in Measures of Job Performance: A New
Meta-Analysis, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 694, 702 (2003) ("Our results do not support the
position that subjective measures have more potential for bias than objective measures.
Instead, we found the opposite.").
152 Ziegert and Hanges demonstrated a relation between IAT scores and
discriminatory hiring recommendations, but only in a "climate for racial bias" in which
the president of a hypothetical company had written a memo expressly directing
managers (played by the subjects) to favor White candidates over Black candidates. See
Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 95, at 558 (The memo from the president to the manager
began with this sentence: "Given that the vast majority of our workforce is White, it is
essential we put a White person in the VP position."). This memo would almost certainly
constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent under current employment
discrimination law. See, e.g., Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("Direct evidence 'can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of discriminatory
intent by the defendant or its agents."'); KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 170.20 (2005) ("Direct evidence would include
statements showing a discriminatory motivation for the defendant's treatment of the
plaintiff."). Indeed, in light of this memo directing the manager to discriminate-a
tremendous demand effect-it would have been surprising had Ziegert and Hanges not
found greater evidence of discrimination in this condition. The study also asked subjects
playing the role of managers to evaluate applicants on the basis of paper dossiers alone,
Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 95, at 556, a practice which may occur with some
regularity but which rarely gives rise to discrimination lawsuits. See Copus, supra note
147, at 452 ("[E]mployment discrimination lawsuits challenging alleged discrimination in
the screening of resumes are exceptionally rare.").
153 See infra Part III.C.2.
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women in social skills ratings by subjects who scored higher on the gender
stereotype IAT, but this relationship between subjective judgments and IAT
scores was not found with respect to hireability ratings).15 4
A few other studies examine the relation between implicit prejudice and
subjective evaluations of social group members, but not in employment
settings, which present a host of special external validity concerns. 155
Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues examined the relation between African-
Americans' scores on the race IAT and their judgments about a Black or
White person as a partner on an upcoming anagram-solving task. 156 They
found no relation between subjects' actual choices of partners and IAT
scores, 157 but they did find a significant correlation between IAT scores and
subjects' expectations and attitudes about partnering with a White or Black
person. 158 Rudman and Lee found a correlation between subjects' scores on a
race stereotype IAT and subjects' ratings of the hostility and sexism
evidenced by a Black target's ambiguous behavior, but this correlation did
not hold for subjects' ratings of the Black target's intelligence or for any
ratings of a White target. 159
Given the mixed evidence on implicit measures of prejudice as predictors
of subjective judgments, a priority for would-be exporters of IAT findings to
the law should be to examine the relationship between IAT scores and
subjective evaluations of men, women, and minorities for suitability in
different jobs and for performance in different jobs, and the moderators of
154 See Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and
Backlash TowardAgentic Women, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 743, 756-57 (2001).
155 For a discussion of external validity considerations when extending basic
research to employment settings, see infra Part III.D.
156 Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Black Americans' Implicit Racial Associations and
Their Implications for Intergroup Judgment, 21 SOC. COGNITION 61, 66 (2003).
157 Id. at 70 n.2.
158 Id. at 75 ("The more blacks implicitly preferred their own race relative to whites,
the greater their preference for a black relative to a white work partner."). Note that the
researchers used the phrase "partner preference" to refer to judgments about the White
and Black potential partners, rather than to refer to the actual choice of partners. Note
also that this correlation was only marginally significant after controlling for explicit
measures of racism. Id. at 76.
159 Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of
Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 133, 143 (2002); see also Gawronski et al., supra note 133, at 26 (using a
median split of scores on a gender stereotype IAT to group people as possessing strong or
weak gender stereotype associations and finding that strong stereotype associations were
correlated with a gender bias in target attributions when guessing whether a man or
woman made a statement).
2006]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
this relationship. 160 However, these studies should-at a minimum-control
for objective differences in job performance across groups, which may reflect
true differences in performance or may reveal that objective measures have
even greater adverse impact than subjective evaluations. 161
4. Alternative Psychological Explanations of the IAT Effect
Some legal scholars carefully avoid labeling high scores on the TAT
evidence of unconscious prejudice. 162 Recent research underscores the
wisdom of such circumspection. There is strong evidence that psychological
processes aside from out-group hostility can artificially inflate and otherwise
distort scores on implicit measures such as the IAT. 163 These alternative
processes include the power of stimulus familiarity/unfamiliarity to
facilitate/impede reaction time, the power of compassion to increase the
accessibility of negatively-charged cognitions, the power of widely known
but not personally accepted cultural stereotypes to influence the accessibility
of associations, the power of objective correlations between group
membership and socio-economic outcomes to influence the accessibility of
associations, and the power of individual differences in cognitive flexibility
to influence reaction time in response to shifting instructions such as those
employed with the IAT.
a. Figure-Ground Asymmetry, Not Antipathy
One challenger to the implicit-prejudice explanation of the TAT effect is
160 See Dasgupta, supra note 36, at 157-58 ("Just as implicit attitudes have, in
recent years, been shown to be remarkably malleable, so too behaviors are also quite
malleable depending on the extent to which awareness, control, and motivation are at
play." (citation omitted)).
161 See generally Roth et al., supra note 151, at 702; Frank L. Schmidt & John E.
Hunter, The Validity and Utility of Selection Methods in Personnel Psychology: Practical
and Theoretical Implications of 85 Years of Research Findings, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 262
(1998).
162 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 108, at 1551 (indicating that "when
we say that subjects have an 'automatic preference for white,' we mean nothing more
than that they automatically associate white with good and black with bad").
163 See, e.g., Frederica R. Conrey et al., Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit
Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implicit Task Performance, 89 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483 (2005) ("[O]ur findings suggest that researchers should exercise
caution in assuming that the implicit prejudice scores they calculate with priming
measures or with the IAT reflect exclusively the strength of automatic associations.").
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the "figure-ground model." 164 In this model, IAT effects do not carry the
morally loaded meaning assigned them by IAT proponents (unconscious
negative evaluations of minorities) because the effects can be better
explained by confounding variation in the salience of the specific stimuli
used in the test.
The figure-ground model starts from the widely accepted assumption
among cognitive psychologists that the human brain organizes visual
experience into figure-ground contrasts: some things occupy the foreground
in consciousness (the "figure") and other things recede into the background
(the "ground"). People partition their experience so that the novel, strange,
and unexpected stand out against the routine, normal, and expected. 16 5
Accordingly, we should generally expect members of out-groups to stand out
against the more routine backdrop of one's in-group:
[D]ifferences in salience reflect an even more fundamental distinction than
differences in evaluation. Figure-ground asymmetries are closely related to
the regulation of behavior. Confronting a stimulus of a figure category
causes an allocation of attention, controlled processing, an interruption of
ongoing processing and behavioral routines, and a reorienting of cognition
and action. The capacity of salient information to capture processing and
164 Rothermund and Wentura call this explanation the "[f]igure-[g]round [m]odel of
IAT [e]ffects," Klaus Rothermund & Dirk Wentura, Underlying Processes in the Implicit
Association Test: Dissociating Salience From Associations, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 139, 140 (2004), while Kinoshita and Peek-O'Leary refer to it as the
"salience asymmetry account," Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary, supra note 26, at 444. "The
main tenet of this account is that the JAT effect is driven by asymmetries in salience
between the contrasting categories." Id. Proctor and Cho, in turn, refer to the IAT effect
as an example of the "salient features coding principle" at work: "The stimulus and
response sets are coded with respect to their salient features, and translation of a stimulus
into a response is fastest for mappings in which the salient features of the sets
correspond." See Robert W. Proctor & Yank Seok Cho, Polarity Correspondence: A
General Principle for Performance of Speeded Binary Classification Tasks, 132
PSYCHOL. BULL. 416, 418 (2006). Proctor and Cho note that this account has the
advantage of parsimony over the evaluation account because: (1) it fits the data from a
wide range of speed binary classification tasks, of which the IAT is a special case, see id.
at 418; and (2) it is possible to obtain IAT effects even when the attribute categories do
not differ in valence. See id. at 435.
165 Recently Nisbett and his colleagues have shown that East Asians tend to attend
to the environment as a whole while Westerns tend to focus on particular objects within
the environment. Li-Jun Ji et al., Culture, Control, and Perception of Relationships in the
Environment, 78 J. PERSONALITY SOC. & PSYCHOL. 943, 952 (2000); Takahiko Masuda &
Richard E. Nisbett, Attending Holistically Versus Analytically: Comparing the Context
Sensitivity of Japanese and Americans, 81 J. PERSONALITY SOC. & PSYCHOL. 922, 933
(2001). Therefore, disparity in attention to the figure relative to the ground may be
culturally determined rather than a universal feature of cognition.
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action resources, however, is not tied to a specific valence. For example,
both positive and negative other-relevant traits (e.g., generous, aggressive)
automatically attract attention and interrupt current behavioral routines
irrespective of their valence. 16 6
The figure-ground model attributes the IAT effect to a confounding
variable: the failure to control for asymmetries in salience between the
contrasting categories. When subjects confront the taxing binary-
classification task used in the IAT (whether to press the left or right key
when shifting combinations of pleasant-versus-unpleasant and young-versus-
old stimuli flash up on the screen), they try to simplify that task by focusing
on only one of the contrasting categories. 167 People reflexively place the
more unusual category in the perceptual foreground-and relegate the other
category to the background. This leads to the prediction that performance
should be facilitated if people are asked to press the same key (say, left) to
both of the stimuli in the perceptual foreground and the same key to both of
the stimuli in the perceptual background. Researchers have found exactly
such facilitation when they manipulated the focal category by instructing
subjects to respond to only one category in the individual target and attribute
classification blocks (e.g., "respond if the item is a young [old] person's name
and make no response otherwise"). 168
Brendl and colleagues also demonstrate the power of figure-ground
asymmetries by tweaking the original demonstration of the IAT as a measure
of implicit attitudes. In the first published report on the IAT, Greenwald and
colleagues constructed a flower-insect IAT to show that people more
strongly associate flowers with positive words and insects with negative
words-and the data seemed to support that contention. 169 Brendl and
colleagues, however, substituted nonsense syllables for flowers as one of the
target categories and showed that people responded faster when insects and
pleasant words were assigned one response (say, the left key) and
affectively-neutral nonsense syllables (e.g., WAB, ZIL) and unpleasant
words were assigned the other response (say, the right key). 170 If we accept
the logic underlying Greenwald et al.'s interpretation of the IAT effect, we
are now obliged to conclude from the Brendl group's results that people have
an implicit positive attitude toward insects.
But this leads to a contradiction for the implicit-attitude explanation. If
166 Rothermund & Wentura, supra note 164, at 159 (citation omitted).
167 For a full description of procedure involved in the IAT, see supra Part II.B.
168 Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary, supra note 26, at 444.
169 See Greenwald et al., supra note 5, at 1466-70 (Experiment 1).
170 Brendl et al., supra note 71, at 767-68.
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the IAT exclusively measures evaluative associations and if the original IAT
result reflects an insect-negativity association, then this same association
should have prevailed in the nonsense-syllable IAT. By contrast, the figure-
ground model readily explains these findings. Nonsense syllables carry, by
definition, minimal good-bad meaning but these weird combinations of
letters are unfamiliar and thus more distinctive than words that denote
everyday insects. The figure-ground asymmetry in the target dimension was
thus reversed, and nonsense syllables and negative words formed the figures
against a background of positive words and insects. The figure-ground model
thus predicts faster responses when insects and positive words are assigned
the same response. 171
Such experiments have led some scholars to conclude that greater
familiarity with one ethnic-racial group (e.g., Whites over Blacks) drives at
least part of the race IAT effect. 172 Here it is worth emphasizing that this
171 Rothermund and Wentura explain the result thus:
Assume ... that the two categories of both the target and the attribute
dimension indeed differ in salience (e.g., assume that insects are more salient than
flowers and that unpleasant words are more salient than pleasant words). In this
case, participants would find it easier to respond if the salient categories of both
dimensions (the figures) were mapped onto one response and the non-salient
categories (the background) were mapped onto the other response. With such a
consistent assignment of salient and non-salient categories to responses, category
salience helps to discriminate between responses. The categorization task now
resembles a simple visual search task with a display set size of one stimulus .... If
a stimulus belongs to a salient category, a "yes" response is executed .... If the
stimulus does not belong to a salient category, a "no" response is executed .... In
incompatible blocks, by contrast, the salience and response dimensions are ... not
mapped consistently onto responses .... [And] there is [therefore] no facilitative
influence of salience on responding. The figure-ground model thus assumes that IAT
effects reflect independent salience asymmetries within the target and attribute
dimensions.
Rothermund & Wentura, supra note 164, at 140 (citation omitted).
172 For instance, Brendl and colleagues caution against a "prejudice only"
interpretation of the IAT effect:
The present studies show that each one of the following people would be
diagnosed as negatively prejudiced against African Americans in the Black-name-
White-name IAT: A person with (a) prestored negative evaluations of Black names,
(b) prestored positive evaluations of White names without evaluative associations to
Black names, (c) stronger prestored positive evaluations of White than Black names
without negative evaluations of either, and (d) low familiarity of Black names in the
absence of any prestored evaluation of Black names. In our view there is little doubt
that according to commonly agreed on definitions of prejudice only the first person
would be called prejudiced. Whereas prejudice leads to an IAT effect, an IAT effect
does not unambiguously indicate prejudice, because it can have multiple causes.
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argument, like later arguments in this subsection, need not be "either/or." It is
damaging to the "prejudice" interpretation of the IAT effect even if only
modest percentages of the variance in IAT scores (say, 10% or 15%) are
attributable to salience asymmetries. Such damage can be cumulative in an
especially theory-threatening way in light of two additional facts: (a)
psychometric estimates of error variance (unreliability) in implicit measures
often exceed 50% of the total variance, 173 so conceding any portion of the
remaining systematic variance to other theoretical perspectives is troubling to
the implicit prejudice account; (b) salience asymmetry is but one of many
counter-interpretations of what the IAT and related instruments tap, which
we address shortly. Insofar as these additional counter-interpretations of the
race IAT effect also explain significant fractions of the variance, it becomes
increasingly difficult for defenders of the race IAT not only to portray their
instrument as a pure measure of implicit racial attitudes, but even to portray
their instrument as primarily a measure of implicit racial attitudes.
One worrisome sign of politicized research programs-in which
hypothesis advocacy has supplanted hypothesis testing-is the haste with
which counter-interpretations are dismissed. Implicit prejudice advocates
confidently assert that they have ruled out familiarity as an explanation of
IAT results.' 74 If, by this claim, they mean "for all IAT results," the claim is
Brendl et al., supra note 71, at 768-69; see also Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary, supra note
26, at 446 (reviewing evidence "suggestive of the possibility that at least some part of the
prowhite IAT effect reflects salience asymmetry, rather than more positive evaluation of
whites than blacks").
173 See Cunningham et al., supra note 126, at 169 ("Our analyses of implicit attitude
measures suggest that the degree of measurement error in response-latency measures can
be substantial---estimates of Cronbach's alpha indicated that, on average, more than 30%
of the variance associated with the measurements was random error."). Cunningham et al.
report alpha coefficients of .78 and .63 for the IATs they studied. Id. at 166. If the mean
alpha for the IAT is taken to be .70, this yields a rough estimate of error variance of over
50% (using the simple formula of error variance = I - alpha coefficient squared).
Furthermore, data gathered by Blanton and his colleagues indicates that "the largest
source of variation in the component parts of these measures probably is systematic error
and that variation due to processing speed sometimes may reflect meaningful variation
rather than simple method variance." Hart Blanton et al., Decoding the Implicit
Association Test: Implications for Criterion Prediction, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 27, on file with authors).
174 Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans:
Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 316, 325
(2000) ("The present findings refute the familiarity explanation by demonstrating
automatic White preference even when subjective familiarity with Black and White
exemplars is equated."); see also Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 282 (relying on the
Dasgupta et al., supra, study for the proposition that "mere familiarity' cannot account
for implicit attitudes measured by the IAT"); Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1072 n.46
(claiming that the IAT measures are not confounded with familiarity).
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demonstrably false. If, by this claim, they mean that there are at least some
IAT results that are difficult to explain in terms of figure-ground
asymmetries, they may be right, but the evidence they invoke even for this
limited claim is far from decisive.' 75 For instance, IAT advocates regularly
175 Rothermund and Wentura recently re-affirmed their position that the figure-
ground explanation remains strong despite the efforts of Greenwald and others to
undercut it. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Validity of the Salience Asymmetry
Interpretation of the Implicit Association Test: Comment on Rothermund and Wentura
(2004), 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 420 (2005); Klaus Rothermund et al.,
Validity of the Salience Asymmetry Account of the Implicit Association Test: Reply to
Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005), 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GENERAL 426 (2005).
Indeed, in this exchange, Greenwald and colleagues make critical concessions. They
acknowledge that: (a) they have worked with a very loose definition of mental
"association" that could reflect the operation of a wide range of psychological processes,
including frequency, contiguity (in time or place), similarity, contrast, or causation, see
Greenwald et al., supra, at 421; and (b) "salience asymmetries have the potential to
contribute to IAT effects," id. at 420. Greenwald and colleagues do not, however,
surrender. They counter-attack. On the theoretical front, they try to neutralize the salience
counter-interpretation by attributing the dispute simply to rival definitions and stipulating
that their definition of "association" is broad enough to cover many studies inspired by
the rival figure-ground account. Rothermund, Wentura, and De Houwer reply pointedly
that the broad conception of association preferred by Greenwald et al. renders the concept
of association "meaningless and inconsequential." Rothermund et al., supra, at 427. They
continue:
When used in a broad sense, [association] can refer to any process or relation.
Also, if an IAT effect is found, one can always find some feature that the concepts
of the IAT have in common. Hence, we agree with the view of Kinoshita and
O'Leary: "In the absence of a commitment to a theory of association, association can
be defined only post hoc, by the data. Thus, the target and attribute dimensions are
said to be associated when there is an IAT effect, and unassociated when no IAT
effect is observed .... This is clearly circular, and the claim that the IAT effect taps
associations between the target and attribute dimensions can never be falsified."
Id. at 427. On the methodological front, Greenwald et al. try to neutralize data that
support the figure-ground model by arguing that critics have failed to follow standard
IAT protocols. Displaying uncharacteristic sensitivity to the problems that arise from
using artificial laboratory stimuli, they declare that "the IAT does not function properly"
when researchers use words versus non-words as task categories or when researchers fail
to use their preferred scoring rules. Greenwald et al., supra, at 423. But these objections
have no grounding in psychological theory (IAT advocates had already conceded they did
not have a theory of response mechanisms) and, if heeded, would prevent researchers
from performing the IAT experiments necessary to pinpoint underlying processes (the
only way to determine what should constitute the "standard protocol" is by testing non-
standard variations). In short, the IAT research program, at the tender age of eight years,
is displaying signs of "Lakatosian" degeneration into tautology. See Imre Lakatos,
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND
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cite a study by Dasgupta and her colleagues as definitive evidence against the
familiarity explanation.' 76 That study used photographs of non-famous Black
and White people as stimuli in the IAT and rested on the precarious
assumption that these photographs would be equally unfamiliar to research
participants. 177 When the IAT revealed faster response times to the pairing of
White faces with pleasant words, the authors argued that differential
familiarity could not account for this result because pictures of non-famous
White and Black persons must be equally unfamiliar. 178 As Kinoshita and
Peek-O'Leary point out, this argument ignores the well-replicated "other race
effect": people more readily recognize the faces of strangers from their own
race than from others. 179 Substantial evidence suggests that this effect is due
to familiarity, including work showing that faces from familiar racial groups
are recognized more holistically and evidence that the other-race effect can
be reduced by frequent cross-racial contact. Similar indeterminacy problems
arise with respect to the other lines of evidence that IAT defenders invoke
against the familiarity hypothesis, including both brain-imaging and
behavioral evidence.180
It is not unusual for competing theoretical accounts to coexist for
findings from the same experimental task in cognitive psychology. But it is
unusual for the societal stakes to be so large and so contingent on which
account is correct. From the available evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
that: (a) the familiarity account does explain significant fractions of the
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 118 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970)
(describing "problemshifts" that do not involve novel factual predictions or empirical
corroboration of such predictions as signs of degeneration within a research program);
see also id. at 175 n.2 (describing theoretical moves that predict no novel facts as "ad hoc
theories"). The growing recognition in the scientific community of the failure of IAT
advocates to advance a falsifiable process model should serve as an instructive warning
to the legal community.
176 See Dasgupta et al., supra note 85, at 240; see also Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary,
supra note 26, at 446 (noting that this Dasgupta et al. study is "often cited as ruling out
familiarity as the basis of the race IAT effect").
177 The report of this study does not indicate that subjective familiarity with the
pictures was pre- or post-tested. See Dasgupta et al., supra note 174.
178 See id. at 325 ("The present findings refute the familiarity explanation by
demonstrating automatic White preference even when subjective familiarity with Black
and White exemplars is equated."). The authors of the study also base this conclusion on
a race IAT involving "White names" and "Black names" in which they statistically
controlled for stimulus familiarity, see id. at 322-24, but this study is also problematic for
reasons Kinoshita and Peek-O'Leary point out. See Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary, supra
note 26, at 446-47.
179 See id. at 446.
180 See id. at 446-47 (discussing problems with studies claiming to have ruled out
familiarity as an explanation of the IAT effect).
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variance in those studies in which it has been directly pitted against the
evaluation account; (b) the vast majority of IAT research has not been
properly designed if the goal is to determine the precise processes that
underlie IAT effects; 181 and (c) given that salience and valence are often
naturally intertwined, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to disentangle
these explanations using the naturalistic stimulus materials preferred by IAT
researchers who seek to engage the broader societal debates about racism,
sexism, heterosexism, and ageism.
b. Fear of Being Labeled a Bigot, Not Bigotry
Implicit measures of prejudice are generally more subtle than the explicit
measures of prejudice they have been advanced to complement. 182 But, as
anyone who has ever taken the race-based IAT appreciates, it soon becomes
obvious that the researchers are curious about how one thinks about race, and
this realization can make subjects apprehensive. 183 Consistent with this
concern, a recent study found that the more threatened research participants
felt by the IAT-the threat of being stereotyped as White racists-the
"worse" their scores were on the IAT. 184 "If individuals are highly motivated
to control prejudiced responses, then leading them-or allowing them-to
181 See Rothermund & Wentura, supra note 164, at 159 ("Standard IATs should be
accompanied by a corresponding word-nonword version of the task (or by any other
technical version of the task that makes use of an asymmetrical attribute dichotomy that
is clearly not associated with the target categories).").
182 For a discussion of methods to use to ameliorate social desirability bias in
responses to explicit measures of prejudice, see David 0. Sears, A Perspective on Implicit
Prejudice from Survey Research, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 293, 295-96 (2004).
183 Indeed, the web version of the IAT, through which a massive amount of IAT
data has been collected, see, e.g., Nosek et al., supra note 6, at 102, expressly advises
potential participants that various versions of the IAT are meant to assess attitudes toward
different groups and indicates that the IAT often reveals preferences for majority groups.
For instance, the page on which participants choose a particular IAT test informs the
participant that the gender-science IAT "often reveals a relative link between liberal arts
and females and between science and males," that the race IAT "indicates that most
Americans have an automatic preference for white over black," that the sexuality IAT
"often reveals an automatic preference for straight relative to gay people," that the weight
IAT "often reveals an automatic preference for thin people relative to fat people," and
that the Arab-Muslim IAT "frequently reveals an automatic preference for other people
compared to Arab-Muslims." Implicit Association Test, Select a Test,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/selectatest.jsp (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
184 Frantz et al., supra note 28, at 1621 ("[T]hreatened participants (i.e., those who
were told or who guessed what the IAT assessed) had higher IAT effects than
nonthreatened participants (i.e., those who did not know the nature of the measure)").
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believe that the IAT measures racism will result in elevated IAT effects."' 85
These researchers highlight a measurement dilemma: "the race IAT's
purpose is extremely difficult to mask and that failing to mask its purpose
results in elevated scores." 186
This feature of the IAT has the potential to create a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Implicit prejudice researchers attribute stubbornly persistent
inequalities in the U.S. to stubbornly persistent prejudice among White
Americans-and develop a test that, while less obvious than most explicit
measures of prejudice, is still a fairly transparent gauge of racial sentiment.
Many Whites-including the most politically correct among them-then
react to the identity threat posed by the IAT by choking under stress-and
performing even worse on the IAT, thus confirming the researchers' original
stereotype of them.187
c. Sympathy, Not Antipathy
The alternative explanations considered so far-familiarity confounds
and evaluation-apprehension confounds-raise the possibility that IAT
effects are not driven by negatively-charged mental associations. The next
three alternative explanations-sympathy versus antipathy, awareness versus
endorsement of cultural stereotypes, and awareness versus justification of
depressing realities--concede that some form of associationist account is
needed to explain at least some fraction of the systematic variance in IAT
scores. But these explanations challenge the characterization of associations
as tapping into racial attitudes-at least attitudes in the commonsense view
that the attitudes imply an evaluative preference that, when brought to
people's attention, they endorse and are even prepared to justify under
appropriate conditions. 188
185 Id. at 1622.
186 Id.
187 See id. ("Ironically, the IAT appears to be the most threatening to people who
most want to appear nonracist .... [T]he present results indicate that under situations of
threat, the desire to behave in an egalitarian manner leads to larger, not smaller, IAT
effects.")
188 Implicit prejudice researchers use "attitude" and "association" interchangeably.
But Fiedler and colleagues note that equating attitude and association "is problematic
because attitudes are one-dimensional" approach-avoidance constructs whereas
associations are "multidimensional." Klaus Fiedler et al., Unresolved Problems with the
"I, the "A "and the "T": Logical and Psychometric Critique of the Implicit Association
Test (IA T), EUR. REv. SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 12). Consider
four examples: (1) associations can bind synonyms (friend-ally) or antonyms (friend-foe);
(2) associations can cause assimilation (negative stereotype of group x can lead to
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The "sympathy rather than antipathy" explanation poses the possibility
that the allegedly negative associations revealed by the IAT are rooted more
in compassion or guilt about the predicament of African-Americans than in
hostility or contempt. Consider this thought experiment advanced by Arkes
and Tetlock. 189 Imagine two citizens who have very different views on the
obstacles to racial equality. One citizen is sympathetic to a left-liberal
political agenda, believes that racial discrimination is an ongoing problem,
supports affirmative action, and believes that African-Americans are
disadvantaged in America today due t(, the historical legacy of slavery,
continuing exploitation, and de facto segregation. This citizen believes that
progress during the past half century has been too little too late, and he is
convinced that many Whites unfortunately continue to harbor resentment of
African-Americans. The other citizen is sympathetic to the right-conservative
political agenda and believes in the power of individual responsibility and
competition to propel African-Americans up the ladder of success. This
citizen disapproves of affirmative action and believes that the primary cause
of African-American economic and educational inequality in America today
is internal to the African-American community: the widespread abdication of
personal responsibility within inner city communities and the surge in the
late twentieth century of out-of-wedlock births.
Although the two individuals disagree profoundly on key political issues,
they agree on basic facts. They agree that the African-American family is in
trouble, that African-American crime rates are far too high, and that African-
American educational test scores are too low. They react to these facts with
distinct mixtures of sorrow, frustration, and anger directed at distinct political
targets.
Is there any compelling theoretical reason to expect these two individuals
to exhibit different reaction times on implicit measures or any compelling
methodological reason to expect implicit measures, such as the IAT, to
differentiate people who share a large knowledge base but differ in their
negative evaluations despite surprisingly good performance) or contrast effects (negative
stereotype can lead to even more positive evaluations in the wake of surprisingly good
performance); (3) associations can be asymmetric (the expected probability of cheddar
given cheese is greater than that of cheese given cheddar); and (4) associations can be
influenced by superficial factors such as word frequency or rhyming that are independent
of semantic overlap. If the implied equivalence of attitudes and associations collapses, so
too does the argument for treating implicit associative measures as implicit measures of
attitudes and hence prejudice.
189 See Arkes & Tetlock, supra note 29, at 257. This article is subtitled, "Would
Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the [IAT]?," because Jesse Jackson is at real theoretical risk of
failing the IAT given his admission that he associates Blacks more strongly with violent
crime than he does Whites. See id. at 257, 264-65.
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causal attributions for inequality? 190 Promoters of the IAT have presented no
evidence that current reaction time measures can reliably distinguish
qualitatively different cognitive-emotional states, such as frustration, sorrow
and anger rooted in competing cognitive appraisals of the political scene.
Indeed, there is suggestive evidence to the contrary. Uhlmann and his
colleagues experimentally created fictitious groups, some of which were
portrayed as victims of oppression not dissimilar to that experienced by many
African-Americans, and found that subjects had more "negative" IAT scores
toward the groups who were treated manifestly unfairly and who, most
importantly, elicited sympathy, not contempt, from observers. 191
This alternative sympathy-based account of the IAT effect is every bit as
well-positioned as racial-animus accounts to explain the ostensibly "hardest-
science" evidence for the construct validity of the IAT, namely, work on
neuropsychological correlates.192 Phelps and colleagues reported that
190 Defenders of the IAT can concede that they have no theoretical basis for
distinguishing the two individuals in the thought experiment but still insist they have
some empirical basis. The low positive correlations between the IAT and so-called
modem racism scales suggest at least limited power to make such distinctions. Putting to
the side whether people should be labeled racists for believing that many or most
obstacles to racial equality are now internal to the Black community, the unstable and
often weak correlational links here mean that substantial percentages of White Americans
are failing the IAT even though their belief system is much closer to the first than to the
second individual. Full disclosure on the part of IAT advocates should require that they
estimate these percentages when they make claims about the pervasiveness of implicit
prejudice.
191 See Uhlmann et al., supra note 27, at 494; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis
M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: The Moderating Role of
Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 268, 277 (2006) ("[T]he present studies are the first to show that, although
spontaneous behavior toward stigmatized others may be driven by automatically
activated prejudice under some conditions, conscious processes such as the motivation to
be egalitarian and behavioral control can circumvent the effect of automatic prejudice on
outward behavior."); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype
Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
167, 181-82 (1999) ("Activation of stereotypes can be controlled by more dominant
responses, in this case, egalitarian goals. However, this requires commitment to such a
goal, and without commitment, stereotype activation will be likely to occur ....
Commitment to egalitarian goals can prevent stereotype activation when making
inferences from social information.").
192 Kinoshita and Peek-O'Leary also show how the neuroscience evidence can be
explained in their salience-asymmetry framework. See Kinoshita & Peek-O'Leary, supra
note 26, at 447-48. Contrary to claims that we can now read minds for evidence of
racism in the brain, there is growing concern among neuroscientists that, although careful
research can identify brain sites responsible for key processes such as visual pattern
recognition, spatial-mathematical reasoning and language comprehension, we make an
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differences in strength of amygdala activation to African-American versus
White faces was correlated with bias detected on the IAT. 193 The authors
announced that "we have for the first time related indirect behavioral
measures of social evaluation to neuronal activity."' 94 The authors noted that,
while the amygdala is involved in signaling the presence of stimuli with
emotional significance, their data "cannot speak to the issue of causality."' 195
Thus, it is not clear what emotions are implicated, and no reason is given to
presume that the results are attributable to racial animus as opposed to guilt,
shame, or another emotion.
The neuropsychological research is in sharp tension with the implicit
tone of moral condemnation inherent in the term "implicit prejudice." If we
assume that spreading semantic activation and amygdala activity are beyond
one's conscious control, can we hold others blameworthy for such factors as
"bad" amygdala behavior? Note that Phelps and colleagues failed to find any
relation between scores on explicit measures of prejudice and "bad"
amygdala behavior. 196 If persons exhibit no explicit prejudice and their
behavior is above psychometric reproach, but their amygdala fires
suspiciously, what moral stance should be taken toward these individuals?
We question whether they should be censured for manifesting the "residues"
of a racist culture, particularly when their conscious attitudes indicate disgust
or unhappiness with those aspects of American cultural history.
d. Cultural Knowledge and Other Extrapersonal Associations, Not
Personal Animus
Soon after the IAT was introduced, researchers skeptical of the rush to
label IAT scores evidence of implicit prejudice hypothesized that IAT results
enormous category mistake when we posit crude reductionist equivalences between
neuronal activity and social-legal concepts such as moral responsibility, prejudice and
racism. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 100 (2005)
("Responsibility is a human construct that exists only in the social world, where there is
more than one person. It is a socially constructed rule that exists only in the context of
human interaction. No pixel in a brain scan will ever be able to show culpability or
nonculpability."); id. at 106 ("Even if [brain imaging] studies ... eventually prove able to
link specific brain activity to racist thoughts, it will remain difficult to prove that a
person's racist thoughts necessarily lead to racist acts. The very suggestion is prejudicial
and dangerous. This sort of one-to-one correspondence will prove wrongheaded in the
long run.").
193 Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 732-33 (2000)
(finding this result in Experiment 1, but not Experiment 2).
19 4 Id. at 734.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 732-33.
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may be driven less by what respondents actually feel or believe and more by
what they think other people-in the past or present-feel or believe (in
short, cultural stereotypes to which respondents have been exposed, even in
the context of public education campaigns designed to disabuse people of
prejudice). Just as there is no good theoretical or methodological reason for
supposing that the IAT is sensitive enough to distinguish sympathy from
antipathy, there is no good reason for supposing it is sensitive enough to
distinguish between automatically activated associations that, if called to
people's attention, they would endorse and those associations that, if called to
people's attention, they would categorically reject. Indeed, implicit-prejudice
researchers make precisely this point when they declare that the associations
needed to drive the IAT do not require conscious endorsement. It follows that
mere knowledge of cultural stereotypes about minorities should be sufficient
to cause people to manifest "prejudice" on the IAT. 197 Several studies
support this hypothesis.' 98 For instance, Judd, Blair, and Chapleau concluded
that the activation of cultural stereotypes rather than activation of personal
beliefs or prejudice better explains the anti-Black "shooter bias" found in the
handgun identification studies referenced earlier.19
9
More generally, "the IAT may be influenced not only by information that
is prevalent in our culture, but also by information that, although not the
basis of one's personal evaluations and irrelevant to any privately made
197 See Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 280 ("To speak of implicit attitudes as
endorsed would be as nonsensical as speaking about a dog endorsing a bone."). Note that
Wheeler and Petty, in their review of the effects of stereotype activation on behavior,
concur that a stereotype can influence behavior even if one disagrees with the stereotype.
See S. Christian Wheeler & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Stereotype Activation on
Behavior: A Review of Possible Mechanisms, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 797, 820-21 (2001).
198 See Han et al., supra note 144, at 269 ("The two experiments reported here
suggest that the traditional LAT is influenced both by one's personal associations and by
extrapersonal associations--ones that are attitude-irrelevant but that are valenced and
available in memory."); Karpinski & Hilton, supra note 131, at 786 ("[T]he results of
these studies provide preliminary support for the environmental association model of the
TAT. According to this model, the TAT taps the associations a person has been exposed to
in his or her environment, not that individual's level of endorsement regarding the
attitude object."); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing the Influence of
Extrapersonal Associations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT, 86 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 653, 663 (2004) (replicating and extending work of
Karpinski and Hilton and concluding that "[d]ata from the four experiments reported here
suggest that the IAT has the potential to be contaminated by associations that although
available in memory are irrelevant to one's evaluation of the attitude object").
199 Charles M. Judd et al., Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting
Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 75, 80 (2004); see also supra note 146 (describing prior handgun identification
studies).
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approach-avoidance decision, nevertheless is valenced and available in
memory." 200 Accordingly, Han, Olson, and Fazio found that experimental
subjects exposed to valenced information inconsistent with the subjects' own
personal associations with an attitude object showed a reduced IAT effect
(that is, the IAT picked up the extrapersonal association and not just personal
associations with an attitude object).20' And Olson and Fazio have shown in
other studies that traditional versions of the IAT likely overstate the
prevalence of anti-Black attitudes because the traditional IAT is a crude
measure of associations that cannot distinguish between personal attitudes
toward an object and extrapersonal associations with the same object.20 2
e. Knowledge of Depressing Realities, Not Approval of Those Realities
This next objection is easily misunderstood: it posits that implicit
prejudice, as now conceived, labels perfectly rational reactions to existing
socioeconomic conditions as prejudiced. It is easy to twist this argument so
that it reads "prejudice or discrimination is rational." The actual argument is,
however, more subtle: if one accepts the approach taken by IAT advocates to
the definition of implicit prejudice, then one also accepts that it is reasonable
to set one's threshold for labeling people prejudiced so low that virtually
everyone-even rational observers of the social scene-qualifies as
prejudiced. Curiously, this was one of the few points of convergence in a
recent debate in Psychological Inquiry over the lessons that can be drawn
from the IAT research program.203 The leading psychological defenders of
the IAT, Banaji, Greenwald, and Nosek, and their critics seemed to agree that
the IAT makes it possible to be a Bayesian bigot (that is, simply following
Bayesian principles for updating beliefs and computing probabilities in an
inegalitarian society should qualify one as a bigot under the implicit-
prejudice view)-although they disagreed over whether this constituted a
strength or a reductio ad absurdum of the IAT research program. 204
200 Han et al., supra note 144, at 261.
201 See id. at 267.
202 Olson & Fazio, supra note 198, at 663 ("In Experiments I and 2, White
participants appeared less prejudiced on the modified Black-White IAT than on the
traditional IAT. This finding is consistent with the reasoning that when completing a
traditional Black-White IAT, information about society's negative portrayal of Blacks
facilitates the process of assigning Blacks and unpleasant items to the same response key,
hence creating more prejudiced attitude estimates.").
203 See Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 83-85; Tetlock & Arkes, supra note 29, at
319.
204 See Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 285. Arkes and Tetlock were of the view that
if the theoretical logic of the IAT requires that Jesse Jackson be classified as prejudiced
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To understand how easy it is to qualify as a Bayesian bigot within the
IAT methodology, it is necessary to grant only the following, borderline
platitudinous, observations about American society. First, although there is
sharp disagreement about why there is so much racial inequality, there is
little disagreement about the raw facts: across the spectrum, African-
Americans have, on average, fewer of the good things in life (high incomes
and net worth, college educations, etc.) and more of the bad things in life
(higher rates of imprisonment, violence, drug abuse, out of wedlock births,
etc.). Second, although psychologists debate exactly how adept people are at
assessing natural patterns of covariation, 20 5 no one has seriously argued that
racial inequalities of the magnitude present in American society would likely
go unnoticed by the majority of the American population, or fail to be
encoded in the associative networks on which the population relies to
navigate the social environment (judgment calls on which neighborhoods are
safer-and does this covary with race?; which schools have higher test
scores-and does this covary with race?; and so on). Third, given all that
psychologists have learned about the dynamics of associative learning over
the past century-from Pavlov's salivating dogs to Skinner's pecking
pigeons to computer simulations of semantic memory-it is inevitable that a
substantial network of negative associations will build up over a lifetime in a
society in which there are large intergroup inequalities charged with negative
emotional significance.
This argument implies that if we accept the theoretical logic of the IAT
at face value, people are guaranteed to fail the test whenever they satisfy
three starkly minimalist conditions: (a) they live in a society with intergroup
inequalities; (b) they are reasonably attentive observers of covariations
between group membership and important social facts (crime, school failure,
poverty, etc); and (c) they attach evaluative significance to these factual
inequalities, regardless of how they might explain them. This argument also
implies that IAT researchers have overlooked the most obvious of all
possible confounding variables within their associationist/learning-theory
paradigm: knowledge of the social world. The more people know about the
past and present history of American race relations, and about current
patterns of inequality, the worse they should score on the IAT. It reveals
much about the collective mindset of the IAT research community that no
against Blacks, then absurdity cannot be far off See Tetlock & Arkes, supra note 29, at
319. Banaji et al. were of the view that changing times-scientific and societal-require
changing definitions of prejudice and that there is no place for nostalgic clinging to old-
fashioned definitions of prejudice. See Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 286-87.
205 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered. Descriptive,
Normative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1996).
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reported IAT study has yet implemented this fundamental control variable. 20 6
The analytical distinctions in this subsection are of more than
philosophical interest. Recognizing that real-world variables do not exist in
statistical isolation from one another, the courts permit employers to base
decisions on job-relevant attributes correlated with protected-category
membership, 20 7 though such decision-making may expose the employer to
disparate impact liability or disparate treatment liability if the correlated
category is used as cover to discriminate on the basis of protected category
membership. 20 8 Just as it would be bizarre to constrain employers to base
206 McCauley and Stitt provide a measure for implementing this control variable
which might be called an "explicit association test." See Clark R. McCauley &
Christopher L. Stitt, An Individual and Quantitative Measure of Stereotypes, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 929, 933 (1978). These researchers examined the
accuracy of stereotypes about African-Americans by comparing beliefs about what
percentage of African-Americans and other Americans exhibit various population
characteristics (e.g., high school graduate, unemployed, crime victim) with census data
on these characteristics. See id. at 936. They found a high correlation between beliefs and
data, indicating that the racial stereotypes were quite accurate. See id. at 937
("Stereotyping on our seven characteristics is clearly veridical in terms of the direction of
the difference perceived between black Americans and all Americans .... [T]he
diagnostic ratios do not appear more extreme than the criterion ratios."). But see MARTIN
GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 68 (1999) (presenting survey evidence in
which Americans overestimated the poverty rate among African-Americans); Ted
Chiricos et al., Racial Typification of Crime and Support for Punitive Measures, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 359, 369-70 ("Estimates substantially exaggerate black involvement in
violent crime, slightly exaggerate black involvement in burglary and underestimate black
involvement in robbery."). Given the psycho-logic of the IAT, subjects in the McCauley
and Stitt study should have exhibited the IAT effect, regardless of their animus toward
African-Americans, simply because they recognized that, for whatever reasons, African-
Americans suffer from social problems at a greater rate than other groups in American
society.
207 In Hazen Paper, the Court ruled that evidence an employer acted on the basis of
an age-correlated variable did not prove intentional age discrimination, at least where age
and the other variable are "analytically distinct." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S.
604, 611 (1993) ("Because age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer
can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a
decision based on years of service is necessarily 'age based."'); see also Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (permitting jury strikes on the basis of Spanish-English
bilingualism despite their adverse impact on persons of Hispanic national origin).
208 Reliance on a variable correlated with protected-category membership may give
rise to a prima facie case of disparate impact, but the employer may avoid liability by
showing that reliance on this correlated variable is a business necessity or has been vetted
as part of a professionally developed test process. Disparate impact claims are viable
under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, and "it seems likely that disparate impact
remains available only to racial minorities and women, with the possible exception that
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their decisions solely on variables that have zero correlations with
membership in protected groups, it would be bizarre to expect people to fail
to notice real-world statistical relationships involving protected categories-
and to expect them not to form mental models of the world (associative
networks) that reflect those relationships. At best, the IAT demonstrates that
these mental models of correlated variables exist for some people-it cannot
disentangle the causal role that either variable, or the correlation itself, plays
in judgment and choice, and it does not take into account competing mental
models that can be readily primed in other contexts. 209
The importance of this distinction can be brought home with a thought
experiment. It is highly likely that the IAT researchers who report "failing"
the IAT, including the test's developers, Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin
Banaji, 210 do so because they recognize the plight of minorities and
sympathize with those groups-indeed, their research is often motivated by a
desire to rectify inequalities. 211 Yet, by the logic of the LAT, these
researchers are implicit bigots on par with children reared in prejudiced
households and taught to hold mean-spirited beliefs about minorities and to
act out these prejudices. But do we really believe that these researchers and
others who "fail" the IAT because they sympathize with minorities-the
whites and males can utilize the theory when they, too, are minorities in a particular
workplace." Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact
Claims by White Males, Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1543 (2004). In addition, conscious use of,
say, income as a proxy to discriminate on racial or ethnic grounds will give rise to a
disparate treatment claim. See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611 ("The employer cannot
rely on age as a proxy for an employee's remaining characteristics, such as productivity,
but must instead focus on those factors directly.").
209 We discuss work on the power of realistic work-setting cues to prime very
different, sometimes pro-Black, sets of associations in the section on external validity.
See infra Part III.D.
210 See Shankar Vedantum, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12
(relating story about failed IATs by Professors Banaji and Greenwald, developers of the
IAT); see also AYRES, supra note 103, at 427 ("I'm saddened to report that after taking
the implicit attitude test several times, I have consistently been rated as having a
'moderate' to 'strong' automatic preference for whites relative to blacks .... I find my
IAT results jarring not because I am surprised that growing up in this society almost
necessarily racialized my perceptions, but because I was mistakenly confident that my
nondiscriminatory ego could stamp out any unconscious discriminatory
predispositions.").
211 See Dasgupta, supra note 36, at 144 ("The discrepancy between increasingly
tolerant self-reported attitudes in the face of enduring and glaring disparities in people's
lived experience prompted some social psychologists to urge the development of
alternative, less obtrusive, measures of attitudes and behavior that do not rely so heavily
on people's willingness and ability to accurately self-report their thoughts and actions,
especially with regard to socially sensitive issues like prejudice and stereotypes."
(citations omitted)).
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same persons who often endorse affirmative action programs, as Kang and
Banaji do,212 and who actively police themselves for discrimination-are
likely to make employment decisions that disadvantage minorities relative to
majority groups? Even in situations involving subjectivity, which
antidiscrimination scholars and IAT proponents most worry about,2 13 it is
more probable that implicit associations entwined with sympathy for
minorities will work for, not against, minorities in the workplace.
f. Cognitive Dexterity, Not Antipathy
We close this section by adding one more explanatory contender to the
mix: the possibility that the IAT will prove a better measure of cognitive
flexibility than of prejudice.
Recall that one's score on the IAT is a difference score: how long it takes
to respond on "incompatible" trials (e.g., "Black" names with positive
adjectives) minus how long it takes to respond on "compatible" ones (e.g.,
"White" names with positive adjectives). If incompatible trials take longer
than compatible trials, then IAT defenders treat this difference as evidence of
implicit prejudice or stereotypes at work. A curious implication of this
procedure is that rapid responding on compatible trials contributes as much
to one's score as sluggish responding on incompatible trials. All trials-being
fast on the designated response keys for White + positive and Black +
negative in "compatible" trials, and being slow on the designated keys for
White + negative and Black + positive in "incompatible" trials-receive
identical weights. IAT researchers recognize some of the dangers created by
this procedure. They recommend data-transformation procedures to minimize
the influence of individual differences in cognitive processing speed. They
argue quite rightly that, by standardizing each individual's scores around his
or her own personal average reaction time, researchers can reduce the risk
that low scores on the IAT are confounded with individual differences in
ability to respond rapidly to any set of stimuli that might flash across a
computer screen. 214
212 See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1098-99 (arguing for tie-breaking in
favor of bias targets).
213 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 151, at 742 ("A decisionmaking process where the
subjective judgments of the selecting officials are the primary criteria is particularly at
risk for [unconscious] discrimination."); Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1074 (warning
against subjectivity in employment interviews).
214 However, Blanton and colleagues have recently shown that the use of a
difference score "can only remove processing speed confounds [from the TAT] under
restrictive conditions." Blanton et al., supra note 173, at 208; see also id. at 209-10
(appendix discussing strategies for controlling general processing speed confounds).
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There is, however, one deeply threatening confound that no amount of
data transformation can eliminate: the possibility that a personality
dimension other than prejudicial tendencies influences performance on all
speeded-classification tasks that require flexibly switching response-
preparedness (be it responding left-right or up-down to different stimuli,
whatever their content). Research on cognitive styles strongly suggests that
such individual differences exist and arise from variation in mental
flexibility, fluid intelligence, and hand-eye coordination rather than from
attitudinal variation. And psychologists have been on this trail for a long
time. In 1965, Baeumler advanced the notion of "interference inclination" to
explain individual differences in the capacity to respond rapidly on tasks that
require inhibiting competing response inclinations at different moments. 215
There is also direct evidence from recent work. Mierke and Klauer
experimentally created associations between target stimuli (blue versus red)
and attribute stimuli (large versus small) and then programmed an IAT to
measure these arbitrary geometric associations. 216 They found that scores on
this "geometric association" IAT correlated with individual differences on
the original "flower-insect" IAT that defined the procedural template for IAT
work on implicit prejudice. 2 17 Evidence of a systematic individual difference
across types of IATs strongly suggests the operation of a general personality
factor that, independently of prejudice, shapes performance on all speeded
binary classification tasks.
5. Mystery Metric: Reaction Time Does Not Possess Intrinsic Social
Meaning Even if We Assume that Reaction Times Reflect Association
Strength
Even if we discard all of the foregoing grounds for concern and accept
that the IAT is a valid measure of implicit prejudice, a vexing and thus far
unsolved psychometric problem remains: namely, that the IAT employs an
arbitrary metric and IAT scores, by themselves, say nothing about a
particular individual's propensity to discriminate. Only by linking IAT scores
215 See Fiedler et al., supra note 188, at 17, 24 (citing G. Baeumler, Interferenz und
Intelligenz, 8 PSYCHOLOGISCHE BEITRAGE 596 (1965)).
216 See Jan Mierke & Karl Christoph Klauer, Method-Specific Variance in the
Implicit Association Test, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1180, 1189-90 (2003).
217 In the flower-insect IAT, participants tend to respond more quickly when flowers
are paired with pleasant-meaning words and insects are paired with unpleasant-meaning
words. The flower-insect IAT produced the first reported results from the IAT as a
supposed implicit measure of attitudes, in that case of attitudes towards flowers and
insects. See Greenwald et al., supra note 5, at 1466-70.
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to reliable patterns of observable behaviors can specific IAT scores acquire
diagnostic meaning.
As pointed out by Brendl and his colleagues, the IAT provides
[A]t best a relative measure of one target set against another. However, in
contradiction to this constraint of relativity, the results of the IAT are often
interpreted as reflecting an implicit prejudice for one group over another.
The problem with this interpretation is that ... prejudice connotes a
negative attitude toward a group. 218
Assume that a subject taking the IAT responds more slowly when the
name Ebony requires responding to the Good key than when the name Betsy
requires responding to the Good key.219 Also grant the assumption that
relative reaction time reflects associations between these names and positive
adjectives and these associations in turn connote an attitude toward groups
for which these names are more common. It remains possible that the subject
holds an implicit positive attitude toward African-Americans, albeit not as
positive as toward Whites. A relative difference in reaction time between two
target sets does not necessarily imply hostility or prejudice toward either
group.
But the psychometric problems run still deeper. Presently, no scale or
function exists for translating different reaction times into differences in
direction, intensity, or strength of attitudes across persons. It is possible that,
for many samples and contexts, a reaction-time differential of plus or minus
200 milliseconds around the IAT zero point of perfect color-blindness has no
attitudinal or behavioral implications whatsoever. By contrast, for other
samples and contexts, differentials of this size may carry great significance.
Unfortunately for those eager to extract strong prescriptive conclusions from
this body of work, implicit prejudice researchers have yet to theoretically
specify, less still empirically quantify, the functional relationships between
reaction times and attitudinal positions. Stated simply, we have no idea
whether the same reaction-time differences across persons, samples or
contexts have the same attitudinal implications. Ignorance on this scale is
disconcerting when law review proponents of the IAT use the test to justify
sweeping assertions about the pervasiveness and potency of implicit biases.
Absent full disclosure of these limitations, the IAT will appear much
more scientific to outside observers than it actually is. Although reaction
time looks like an impressive ratio-scale metric, with all the objective
218 Brendl et al., supra note 71, at 771.
219 This example is taken from the original race IAT, which utilized names that
would supposedly trigger different racial associations. See supra Part II.B.
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properties of temporal measurements in physical science, it is an utterly
arbitrary metric for its intended purpose in the IAT: the assessment of the
not-directly-accessible psychological construct of implicit prejudice. For
instance,
[I]t is not known where a given [reaction time] locates an individual on the
underlying psychological dimension or how a one-unit change [in observed
reaction time] reflects the magnitude of change on the underlying
dimension .... When a metric is arbitrary, the function describing this
relationship and the parameter values of that function are unknown.220
With an arbitrary metric, researchers must meticulously map scores on
the metric to observable behaviors or external events to lend meaning to the
otherwise arbitrary metric. "In the case of the race IAT, this means that [the
IAT's reaction-time] metric becomes meaningful to the extent that one knows
just how much relative implicit preference for Whites versus Blacks is
implied by any given IAT score." 221
Instead of undertaking this mapping task, IAT researchers have simply
assumed that identical reaction times across compatible and incompatible
trials reflect no preference for majority or minority groups and differential
reaction times reflect relative preferences for the groups. "Although studies
have investigated the predictive validity of the race IAT with regard to racial
attitudes and prejudicial behaviors, no published study has shown that the
zero-point used to diagnose 'attitudinal preferences' is the true dividing line
between preference for Blacks versus Whites."222 In view of our earlier
demonstration that systematic factors other than attitudinal preference
demonstrably influence reaction times on the IAT, and that reaction time
scores contain a great deal of random and systematic measurement error, it is
inappropriate to treat reaction times as unproblematic measures of relative
liking of majority and minority groups.2 23
220 Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Arbitrary Metrics in Psychology, 61 AM.
PSYCHOL. 27, 28 (2006).
221 Id. at 13.
222 Id. at 17.
223 See id. at 16; see also Sam G. McFarland & Zachary Crouch, A Cognitive Skill
Confound on the Implicit Association Test, 20 SOC. COGNITION 483, 503-04 (2002) ("As
traditionally administered, with many exemplars in each category, IAT scores are
confounded by a respondent's skill in responding on control IATs .... The magnitude of
the confound is substantial ...."); id. at 504 ("The implications of this confound are
straightforward: Participants with little difference in their response speeds to incongruent
versus congruent pairings on control IATs are biased toward lower prejudical IAT scores;
those with larger differences are biased toward higher IAT-assessed prejudice."). The use
of standardized difference scores to decide relative preference on the IAT further
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complicates matters. Persons whose reaction times vary little in response to majority and
minority group targets could receive an IAT effect size equal to or larger than a person
with widely varying response times because the first subject's raw scores are divided by a
much smaller standard deviation. See Blanton & Jaccard, supra note 220, at 35.
Building on Blanton and Jaccard's demonstration of the need to remove confounding
factors from IAT scores, see id. at 40-41, we illustrate below the many assumptions that
must hold to give the zero-prejudice meaning to the zero point on the IAT scale. The first
and second equations represent, respectively, the factors influencing reaction times on
incompatible (IRL) and compatible (CRL) trials, where GPS represents general
processing speed of respondents, Aw represents attitudes toward Whites, Bw represents
attitudes toward Blacks, F represents familiarity, EE represents egalitarian empathy, CK
represents cultural knowledge (especially of stereotypes), PK represents political
knowledge (especially of depressing socio-economic facts), IT represents identity threat
(fear of being labeled a bigot), the c's represent random measurement error, the 13's
represent slopes, and the a's represent intercepts:
IRL = a, + 13GPS + 32Aw + 133A, + 034F + 135EE + 136CK + 137PK + 13sIT + c,
CRL = c + 139G + 13,oAw + 131lAB + 1312F + 0313EE + 1314CK + 1315PK + 13161T + &I
It follows that the difference in reaction times between incompatible and compatible
reaction times, which is the most widely used index of implicit prejudice, must be a
function of the following:
IRL - CRL = (ac - a,) + (13 - 139)GPS + (132 - 131 )Aw + (13 - 3 1)AB + (134 - 312)F + (135 -
1313)EE + (136- 134)CK + (137 - 315)PK + (138 - 1316)IT + (ec - cl)
Therefore, researchers who assume that the zero point on the IAT scale indicates
zero prejudice must also assume that the following difficult-to-satisfy psychometric
conditions have been satisfied:
1) acE = O1
2) & = s-
3) 131 = 139
4) 13 = 112
5) 035 = 1313
6) 136 = 1314
7) 137 = 1315
8) 138 = 1316
9) 13,0 >132
10) 1311 <133
11) 113o- 1321 11311-1331
This list actually underestimates the number of assumptions underpinning the "zero
point = no prejudice" interpretation of the IAT. If we allow for interactions among known
causal factors, the list easily triples in length. Because of the considerable difficulty in
testing the influence of all of these variables and their interactions in a unified study,
Blanton and Jaccard sensibly argue for the alternative strategy of mapping IAT scores
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6. Recapitulation of Construct Validity Arguments: What Still Stands?
What proportion of the variance can be plausibly attributed to
unconscious prejudice after we subtract the variance properly assignable to
the six counter-interpretations considered here? The direct answer is: no one
knows. And that, in itself, should suffice to put the brakes on legal
applications of this line of work. For our part, we feel it is safe to propose the
reputational bet that the answer will prove considerably closer to 0% than to
the 100% "pure-prejudice" position taken by Banaji and her colleagues. This
reputational bet strikes us as safe in view of the fact that reliability studies
reveal half or more of the variance in the IAT to be error variance and that
construct-validity studies reveal the need to apportion significant amounts of
the remaining variance to each of the six alternatives advanced here, with
high likelihood that other viable alternative explanations will yet be
proposed.
B. Internal Validity: Does Implicit Prejudice Cause Discriminatory
Behavior?
When implicit prejudice researchers find a predicted correlation between
their hypothesized causal variable (implicit prejudice) and one of its
hypothesized effects (say, increased eye blinking), they typically argue that
this predictive success increases both the plausibility of the claim that their
measure taps into implicit prejudice and of the claim that implicit prejudice
causally contributes to the hypothesized effect.224 This chain of logical
inference breaks down, however, insofar as the research design lacks internal
validity, or the power to rule out alternative causal interpretations of the
patterns of covariation in the data. Implicit prejudice research is plagued by
internal validity problems for two basic reasons.
First, and most obvious, correlation does not prove causation. One set of
possibilities, raised repeatedly in the construct validity section, is that there is
so much unresolved controversy about what implicit measures of prejudice
assess (familiarity, guilt, embarrassment, knowledge of stereotypes,
knowledge of the environment) that it is rash to assume that implicit
prejudice is the best explanation for correlations between measures of
"implicit prejudice" and criterion variables. However, even if we had
platonically pure measures of implicit prejudice, it would still be necessary to
show that correlations between such measures and criterion variables hold up
after controlling for the influence of alternative psychological constructs.
onto observable events that should differ in respect to the zero point. See Blanton &
Jaccard, supra note 130, at 68, 70.
224 See supra Part III.A.3.
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The list of overlapping constructs is a long one, but the most glaring
omission in many studies is the failure to show that implicit measures of
prejudice have predictive power for criterion variables after controlling for
old-fashioned explicit measures of prejudice.225 One could argue that this
methodological omission is relatively harmless because implicit and explicit
measures are dissociated, as some researchers have reported. 226 But, as noted
earlier, other researchers argue that implicit and explicit measures have
considerable statistical overlap and that this constitutes evidence for the
convergent validity of the measures.227 The net result is that implicit
prejudice researchers are caught between a rock and a hard place. If they
argue for the full-dissociation thesis, they undercut the convergent-validity
argument. But if they make strong convergent-validity claims, they raise the
question of whether their effects would hold up after controlling for the
influence of moderately to highly correlated explicit measures. It is odd, after
all, to claim to have discovered a new causal source of racial discrimination
without statistically controlling for the possibility that the effects can be
explained by traditional sources of racial discrimination.
Second, internal validity problems are daunting because the criterion
variables typically chosen in predictive validity research are open to multiple
interpretations. 228 For example, the criterion variables in many studies
involve measures of the quality of an interaction between subjects and
members of minority versus majority groups.229 When a subject exhibits
225 And in one of those rare cases where the researchers did check, the correlation
between IAT scores and expressed preferences for interactions with a White or Black
partner decreased slightly and passed from significance to marginal significance after
controlling for explicit racial attitudes. See Ashbum-Nardo et al., supra note 156, at 76.
226 See, e.g., Rudman, supra note 76, at 132 ("[A]bsence of consistently strong
[Implicit Explicit] convergence underscores the discriminant validity of response latency
techniques .. "); Rudman & Glick, supra note 154, at 755 ("[T]he relationships among
the IAT and the explicit measures were negligible for both men and women, supporting
their discriminant validity." (footnote omitted)).
227 See supra Part III.A.2.
228 For an overview of the predictive validity studies, see supra Part III.A.3.
229 For example, Dovidio and colleagues found that the number of eye blinks and
amount of eye contact toward an African-American versus a White person correlated
with levels of implicit prejudice. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice:
Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510 (1997)
(Experiment 3). Similarly, McConnell and Leibold found that pro-White bias on the IAT
related to differences in some nonverbal behaviors during interactions with a Black
versus a White Experimenter (significant differences were found with respect to speech
errors, smiling, and speaking time, but not for seating distance, fidgeting, or
expressiveness). See McConnell & Leibold, supra note 85, at 439-40. Other predictive
validity studies have used dependent measures such as judgments of responsibility and
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greater interpersonal anxiety or greater distance in the presence of a minority
group member and this subject also scores as implicitly prejudiced on the
IAT, one explanation is that this behavior represents unconscious prejudice
leaking out into interpersonal relations.230 Until alternative explanations are
eliminated, however, the internal validity of such arguments is suspect.
Obvious alternative explanations for the effects in these studies await
testing. Certainly bigotry may cause Whites to sit further from or avoid eye
contact with African-Americans. But so too may shame. Indeed, Keltner has
found that a downcast gaze, halting speech, verbal silence, and slumped
posture are characteristics of shame.231 Thus, a White person who is
genuinely ashamed of society's treatment of African-Americans, or perhaps
fears that African-Americans are understandably wary of Whites, might well
be scored as prejudiced by raters in validation studies that probe links
between implicit prejudice and nonverbal behavior. Yet a person who is
ashamed of Whites' treatments of African-Americans is not likely to be a
bigot; rather, the opposite is likely.
Another possibility involves social awkwardness stemming from lack of
experience with members of other ethnic-racial groups. Consistent with this
explanation, Keltner and Buswell found that a downcast gaze is also
characteristic of embarrassment, 232 and Asendorpf collected evidence
emotional reactions to racially-charged stimuli. For example, Fazio and colleagues
reported a significant correlation between one's results on an affective-priming task and
one's assignment of responsibility for the 1992 Los Angeles riots primarily to African
Americans. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 5, at 305. Using the affective-priming
procedure, Fazio and Hilden were able to predict emotional reactions to a public service
advertisement that led viewers to draw an unwarranted and prejudiced conclusion. See
Russell H. Fazio & Laura E. Hilden, Emotional Reactions to a Seemingly Prejudiced
Response: The Role of Automatically Activated Racial Attitudes and Motivation to
Control Prejudiced Reactions, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 538 (2001). And
Fazio and Dunton reported a relation between racial attitudes detected by the affective-
priming procedure and the extent to which racial characteristics-as opposed to
occupational or gender-related ones-were used to assess the similarity of photographs.
See Russell H. Fazio & Bridget C. Dunton, Categorization by Race: The Impact of
Automatic and Controlled Components of Racial Prejudice, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 451 (1997).
230 Kang, supra note 16, at 1524 ("These nonverbal behaviors that leak out from our
implicit bias influence the quality of our social interactions." (footnote omitted)).
231 See Dacher Keltner & Brian N. Buswell, Evidence for the Distinctiveness of
Embarrassment, Shame, and Guilt: A Study of Recalled Antecedents and Facial
Expression of Emotion, 10 COGNITION & EMOTION 155 (1996); Dacher Keltner & L.
Harker, The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal Signal of Shame, in SHAME:
INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE 78 (P. Gilbert & B.
Andrews eds., 1998).
232 Dacher Keltner & Brian N. Buswell, Embarrassment: Its Distinct Form and
Appeasement Functions, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 250 (1997).
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showing that speech disturbances also characterize embarrassment. 233 Given
the segregated nature of many American high schools, a White
undergraduate student being interviewed by an African-American
experimenter might find that situation to be an unfamiliar one that fosters
anxiety and embarrassment. Of course, a person experiencing such emotions
and displaying awkward nonverbal behaviors is not necessarily prejudiced.
Defenders of the implicit prejudice research program could argue that,
although the nonverbal behaviors in some studies might reasonably be
attributed to shame, embarrassment, or some other emotion, prejudice is the
most parsimonious explanation because it is a possible cause of the targeted
nonverbal behavior in all of these studies. However, given that the
overwhelming majority of White undergraduates score quite low on explicit
measures of prejudice, 234 it is just as parsimonious to suppose that guilt and
shame over their race's past treatment of African-Americans would be
aroused in these situations. Neither the IAT nor the affective-priming
methods can answer these fine-grained questions about which motive
underlies which nonverbal tic or twitch. Yet some researchers insist that their
results specifically tap implicit prejudice, rather than guilt, nervousness, or
other automatically activated reactions. 235
It is unclear to us how data such as differential eye gaze duration or eye
blink frequency can be confidently attributed to implicit prejudice, given that
these nonverbal behaviors have long been known to be characteristic of a
host of other affective states. Unconscious prejudice is neither the only nor
the most plausible explanation for such findings.
C. Statistical Conclusion Validity: Is Implicit Prejudice Really
Pervasive and Distinct from Explicit Prejudice?
Implicit-prejudice research has become a sociological phenomenon
because the researchers claim to have developed mindreading tools that
reveal a great deal more prejudice in modem American society than has been
registered by conventional opinion surveys.236 It is doubtful the implicit
233 Jens B. Asendorpf, The Expression of Shyness and Embarrassment, in SHYNESS
AND EMBARRASSMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 87 (W. R. Crozier ed.,
1990).
234 See, e.g., Monteith et al., supra note 2.
235 See, e.g., Dovidio et al., supra note 229.
236 See, e.g., BBC News, Ten Minute Test Could Spot Killers,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2943160.stm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) ("The 10
minute test is based on the Implicit Association Test, developed in the United States, and
used to reveal people's deepest thoughts and feelings."); Vedantum, supra note 210, at
W13 (This Washington Post reporter writes that "results of the millions of [IAT] tests
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that have been taken anonymously on the Harvard web site and other sites hint at the
potential impact of the research. Analyses of tens of thousands of tests found 88 percent
of white people had a pro-white or anti-black implicit bias; nearly 83 percent of
heterosexuals showed implicit biases for straight people over gays and lesbians; and more
than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim volunteers displayed implicit biases against
Arab Muslims."); id. ("The [IAT] bias tests.., have arguably revolutionized the study of
prejudice. In their simplicity, the tests have raised provocative questions about this
nation's ideal of a meritocracy and the nature of America's red state/blue state political
divide.").
Such remarks could-and should-be written off as journalistic hyperbole. But what
should we make of Professor Banaji's claim that the IAT is to psychological research on
prejudice what Galileo's telescope was to the Copernican Revolution? See Jill D. Kester,
A Revolution in Social Psychology, APS OBSERVER ONLINE (July/Aug. 2001),
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/070l/family.html. She additionally claims
that the IAT ushers in a scientific revolution that will be harder to accept than the
Copernican or Darwinian revolutions:
[It] will challenge our beliefs about the very nature of our own minds ... it is not
merely about the place of our planet amongst other planets, it's not merely about our
place in the larger set of other species, it's about the core issue of our competence,
it's about our goodness, our ability to be moral, and to have control over our
thoughts and feelings, about the most important object in our universe, other
humans.
Kester, supra; see also Banaji et al., supra note 29, at 281 ("Moving from Newtonian
physics to quantum mechanics required large shifts in assumptions, technology, and
understanding. There is no reason to assume that the smaller steps in any science that
moves away from the familiar and comfortable (here, the view of prejudice as only
conscious) is any different.").
We would caution that greater historical distance is needed for distinguishing
genuine scientific revolutions, which are rare, from the fads and illusions of progress that
regularly roil the behavioral sciences. We would also note that the IAT-telescope analogy
reveals a lack of appreciation for arguably the most profound difference between the
physical and social sciences: the far looser conceptual connections between measurement
and target constructs in the social sciences. Labeling the IAT a measure of "implicit"
"prejudice" is, twice over, an act of scientific over-claiming. First, as a leading implicit-
memory researcher, Larry Jacoby, has pointed out, using the adjective "unconscious" or
"implicit" to refer to target constructs requires making a "process-pure" assumption (that
the construct validation problem has been solved and that the implicit measure taps
implicit processes, the unobservable target construct). See Larry L. Jacoby, Dissociating
Automatic and Consciously Controlled Effects of Study/Test Compatibility, 35 J.
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 32, 34-35 (1996); see also Conrey et al., supra note 163, at 470
("The more general point is that no task is 'process pure.' It is technically impossible that
any task that requires observable responses depends entirely on automatic processes and
not at all on controlled processes."). It is more accurate to characterize the IAT as an
implicit measure of a difficult-to-disentangle mixture of processes or states, some of
which may be implicit, a further subset of which may have an evaluative component, and
a further subset of which may tap into affect that observers of a certain political
orientation might characterize as prejudicial. Further, as De Houwer recently
demonstrated, the assumption that the IAT measures only automatic associations, without
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prejudice research would have attracted the massive media attention it has if
researchers had been more circumspect in the labels they attached to their
results and in the scope claimed for implicit prejudice. The New York Times,
Boston Globe, NBC Dateline, CNN and other media outlets would certainly
have shown less interest if social psychologists had offered a more
theoretically modest and technically accurate designation of the IAT: a
measure of automatically activated affect that may be intertwined with a
wide range of emotionally charged appraisals of target groups (from
sympathy to contempt) and that predicts behavioral criterion variables of
uncertain meaning under yet-to-be-determined boundary conditions. 237
Additional concerns arise about these far-reaching claims when we
evaluate implicit prejudice research in terms of our third category of validity,
statistical conclusion validity. The data analyses used by implicit prejudice
researchers suffer from three recurring flaws: (a) over-reliance on low to
moderate correlation coefficients for making claims about the pervasiveness
of prejudice and about the propensities of IAT test-takers to discriminate; (b)
inattention to the potential role of outliers in biasing correlation coefficients
and in rendering correlations even more misleading as estimates of
population-wide propensities to discriminate; and (c) inattention to stimuli-
the influence of conscious propositional knowledge, is not correct. See Jan De Houwer,
Using the Implicit Association Test Does Not Rule Out An Impact of Conscious
Propositional Knowledge on Evaluative Conditioning, 37 LEARNING & MOTIVATION 176,
186 (2006) ("The present results make clear, however, that one cannot simply assume
that implicit, reaction time based measures are impervious to the effects of conscious
propositional knowledge.").
Second, as noted earlier, prejudice is not a natural phenomenon, such as light, that
can be analyzed objectively into its components. Prejudice is, in part, a political construct
that takes on radically different meanings at different times and places. Unlike cognitive
neuroscience constructs such as amygdala activation, prejudice is not a purely intra-
psychic construct that unfolds inside the bony confines of our craniums; it is the product
of the broader battle of ideas, and struggle for power, in society as a whole. The telescope
analogy stands as another warning to outsiders that some IAT researchers are using
science for the "honorific" purpose of advancing a political agenda.
237 See Implicit Association Test, In the Media,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/canada/inthemedia.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
In addition to these media reports, it has become common for websites aimed at
educating the public on intergroup relations to link to the IAT and information about
research findings employing the IAT. See, e.g., Bowling Green State University, Office
of Equity & Diversity, http://www.bgsu.edu/offices/oed/page7695.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2005); Seattle Pacific University, Intercultural Affairs, Ethnic Minority Links,
http://www.spu.edu/depts/intercultural/multiethnic/ethnicminority.asp (last visited Sept.
21, 2005); Tolerance.org, Dig Deeper: Test Yourself for Hidden Bias,
http://www.tolerance.org/hidden bias/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); Understanding
Prejudice, Exercised and Demonstrations: Implicit Association Test,
http://www.understandingprejudice.org/iat/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
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specific processes that limit the generality of statistical conclusions.
1. Correlation Coefficients (of the Magnitude Observed in IAT
Research) Shed Limited Light on the Relative Risks of Classification
Errors
A specious but seductive syllogism resides at the heart of the implicit
prejudice argument that legal scholars wish to import into American law. The
major premise of that syllogism is that the vast majority of the population
harbors the morally corrosive psychological construct "implicit prejudice."
We know this to be true because 80% or more of the population often scores
as prejudiced according to the IAT.238 The minor premise is that implicit
measures of prejudice tend to have low but positive correlations with
judgments or acts that could be construed as prejudicial toward African-
Americans or other protected groups. We know this to be true from a recent
meta-analysis which shows that IAT-criterion variable correlations hover in
the vicinity of .25.239 Accordingly, we are justified in concluding that the
vast majority of the population will exhibit these same prejudicial
tendencies. 240
The conclusion does not follow from the premises: quite the opposite, the
fact that IAT scores have low positive correlations with behavior expansively
defined as discriminatory guarantees that many individuals labeled
prejudiced by the IAT will not exhibit the behavior in question.241 Indeed, we
can estimate how common false accusations of prejudice will be if we make
plausible simplifying assumptions about three parameters: (a) how often
people "fail" the IAT by showing an implicit bias toward some group (let's
238 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
240 For instance, Richardson & Pittinsky write that:
After several years and experiment modifications over time, [implicit
measurement] methodologies have been accepted as both valid and reliable. With
over 75,000 interpretable results, 75% of White participants and 42% of Black
participants showed pro-White/anti-Black preference. These findings shatter the
Court's understanding of prejudice and discrimination as being the result of the
malicious intentions of a minority. They suggest that discriminatory attitudes are
ubiquitous, often operating without the conscious awareness of the individuals
harboring them.
Margaret Richardson & Todd L. Pittinsky, The Mistaken Assumption of Intentionality in
Equal Protection Law: Psychological Science and the Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 31 (KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWPO5-011, 2005).
241 For information on the correlation between IAT scores and discriminatory
behavior, see supra Part III.A.3.
1100 [Vol. 67:1023
PERILS OF MINDREADING
say, drawing on the published literature, the "failure" base rate ranges
between 70% and 90%); (b) the hit rate of the test, or the probability that if
someone is truly prejudiced that person will "fail" the IAT (let's stipulate
that these hit rates range between 70% and 90%, which is generous given the
IAT's low test-retest reliability and the number of confounding variables
distorting IAT scores); and (c) the base rate of "true" prejudice in the
population (let's say, drawing on explicit measures used in survey research,
that these true-prejudice base rates range from 10% to 30%).
Using elementary Bayesian analysis, we find that false-accusation rates
range between approximately 60% (when the failure rate of the IAT is 70%,
the base rate of true-prejudice is 30%, and the IAT's hit rate is 90%) and
90% (when the failure rate of the TAT is 90%, the base rate of true prejudice
is 10% and the IAT's hit rate is 70%).242 Whether one judges such false-
accusation rates to be excessive is ultimately a matter of political values, not
scientific fact. But these rates should be sobering.
The most tempting defense for TAT proponents is to point out that much
hinges on the extremity of the assumptions we choose to make about the base
rate for the hypothetical construct of true prejudice in the population. IAT
researchers, however, flirt with tautology if they argue that they know the
base rate of true prejudice must be much higher than posited in the earlier
estimates, as high as in the 70% to 90% range, because, after all, roughly
those percentages of people fail the IAT. Unfortunately for IAT proponents,
that counter-argument has force only if we grant IAT researchers the pivotal
assumption that the IAT is a pure measure of prejudice, which is the central
point in contention.
The published data on IAT-criterion variable correlations point to a
possible path out of this morass. We can mathematically deduce the
correlations that must hold between the IAT and hypothetical criterion
variables capturing true prejudice when we make varying assumptions about
the p(prejudice I IAT failure), the p(IAT failure), and the base rate of true
prejudice, p(prejudice). 243 The results tell us that the population base rate of
242 The estimates of 61% to 92% are derived from the most basic definitions of
probability, as follows: p(not prejudiced [failure on the IAT) = 1 - p(prejudiced I failure
on the IAT) = 1 - (p(failure on IAT I true prejudice) * p(true prejudice)/p(failure on the
IAT)). Bayes' theorem provides the proofs of these results. See Richard Price, An Essay
Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. By the Late Rev. Mr. Bayes,
F.R.S. communicated by Mr. Price, in a letter to John Canton, A.MF.R.S., 53 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONs ROYAL Soc. LONDON 370 (1763).
243 These estimates are also derived from an elementary statistical concept, this
time, the correlation coefficient. If a = p(prejudice and IAT failure), b = p(no prejudice
and IAT failure), c = p(prejudice and IAT passing) and d = p(no prejudice and IAT
passing), the correlation coefficient is (ad - bc)/(a*b*c*d)^.5. If we make assumptions
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true prejudice could be as low as 20% when 70% of people "fail" the IAT,
the p(IAT failurel prejudice) is 90%, and the correlation of the IAT with
criterion variables is .22. This latter value is virtually identical to the average
correlation found in a meta-analysis of studies examining correlations
between implicit and explicit attitude measures.244 Put another way, the data
invoked by IAT proponents to support the convergent validity of their test is
logically consistent with the view that that the population base rate of true
prejudice is far closer to survey research estimates than that implied by IAT
proponents.
These statistical estimates, by themselves, neutralize much of the
purported relevance of implicit prejudice research to antidiscrimination law.
But we view these estimates as still too flattering to the IAT. The estimates
are too generous because they rest on the shaky assumption that IAT
correlations with criterion variables are perfect proxies for the IAT
correlation with the hypothetical construct of true prejudice-an assumption
we reject in view of the plethora of alternative explanations for such
correlations noted earlier.
The crux of the problem is that correlation coefficients-which are relied
on almost exclusively in the IAT literature-are not necessarily sensitive to
asymmetries between test failure rates and the base rate likelihood of the
phenomenon the test is supposed to assess. Even when p(prejudice I IAT
failure) is low, because truly prejudiced people constitute but a small set of
IAT failure cases, the resulting validity coefficient can indicate a significant
relationship if we are correlating variables with markedly different base rates.
As Fiedler and his colleagues note, "this problem is widely ignored in
validity studies in general and in IAT research in particular." 245 This relative
insensitivity of correlation coefficients also creates special difficulties for
translating psychological results into legal contexts in which key concepts,
such as preponderance of evidence and reasonable doubt, presuppose
inferences about base rates (how pervasive are prejudicial response
tendencies in this population?) and conditional probabilities (how likely is
someone who acts this way to discriminate against that group, and how likely
are people who discriminate against that group to behave this way?).246
about p(IAT failure), p(prejudice), and p(IAT failure I prejudice), we can solve for the
correlation between IAT and prejudice. We can then restrict that range from .2 to .25,
find the associated values of p(prejudice I IAT failure), and convert those values to p(no
prejudice I IAT failure).
244 See Hofmann et al., supra note 131, at 1379 ("[W]e found a small but significant
positive mean population correlation of .24 between self-reported representations and
representations assessed with the IAT.").
245 Fiedler et al., supra note 188, at 10.
246 The IAT data look even weaker when we add to the mix a likely bias in
published IAT studies that favors publication of studies showing a significant relationship
[Vol. 67:10231102
PERILS OF MINDREA DING
2. Correlation Coefficients Can Be Biased by Outliers
The probative value of the correlations reported in IAT research is
further undercut by the inferential threats posed by outliers. Implicit-
prejudice researchers typically fail to check the possibility that, even if their
implicit measures of prejudice do tap into a psychological construct we can
fairly label prejudice and this construct does exert causal impact on criterion
variables, the results may be driven by a small number of extreme scorers on
either the independent or dependent variable side of the equation.2 47 The
between [AT scores and criterion variables and disfavors publication of studies failing to
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation.
Both behavioral researchers and statisticians have long suspected that the studies
published in the behavioral sciences are a biased sample of the studies that are actually
carried out. The extreme view of this problem, the 'file drawer problem,' is that the
journals are filled with the 5% of the studies that show Type I errors, while the file
drawers back at the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show nonsignificant
(e.g., p > .05) results. Robert Rosenthal, The "File Drawer Problem" and Tolerance for
Null Results, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979) (citations omitted). This "file-drawer
problem" is not a hypothetical concern: "There is ample evidence that publication bias
exists." Jack L. Vevea & Carol M. Woods, Publication Bias in Research Synthesis:
Sensitivity Analysis Using A Priori Weight Functions, 10 PSYCHOL. METHODS 428, 428
(2005). Indeed, one of the IAT developers, Anthony Greenwald, warned long ago about
the pernicious effects of publication bias. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Consequences of
Prejudice Against the Null Hypothesis, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 15 (1975) (noting that his
quantitative estimates of effects of a publication bias against the null hypothesis are
"frightening, even calling into question the scientific basis for much published
literature"). Yet, in Greenwald and his colleagues' meta-analysis of studies examining the
predictive validity of IAT scores, these authors only speculate that there is no publication
bias within the [AT research, see Poehlman et al., supra note 62, at 22; they do not report
any sensitivity analyses to test for the potential impact of such a bias.
247 See, e.g., John M. Orr et al., Outlier Detection and Treament in I/0 Psychology:
A Survey of Researcher Beliefs and an Empirical Illustration, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL.
473, 473 (1991) ("An essential aspect of data analysis is examination of the data set to
determine whether all points are appropriate for inclusion in the study at hand.").
Rothermund and colleagues note that outliers may pose significant problems in the
scoring of the IAT:
Besides using a millisecond metric on the basis of correct responses,
eliminating outliers is the norm rather than the exception in experimental
psychology. The D measure [for scoring the IAT], however, is nonstandard: It is
based on individually standardized reaction time differences; makes use of practice
trials; does not eliminate outlier values at the right or left tail of the response time
distribution; and includes reaction times based on second, correcting responses after
erroneous responses or uses arbitrary error penalties. Finally, it should be
emphasized that the D measure might be sensitive to strategic factors, because it was
chosen to yield maximal correlations of IAT effects with self-report measures.
Rothermund et al., supra note 175, at 428 (citation omitted).
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failure to conduct such sensitivity analysis would be a flaw in any research
program, but the need for such analysis is particularly great for a research
program that is being used to indict the vast majority of the American
population as implicitly prejudiced and disposed to discriminate whenever a
suitable pretext emerges.
Consider what happens when we perform rudimentary sensitivity
analyses on the data collected by Ziegert and Hanges, 248 which is the only
study to date to suggest that the IAT predicts discriminatory decisions in an
experimental simulation of managerial decision making and which Kang and
Banaji invoke as evidence for the predictive power of the IAT with respect to
ultimate decisions in employment settings.249 We find that the predictive
power of the IAT falls to statistical nonsignificance when only three subjects
whose scores qualify as outliers under traditional tests (scores over three
standard deviations away from the mean) are deleted from the analysis (out
of a total of ninety-seven subjects). 250 These three individuals were not,
moreover, extreme scorers on the IAT or indeed on either of the two self-
report measures of racial attitudes used in the Ziegert and Hanges study; they
248 See Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 95.
249 See Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1073.
2 5 0 See GREGORY MITCHELL ET AL., SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF ZIEGERT & HANGES 1
(2005) (manuscript on file with authors). With standardized, or Z, scores, the traditional
definition of outlier is any Z score above 3 or below -3. See BORIS IGLEWICZ & DAVID C.
HOAGLIN, HOW TO DETECT AND HANDLE OUTLIERS 10 (1993). Jonathan Ziegert and Paul
Hanges kindly shared their original data with us so that we could conduct these
sensitivity analyses. It should also be noted that Professors Ziegert and Hanges advocate
alternative methods for outlier detection, some of which do not result in the relationship
between IAT scores and ratings of hypothetical White and Black job candidates
becoming non-significant. More specifically, they contend that multivariate outlier tests
should be relied on rather than the simple measures discussed in the text. A number of
multivariate outlier tests exists, and, under some of these tests, Ziegert and Hanges'
results remain statistically significant, but not under others. However, the significant
relation between IAT scores and discriminatory behavior did not hold up in robust
regression analysis on the Ziegert and Hanges data (robust statistical approaches are
designed to perform well even when outliers are present in the data). Furthermore,
quantile regression (which allows one to make more differentiated statements about the
IAT score-behavior relation within the sample) revealed that the relation between TAT
scores and discriminatory behavior held only for persons showing the greatest anti-black
bias on the dependent measure (i.e., for the quantile of subjects whose difference in
ratings between resumes of Black and White hypothetical candidates was greatest). Our
point with this illustration is not to show that the Ziegert and Hanges' study is flawed but
rather to demonstrate that "more biased" TAT scores are not reliable predictors of
discriminatory behavior, even in the aggregate, given the sensitivity of the relationship
between TAT scores and discriminatory behavior to the influence of persons with extreme
scores in the experiment.
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were extreme scorers with respect to the difference between ratings for
hypothetical Black and White job candidates (that is, people who assigned
Blacks much lower when there was pressure from the president of the
company to do so). Such results are hardly compatible with a portrait of
American public opinion in which most citizens are eager to seize on the
thinnest pretexts to treat Blacks unfairly. The results are far more compatible
with the view that, with a few exceptions difficult to identify with any of the
measures of prejudice used in the study, most people treated Blacks fairly. 251
3. Observed Statistical Relationships May Be Stimuli Specific
As described previously, a subject's score on the IAT is a difference
score: one scores as more prejudiced to the degree one responds faster to
"compatible" pairings (e.g., White/good, Black/bad) than to "incompatible"
pairings (e.g., White/bad; Black/good). This simple scoring rule has great
intuitive appeal. Test-takers, especially those who fear that racism remains a
powerful force in our society, can readily imagine hidden anti-Black
prejudices slowing them down as they fumble about finding the left or right
keys when responding to the incompatible pairings. Unfortunately, these test-
takers may be beating themselves up for no good reason: a finding of
"implicit bias" on the IAT may depend greatly on the particular stimuli
chosen to test for this implicit bias; when the stimuli are changed, this
ostensible bias may disappear.
One may have different reaction times to Black and White stimuli not
because of the relative strengths of one's associations linking the very
abstract categories, White and Black, to the even more abstract categories,
Good and Bad, but rather because of the relative strength of: (a) mental
associations or strategies that predate the experiment and that link specific
White and Black stimuli in particular versions of the test to Good/Bad (e.g.,
the stereotypically White name "Madison" and Black name "Latonya" are
linked to positive and negative economic outcomes in the real world);252 and
251 Indeed, in the Ziegert and Hanges study, after removing the three scores that we
label as outliers, IAT scores did not relate to discriminatory behavior even when subjects
played the role of managers specifically incited to discriminate by the hypothetical boss.
See Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 95, at 559 (reporting a statistically significant relation
between IAT scores and discriminatory behavior toward Blacks by subjects acting as
hypothetical managers, but only in the condition in which the "boss" has specifically
requested that subjects discriminate in favor of Whites in hiring).
252 Fryer and Levitt found in their post-1970 sample of children born in California
that Black parents who give their children distinctively Black names tend to be poorer
than those who do not. See Fryer & Levitt, supra note 41, at 783 ("In almost all cases,
variables associated with low socioeconomic status are also associated with Blacker
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(b) mental associations or strategies that subjects improvise in the
experimental session to help in linking the categories of White and Black,
Good and Bad, or the stimuli representing those categories to the left and
right response keys.253
This is no quibble over methodological details, for when it comes to the
IAT, the devil lurks in the details. Growing evidence indicates that IAT
difference scores depend greatly on the specific stimuli chosen for the sorting
task. Fiedler and his colleagues cite several studies to this effect and describe
a particular study in which it proved possible to invert West Germans' IAT
difference scores toward East and West Germans when the specific target-
related stimuli (e.g., positive West-related stimuli such as DEMOCRACY
versus negative East-related stimuli such as COMMUNISM) or evaluative
stimuli (e.g., traits such as SOCIABLE or IMPERSONAL) are replaced by
an alternative set of "representative" stimuli.
This raises the question of whether the IAT assesses the person's
attitude toward the concept of East Germans, the meaning of the
stimuli ... , the specific Germans chosen to represent the attitude
objects .... or the surnames and forenames as generic stimuli..., all of
which are in principle distinct from the general concept. More generally, the
crucial question is whether the IAT involves person scaling or stimulus
scaling. 254
names. Moreover, the link between low socioeconomic status and Black names becomes
much stronger over time.").
253 For instance, Nosek et al. found that older adults evidenced greater implicit bias
toward "Black" names than photographs of Black persons. See Nosek et al., supra note 6,
at 111 ("[O]lder participants tended to show stronger implicit bias against Black relative
to White and old relative to young on the name versions of the task but not the faces
version"); see also Cassandra L. Govan & Kipling D. Williams, Changing the affective
valence of the stimulus items influences the IA T by re-defining the category labels, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 357, 363 (2004) ("Both studies provide support for the
hypothesis that IAT effects are not solely a function of category labels. The stimulus
items chosen to represent the category labels are also important, and they may drive
participants to re-define the categories."). As Fiedler and his colleagues observe, current
IAT scoring procedures entail "very strong assumptions" that the two classes of attitude
objects (e.g., Whites and Blacks) have the same impact on final scores, that the specific
stimuli chosen to represent the categories of attitude objects (selection of White and
Black names) and to represent the categories of Good and Bad (selection of positive and
negative words) have the same impact on final scores, and that systematic and random
measurement error influences scores on the incompatible and compatible trials to the
same extent. See Fiedler et al., supra note 188, at 22. Insofar as differential measurement
error operates on the two components of the difference score, the zero point on the
measurement scale will become increasingly meaningless.
254 Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
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The sensitivity of IAT difference scores to the specific stimuli used to
represent the latent concepts of true interest (attitudes towards Whites versus
Blacks or East versus West Germans) cuts to the heart of controversies
discussed in our sections on construct validity:255 does the IAT measure
deep-seated prejudices toward latent concepts or does it simply rediscover
the obvious semantic fact that some words, such as TORTURE and
PROSPERITY, come pre-charged with negative or positive evaluative
meaning? If a relative aversion toward a category only materializes when we
use certain types of names or faces-or when we embed those stimuli in
certain types of context cues-are we justified in saying people are
prejudiced toward the category as a whole or only toward particular
exemplars of that category in certain contexts?
And it is important to note that most of the IAT data derives from a fairly
limited set of stimuli given the redundant use of the most common IATs. IAT
researchers boast that they have collected the results of millions of IATs.256
However, while the sample of subjects is large and diverse, the sample of
stimuli is not nearly as impressive. Not too long ago one of social cognition's
most popular biases, the overconfidence effect, was found to be in many
cases the by-product of the sample of experimental stimuli repeatedly used to
demonstrate the bias.257 We suspect the same fate may well befall many of
the implicit "biases" demonstrated with the various IATs.
D. External Validity and the Law's Requirement of "Fit ": Unpacking
the Ceteris Paribus Clause Attached to the JATEffect
External validity refers to the degree to which one can generalize causal
or statistical relationships found by relying on particular measures of
particular subjects in a particular setting to other possible measures, subjects
and settings. This last set of validity challenges is perhaps the most
devastating for the application of implicit prejudice research to the law, 258
255 See supra Parts III.A.3-4.
256 See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1072 (referencing a database
containing "well over three million tests").
257 See Peter Juslin, Representative Design: Cognitive Science from a Brunswikian
Perspective, in THE ESSENTIAL BRUNSWIK: BEGINNINGS, EXPLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS
404, 404-08 (Kenneth R. Hammond & Thomas R. Stewart eds., 2001); Peter Juslin,
Anders Winman & Henrik Olsson, Naive Empiricism and Dogmatism in Confidence
Research: A Critical Examination of the Hard-Easy Effect, 107 PSYCHOL. REv. 384, 384-
85, 387-88 (2000).
258 Cf Vladimir J. Konedni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in
Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUMAN BEtAV. 39, 40 (1979) ("Research in applied
disciplines must be concerned with issues of external validity and generalizability to an
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for, even if the implicit prejudice research program had emerged unscathed
from the previous three sets of tests of validity, the obstacles to generalizing
from the typical implicit prejudice research paradigm to realistic workplace
settings are daunting.
Legal scholars promoting implicit prejudice research employ far too
simplistic a general-causation model linking stereotypes and racially-biased
personnel judgments. They rarely make more than superficial and selective
reference to the long list of personality and situational factors that can
influence, sometimes dramatically, the degree to which, and even the
direction in which, stereotypes can bias judgments. 259 Moreover, the
omissions conveniently favor assumptions of implicit prejudice as an
implacable causal force. Once we start acknowledging these omissions, we
must also start acknowledging the psychological importance of the many
ways in which workplaces and other discrimination settings systematically
differ from the artificial settings so common in implicit prejudice research.
Consider the following dozen specific ways in which work settings
(many modeled on best-practices precepts in organizational behavior) 260
unusually high degree. The criteria for what is a good experiment, when a certain
methodology appears sound, and which results are to be trusted, must necessarily be
different and more stringent when sweeping, costly, and far-reaching changes in public
policy and-quite literally in the legal domain-people's futures and lives, depend on
inferences from research results.").
259 See, e.g., Kang, supra note 16, at 1567 ("The social cognition studies that I have
presented are not without ambiguity, confusion, and contradiction. They often raise as
many questions as they answer. That said, a prima facie case has been made about the
existence of implicit bias, its dissociation from explicit self-reports of bias, its
measurability through reaction time designs, and its impact on behavior."). Kang and
Banaji dismiss external validity concerns simply by citing one unpublished experiment
that used medical interns as subjects (rather than the usual convenience sample of college
undergraduates) and found some possible connection between the interns' IAT scores and
their differential recommendations for treatment of hypothetical White versus Black
patients. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 3, at 1072. A few of the advocates of implicit
bias research within the behavioral realist movement do forthrightly acknowledge the
limited predictive ability of this research. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 25, at 91 ("In
short, whether attitudes predict behavior depends on the attitude, the context, and the
person .... Specifically, bias, understood as an attitude toward members of a particular
group, predicts overt discrimination only under some circumstances."); id. at 103
("[C]ontext is a powerful moderator of implicit bias.").
260 For an itemization of oft-cited best practices in checking prejudice, see generally
MICHAEL ARMSTRONG, A HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
(9th ed. 2003); see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Best Practices
of Private Sector Employees, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/taskreports/practice.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2006). Although many major companies implement several of these
practices, our knowledge remains thin on: (a) how widespread and carefully implemented
these checks are; and (b) how many checks on superficial biased processing is enough.
1108 [Vol. 67:1023
PERILS OF MINDREADING
differ from the typical laboratory experiment on stereotyping and prejudice:
(1) Subjects in laboratory experiments are typically asked to judge
people about whom they have virtually no work-history or past-performance
information (indeed, subjects often have little more information than group
category membership, like race or gender, on which to base their
impressions); however, hiring and staffing managers often have access to a
great deal of carefully compiled data on the past behavior and performance
of those they are judging;
(2) Subjects in laboratory experiments are not typically judging people
with whom they expect to interact in the future; yet, hiring and staffing
managers often expect future interaction (including potentially awkward
social encounters in which they must explain in detail to those whom they
have judged why the ratings or outcomes take the form they do);
(3) Subjects in laboratory experiments are not typically asked to judge
people whom they perceive to be on their "team" (people with whom they
must work collaboratively to achieve shared goals-an independent variable
some psychologists have designated as "outcome interdependence"); hiring
and staffing managers have strong interests in choosing the best possible
people because the people they choose will indeed be on their team and
potentially affect their own future performance evaluations and raises;
(4) Subjects in laboratory experiments rarely, if ever, have powerful
long-term financial or legal incentives for doing a better job at performance
appraisal; hiring and staffing managers typically have strong financial, legal,
and long-term incentives for making correct and lawful decisions;
(5) Subjects in laboratory experiments are rarely given any training in
using rating scales or other evaluation tools; hiring and staffing managers at
many organizations receive extensive training in performance evaluation and
making compensation decisions, and these persons have been alerted to the
dangers of a variety of rating biases as well as the dangers of discrimination;
(6) Subjects in laboratory experiments rarely expect that they will have
to justify their opinions to people above them in an organizational hierarchy
who control important rewards and punishments; hiring and staffing
managers are well aware of the need to have adequate and legal justifications
for their judgments and decisions;
(7) Subjects in laboratory experiments rarely expect that they will be
accountable to high-status others who have repeatedly affirmed a non-
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discrimination policy; hiring and staffing managers at many organizations are
often aware of the views of those to whom they are accountable and of the
high value that is placed on achieving diversity goals and avoiding charges of
discrimination;
(8) Subjects in laboratory experiments rarely receive clear or repeated
admonishment not to allow job-performance-irrelevant characteristics, such
as membership in ethnic-racial groups, to affect their personnel judgments;
hiring and staffing managers often receive clear and repeated admonishment
on this score;
(9) Subjects in laboratory experiments are rarely encouraged or required
to attend training workshops on how to make personnel decisions; the
opposite is true of hiring and staffing managers at large organizations, as well
as many small to mid-size organizations;
(10) Subjects in laboratory experiments are rarely given written manuals
and guidelines that place constraints on how they should perform their task;
the opposite is true of hiring and staffing managers at many large
organizations, as well as many small to mid-size organizations;
(11) Subjects in laboratory experiments rarely expect that they will have
to offer comparative rationales for why they selected certain people and did
not select others; hiring and staffing managers are often expected to do so;
and
(12) Subjects in laboratory experiments are typically college
undergraduates who have had virtually no experience supervising and
evaluating employees; hiring and staffing managers typically are fully mature
adults who have considerable experience in supervisory roles.
Entire chapters of the most recent edition of the Handbook of Social
Psychology have been devoted to personality, cultural, and organizational
threats to the generalizability of experimental findings, 261 and these external
261 See Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence: Social Norms,
Conformity, and Compliance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 33, at
151; Alan Page Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 33, at 915; John M. Levine & Richard L. Moreland,
Small Groups, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 33, at 415; Jeffrey
Pfeffer, Understanding Organizations: Concepts and Controversies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 33, at 733; Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor,
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validity constraints counsel against sweeping causal claims such as the
contention that subjectivity in personnel decision-making opens the door
wide to stereotyping and prejudice. 262 An inspection of the business school
curriculum, and of employment practices in Fortune 500 companies, would
reveal the implementation of many of the strategies these Handbook chapters
recommend to check cognitive and motivational biases.263 Worse still for
those hoping that these objections are merely hypothetical (that is, of the
form, "these differences could make a difference-although there is no
evidence that they do"), it is possible to identify experimental studies that
manipulate many of the contextual factors contained in the list of the dozen
differences. In other words, experimental research has repeatedly shown that
these differences do make a difference.
For instance, it has long been known that the likelihood of evaluators
falling prey to a wide range of cognitive biases can be affected by such
factors as the degree to which: (a) these evaluators expect to be called on to
justify their performance assessments and decisions to third parties;264 (b)
evaluators have job-relevant information-a factor on which there is
professional consensus among industrial-organization psychologists; 265 (c)
Understanding Personality and Social Behavior: A Functionalist Strategy, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 33, at 635.
262 See Bielby, supra note 109, at 381 ("In decision-making contexts characterized
by arbitrary and subjective criteria and substantial decision-maker discretion, individuals
tend to seek out and retain stereotype-confirming information and to ignore or minimize
information that defies stereotypes." (footnote omitted)); see also Hart, supra note 151, at
745 ("There is little doubt that unconscious discrimination plays a significant role in
decisions about hiring, promoting, firing, and other benefits and tribulations in the
workplace.").
263 See Arthur & Doverspike, supra note 32, at 307-14; see also Cora Daniels, 50
Best Companies for Minorities, FORTUNE, June 28, 2004, at 136-38.
264 See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 258 (1999). And the desire to get along with
the other person should be an especially effective control on expressions of prejudice
when the other person is a superior believed to be hostile to discrimination. See Stacey
Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of the Self Consequences for the Self-Evaluations of
Stereotype Targets, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 160, 172 (2005) (indicating that
"these experiments showed that individuals' self-evaluations and behavior shifted in
response to the ostensible views of short-term interaction partners as a function of
affiliative motivation").
265 See Michele J. Gelfand et al., Discrimination in Organizations: An
Organizational-Level Systems Perspective, in DISCRIMINATION AT WORK: THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASES, supra note 32, at 89, 101 ("The best way
to combat discrimination in selection is to use measures that tap as many aspects of job
performance as possible, to utilize different media in terms of the ways in which content
is presented and responses are required ... , and to use noncognitive measures such as
personality and integrity tests when possible." (citation omitted)).
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evaluators interact with individuals whose behavior runs counter to, or is not
readily assimilable into, the stereotype; 266 (d) evaluators work in settings in
which race is not a useful predictive cue;267 (e) evaluators have ready access
to "individuating" information that can "dilute" the impact of group-based
stereotypes;2 68 (f) evaluators expect future interactions with those they are
judging; 269 (g) evaluators feel functionally interdependent with those they are
judging (e.g., on the same team); 270 (h) evaluators feel that they have
financial or other incentives for getting the answer right;27 1 (i) evaluators are
highly motivated to control prejudicial reactions and recognize the risk of
prejudice in the immediate situation;2 72 and (j) evaluators work in
266 See Christopher L. Aberson et al., Implicit Bias and Contact: The Role of
Interethnic Friendships, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 335 (2004); Irene V. Blair, The
Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 242 (2002).
267 See Plant et al., supra note 146, at 153-54.
268 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 154-56, 267-68 (1980); Philip E. Tetock &
Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of the Dilution Effect, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1989); see also Copus, supra note 147, at 453 ("In
those real-world employment decisions the parties involved have had extensive personal
contact over an extended period, a critical condition that few if any laboratory studies
have even attempted to replicate. The decision makers have had extended opportunity to
observe the employees and gather much information relevant to the decision at hand-
diagnostic individuating information, in the jargon of psychologists." (citation omitted)).
269 See Barry R. Schlenker et al., Coping with Accountability: Self-Identification and
Evaluative Reckonings, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE HEALTH
PERSPECTIVE 96 (C.R. Snyder & Donelson R. Forsyth eds., 1991); see also Copus, supra
note 147, at 453 ("[T]he decision maker typically anticipates having further interaction
with the target employees.").
270 See Susan T. Fiske, Thinking Is for Doing: Portraits of Social Cognition from
Daguerreotype to Laserphoto, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 877, 879 (1992);
Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on
Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1990).
271 See Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics:
A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 383, 391
(2001); Erik P. Thompson et al., Accuracy Motivation Attenuates Covert Priming: The
Systematic Reprocessing of Social Information, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 474
(1994).
272 See Bridget C. Dunton & Russell H. Fazio, An Individual Difference Measure of
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
316, 324-25 (1997); Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, The Flexible Correction
Model: The Role of Naive Theories of Bias in Bias Correction, 29 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141 (1997); Wheeler & Petty, supra note 197; see also
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cooperative and egalitarian settings that "cue" appropriate behavior.273
These lines of work, almost always absent from recent law review
scholarship on unconscious discrimination, warn us that the differences
between laboratory settings and applied domains significantly constrain the
generalizability of implicit prejudice research. The results repeatedly show
that even pallid laboratory imitations of the many checks on prejudice can
attenuate biased thinking, inducing people to question their preconceptions
and to become more attuned to the limitations of their own knowledge.
Furthermore, our list of twelve ex.ernal validity concerns far from
exhausts the external validity challenges. Five other lines of social-scientific
research suggest that several scholars have exaggerated the threat of
automatically activated unconscious stereotypes and prejudice. These lines of
work demonstrate:
(a) the automatic activation of stereotypes of a racial group by the visual
presence of a member of that group is not as automatic as often implied;
context matters. 274 The preponderance of evidence now indicates that photos
of Black persons embedded in an egalitarian and positive-affect setting do
not evoke the millisecond response-time differentials that some social
psychologists take as evidence of prejudice and, for a non-negligible number
of Whites, such positively embedded photos evoke "pro-Black" responses. 275
(b) both contrast and assimilation effects occur. This means that if a
White and a Black person each behave exactly the same way (e.g., both are
hard working) and that behavior contradicts a negative stereotype that
observers hold of Black people, observers sometimes react more, not less,
favorably to the Black person.276
Copus, supra note 147, at 453 ("[M]ost companies make extensive efforts to make equal
opportunity and nondiscrimination a salient goal in all employment decisions.").
273 See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias:
The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 835 (2002); Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the
Development and Operation of Cues for Control, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1029, 1046-47 (2002); Rudman et al., supra note 90.
274 See Lowery et al., supra note 131, at 851 ("Taken together, the four experiments
presented here provide evidence that automatic racial attitudes are subject to both tacit
and explicit social influence .... [O]ur results contradict the assumption that automatic
prejudice is inevitably activated by the presence of a member of a negatively stereotyped
group, and thereby may represent a challenge to existing theories of automatic
stereotyping and prejudice.").
275 See Jamie Barden et al., Contextual Moderation of Racial Bias: The Impact of
Social Roles on Controlled and Automatically Activated Attitudes, 87 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 16, 21 (2004).
2 76 See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 351-69 (1999);
Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do
They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation
2006] 1113
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(c) stereotype effects recede as people learn more about each other as
individuals, with individuating information often overwhelming stereotype
information. Kunda and Spencer note that even if stereotypes are activated at
the start of an interaction, this activation can dissipate quickly: "In more than
half a dozen studies, we have found no trace of stereotype activation in
participants who had observed or interacted with a Black or an Asian
individual for about [10 minutes]." 277
(d) intergroup contact is associated with reduced prejudice, 278 including
"prejudice" at the implicit level.279 Further, "contact theory applies beyond
racial and ethnic groups to embrace other types of groups as well. 28 °
(e) the strong form of the "subjectivity-opens-the-door-to-prejudice"
hypothesis is strikingly disconfirmed by recent meta-analyses of diverse
datasets bearing on ethnic group differences in job performance. These meta-
analyses, published in the most selective journal in industrial-organizational
psychology, show that objective measures of job performance are associated
with very similar, and sometimes larger, standardized ethnic group
differences than are subjective measures. 281
and Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522 (2003); Leonard L. Martin et al., Assimilation
and Contrast as a Function of People's Willingness and Ability to Expend Effort in
Forming an Impression, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1990).
277 Kunda & Spencer, supra note 276, at 523; see also Lee Jussim et al., Why Study
Stereotype Accuracy and Inaccuracy?, in STEREOTYPE ACCURACY: TOWARDS
APPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES 3, 13 (Y.T. Lee et al., eds., 1995) ("When
individuating information is ambiguous or difficult to detect, people often rely on their
stereotypes rather than individuating information. However, of all the studies that have
manipulated both group information ... and the personal characteristics of targets... ,
we are not aware of a single one that has shown that people ignore individual differences.
Perceivers base their judgments far more on the personal characteristics of targets than on
targets' gender or membership in ethnic groups. . . ." (citations omitted)).
278 See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006) ("The meta-
analytic results clearly indicate that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup
prejudice.").
279 See Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of
Learned Fear, 309 Sci. 785, 786 (2005) (finding reduced implicit racial bias in persons
with more interracial dating experience).
280 Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 278, at 768.
281 See Patrick F. McKay & Michael A. McDaniel, A Reexamination of Black- White
Mean Differences in Work Performance: More Date, More Moderators, 91 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 538, 548 (2006) ("Evidence provided in Table 5 suggests that measurement
method has a relatively low impact on mean racial differences in work performance (R =
.10). Summary results for this moderator presented in Table 2 support this conclusion
because effect sizes are very similar for subjective (d = 0.28) and objective (d = 0.22)
measures of performance."); Roth et al., supra note 151, at 702 ("Our results do not
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All of the factors listed above undercut the sweeping general-causation
arguments recently featured in prominent law reviews. Failure to appreciate
that these factors often make a difference leads to unwarranted optimism
about the external validity of implicit prejudice research-or rather,
unwarranted pessimism about the discriminatory effects of implicit prejudice
as identified in experimental studies. If the task of inferring generally
applicable causal laws from the implicit prejudice experiments is daunting,
the task of inferring specific-causation conclusions in a specific case is no
easier.282 Imagine that an employer utilizes the IAT as a screening
mechanism for the human resources staff, as some legal scholars have
suggested.283 Based on what we know about the construct and external
validity constraints on IAT results, drawing conclusions about an employee's
prejudicial tendencies in the workplace from IAT scores would border on
recklessness. We just do not yet know enough about the sources of the IAT
effect, the behavioral concomitants of this effect, and the parameters on this
effect to make intelligent assessments of the workplace relevance of implicit
prejudice.284
support the position that subjective measures have more potential for bias than objective
measures. Instead, we found the opposite.").
282 Further support for our skeptical stance comes from one of the leading theorists
in the field of implicit social cognition, which encompasses the IAT work. John Bargh is
not convinced that the field has adequate theoretical answers to questions of the general
form: How do we know which of the multitude of possible behavioral scripts will be
activated by a complex naturalistic "stimulus" (such as a Black or female co-worker)?
How do we know which scripts will predominate? And how do we reconcile the
automaton-like view of human nature that emerges from stylized priming studies with
what we know about the resourcefulness with which human beings pursue complex sets
of goals in natural environments fraught with obstacles (such as the world of work)? See
generally John A. Bargh, What Have We Been Priming All These Years? On the
Development, Mechanisms, and Ecology of Nonconscious Social Behavior, 36 EUR. J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 147 (2006). Bargh's abstract critique dovetails well with our much more
focused one: the implicit prejudice research program is a very incomplete project.
283 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
284 Our point in this section is not that real organizations achieve perfection at
preventing or eliminating discrimination. Field work by Pager and Quillian, for instance,
suggests that racial discrimination in entry-level hiring by low-wage employers may
occur with some frequency. See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk?
What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 AM. Soc. REv. 355, 366 (2005)
("[A]ctual behavioral measures in the audit show that white ex-offenders are more than
three times as likely to receive consideration from employers as black ex-offenders."
(footnote omitted)). Rather, our point is that measures of implicit prejudice tested in lab
settings have not been shown to predict discrimination in any settings approximating real
world workplaces, much less workplaces that institute anti-discrimination safeguards or
at which interracial interactions are common.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If we accepted at face value the most ambitious claims about the
pervasiveness and potency of unconscious prejudice, then the factual case for
more aggressive government intervention to fight discrimination in a wide
range of domains would be strengthened.285 But scholars advancing these
claims, in their eagerness to incorporate cutting-edge empirical research into
their policy analyses, fail to acknowledge the complexity of the questions
still surrounding the implicit prejudice research program. To recapitulate,
much murkiness surrounds (a) the proper causal explanation for alleged IAT
effects, (b) the psychological meaning of IAT scores, (c) the statistical
generality and potency of alleged relations between IAT scores and actual
behavior, and (d) boundary conditions on alleged IAT effects.
Many judges and legal scholars have learned to be wary of social
scientists bearing intellectual gifts,2 86 but there are special properties of the
debate on implicit prejudice research to which it is prudent to call attention.
Work on implicit prejudice is not just psychological; it is suffused with
political significance. The concept of implicit prejudice straddles the is-ought
boundary that has traditionally separated facts from values: descriptive
scientific claims about how people think from normative moral-political
claims about how people should think. This blurring manifests itself in many
ways, but most importantly, it manifests itself in the repeated failure of
285 But one would not be logically obliged to draw any conclusions about how the
law should change even if one fully accepted the most far-reaching empirical claims.
Much would still hinge on empirical estimates of the consequences, intended and
unintended, of the new legal regime and even more still would hinge on one's moral-
political values and one's willingness to make egalitarianism a trump value. See Krieger
& Fiske, supra note 25, at 18 ("[E]ven the best insights from the empirical social sciences
can not supply the normative principles needed for substantive lawmaking or resolve the
conflicts between competing norms and interests so often implicated in the legislative and
judicial processes.").
286 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 526 (1995) ("Scientists seek
to bolster their authority by affectations of mathematical rigor, by use of an intimidating
jargon, by suppressing doubts, and by concealing the personal, judgmental factor in the
evaluation of experimental, statistical, or observational results."); David L. Bazelon, Risk
and Responsibility, 205 Sci. 277, 277 (1979) ("We are no longer content to delegate the
assessment of and response to risk to so-called disinterested scientists. Indeed, the very
concept of objectivity embodied in the word disinterested is now discredited."); id. at 278
("[S]cientists are tempted to disguise controversial value decisions in the cloak of
scientific objectivity, obscuring those decisions from political accountability."); Mark S.
Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73
U. GIN. L. REV. 867, 870 (2005) ("[A]lthough social scientists have made significant
contributions to society, as suppliers of courtroom evidence they often stand on shaky
ground.").
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researchers to acknowledge the role that political values unavoidably play in
where they set their thresholds of proof for calling reaction times or puzzling
behavior evidence of prejudice. The resulting distortions help to explain
widespread interpretive over-reaching: the willingness to claim revolutionary
discoveries well before ruling out alternative, more pedestrian accounts of
what implicit measures of prejudice assess.
The claims of implicit prejudice researchers would be less contentious if
they had shown that implicit measures of prejudice correlate highly with
behavior that observers across the political spectrum agree represent
intergroup hostility or discrimination. 287 But implicit prejudice researchers
claim construct validity for the AT-as an implicit measure of
prejudice288-by showing that TAT scores correlate weakly to moderately
with eye blinks, millisecond differentials in reaction times, and other subtle
behaviors that are far from universally regarded as signs of prejudice. Thus,
we can accept the claims of implicit prejudice researchers that they are
studying prejudice and not other psychological constructs only if we are
willing to redefine what prejudice requires in terms of real-world referents.
This debate should not be dismissed as an esoteric feud among
psychological insiders about the proper technical definitions of prejudice; it
is a debate about whether social psychologists are entitled to co-opt a value-
laden concept to advance their policy agenda. Prejudice and racism are not
the sorts of value-neutral descriptive terms one would expect to encounter in
the data language of a positivist science committed to the dispassionate
weighting of rival hypotheses. These terms are not on an epistemological par
with other terms that could be used to describe the concepts at issue, such as
spreading activation networks,289 amygdala activation,290 or response time
latency.29 1 Unlike a claim that pictures of Black and White faces
287 But they have not, as discussed below. See supra Part III.A.2. At best, measures
of implicit prejudice have been shown to relate to some micro-level behaviors that can, in
a technical sense, be labeled "discriminatory behaviors." Little evidence presently exists
tying implicit prejudice measures to macro-level discriminatory behaviors.
288 Or, as Banaji and colleagues put it, "[g]enuine, 100% [p]rejudice." Banaji et al.,
supra note 29, at 280.
289 Which refers to activation of one node within a network leading to the activation
of associated nodes within the network. See, e.g., Charles M. Judd et al., Some Dynamic
Properties of Attitude Structures: Context-Induced Response Facilitation and
Polarization, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 197-200 (1991) (presenting a
spreading-activation model of attitude accessibility).
290 Which refers to activation of "a subcortical structure known to be involved in
emotional learning, memory, and evaluation." Phelps et al., supra note 193, at 729.
291 Which refers to the amount of time it takes to react to a stimulus, as in the IAT.
See supra Part II.B.
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differentially activate the amygdala region within the brain, 292 charges of
prejudice and racism carry powerful connotative as well as denotative
judgments: such charges imply that the investigators are condemning as well
as describing the attitude in question. Prejudice and racism are political hot
potatoes that partisans are quick to disavow for themselves and attribute to
their adversaries. 293 Simply questioning the rigor of prejudice research can
subject one to questions about one's awareness of current social problems and
one's commitment to equality. 294 If social psychologists insist on importing
value-laden constructs from political debate into their scientific work, they
should expect political fissures to ripple through the scientific debate. They
should expect those convinced that social inequality flows from anti-Black
prejudice in the here and now to employ wide-net measures of racism, such
as opposition to affirmative action or greater eye blinking in the presence of
Black versus White experimenters, that label as many people as possible
prejudiced. And they should expect those convinced that inequality is now
largely the result of processes internal to Black communities to view racism
as more excuse than explanation and dismiss all but the starkest evidence of
disparate treatment driven by racial animus.
Our fear is that the stage has been set for an epistemic disaster of minor-
epic proportions. Throughout this Article, we have seen how rarely IAT
researchers temper their enthusiasm for ferreting out unconscious prejudice
with offsetting concerns about the dangers of making false accusations of
prejudice. 295 It is beyond the scope of this Article-and indeed of science-
292 William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 806, 811 (2004) ("[W]e found greater
amygdala activation for Black than White faces when faces were presented for only 30
Ms.").
293 See Tetlock, supra note 60, at 526-27.
294 In a prior exchange, Banaji et al. liken Arkes and Tetlock's criticisms of implicit
prejudice research to criticisms that members of the Plessy v. Ferguson Court would have
made of the Brown v. Board of Education decision. See Banaji et al., supra note 29, at
281. And Sears likens the criticisms by Arkes and Tetlock to the views of William
Parker, a Los Angeles police chief in the 1960s often accused of racism. See Sears, supra
note 182, at 294. More recently, in an exchange with Blanton and Jaccard, Greenwald
and colleagues speculated on the defensive motives of the IAT's critics, see Anthony G.
Greenwald et al., Consequential Validity of the Implicit Association Test: Comment on
Blanton and Jaccard (2006), 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 56, 60 (2006)-remarks much in the
spirit of Kang and Banaji's portrayal of skeptics as self-deceiving hypocrites, see Kang &
Banaji, supra note 3, at 1065. For our part, we believe that what matters is the quality of
the science, not the alleged motives of individual scientists.
295 Such dogged commitment to a theory or research program may admittedly
advance basic science in some cases, see Philip Kitcher, The Division of Cognitive Labor,
87 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1990) ("Whereas it may be rational for each of the scientists to believe
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to stipulate how society should balance Type I and Type II errors in the
courtroom and political arena. It must suffice to note that both errors are
serious-so serious that a balanced social science cannot focus exclusively
on only one of these errors. 296 If the knowledge claims of IAT advocates are
as exaggerated as we maintain, IAT advocates are already causing substantial
harm to American society by: (a) stimulating excessive suspicion of Whites
among Blacks, suspicion that can crystallize into conspiracy theories that
poison race relations;29 7 (b) convincing Blacks that they are held in
contempt, thereby inducing "stereotype threat" and "social-identity threat"
that, respectively, increase the likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies in
which Blacks act in ways that confirm the ill opinions they imagine others
hold 298 and heighten preconscious attention to subtle cues that confirm the
devalued role of minority groups;2 99 (c) providing authoritative-sounding but
false feedback to a million-plus visitors to IAT websites that they are
the theory that is better supported by the available evidence, it may not be rational for
each of them to pursue that theory, and what the community cares about is the
distribution of pursuit not the distribution of belief."), but drawing applications from such
developing research programs may be disastrous.
296 See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research
Results, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 273-75 (1998) (discussing the importance of
considering standards for avoiding false negatives versus false positives in the evaluation
of a scientific program of research); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("[I]n the case of a particular scientific technique, the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation." (citations omitted)).
297 The potential harm in exaggerating beliefs about the pervasiveness of implicit
prejudice within the American public is illustrated by research demonstrating that "the
more ethnic minorities expected whites to be prejudiced, the more negative experiences
they had during interethnic interactions." See J. Nicole Shelton et al., Expecting To Be the
Target of Prejudice: Implications for Interethnic Interactions, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1189, 1189 (2005); see also PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA,
BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK PREJUDICE 50-53 (2002) (reporting on a national survey
indicating that the more Blacks believed prejudice among Whites to be pervasive, the
more likely they were to embrace conspiracy theories for minority inequality).
298 See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797, 808 (1995) ("[M]aking African American participants vulnerable to
judgment by negative stereotypes about their group's intellectual ability depressed their
standardized test performance relative to White participants, while conditions designed to
alleviate this threat, improved their performance."). For a critical discussion of the
stereotype threat phenomenon, see generally Paul R. Sackett et al., On Interpreting
Stereotype Threat as Accounting for African American- White Differences on Cognitive
Tests, 59 AM. PSYCHOL. 7 (2004).
299 Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Prejudice Expectations Moderate Preconscious Attention
to Cues that Are Threatening to Social Identity, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 332, 337 (2006).
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prejudiced; 300 and (d) providing authoritative-sounding but false grounds for
commonality-of-cause requirements in class action litigation.30 1
Empirical claims that carry serious policy implications require serious
scrutiny-and the more sweeping the claims, the heavier the burden of proof
their promoters should bear. And it is a sweeping claim to say that, after half
a century of legal, political and educational efforts to check prejudice, the
vast majority of Americans remain prejudiced. When psychological and legal
scholars join forces to call for wholesale changes in American
antidiscrimination law on the basis of this implicit-prejudice charge, more is
at stake than professorial reputations. These claims from the left shake the
ontological foundations of American political culture as profoundly as do
claims from the right about the genetic causes of intelligence and income
inequality. 30 2 The former claims imply that we cannot achieve equality of
opportunity unless we have already achieved equality of result (otherwise
people will implicitly associate subordinate group membership with bad
outcomes in the lottery of life-and those associations will bias gatekeepers
against members of those groups); the latter claims imply that we cannot
achieve equality of opportunity without achieving an even more fundamental
equality: equality of DNA that shapes our minds and personalities. Either
way, the American dream is vastly more elusive than popularly supposed.
Without denying that disturbing claims, from left or right, sometimes
prove on the mark, we believe that psychologists have an obligation to
subject the claims of implicit prejudice researchers to as vigorous scientific
accountability as they do research on the heritability of intelligence and other
300 See Blanton & Jaccard, supra note 130, at 69. Shelby Steele's work suggests that
information such as that presented on the IAT website may fuel "white guilt," which
makes it hard to have open conversations about current impediments to improving living
standards for African-Americans. See SHELBY STEELE, WHITE GUILT: How BLACKS AND
WHITES TOGETHER DESTROYED THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 34-36 (2006).
301 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. As David Copus points out,
social psychological experts are often used by plaintiffs in employment class actions to
testify that psychological findings, paired with a particular organizational structure, will
create an environment conducive to discrimination. E-mail from David Copus to Gregory
Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock (Dec. 26, 2005, 02:57 EST) (on file with authors).
3 0 2 See generally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). For a discussion of
psychologists' responses to The Bell Curve, see Clayton P. Alderfer, The Science and
Nonscience of Psychologists' Responses to The Bell Curve, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. &
PRAC. 287 (2003). For a discussion of responses by philosophers of science, see Neven
Sesardic, Philosophy of Science that Ignores Science: Race, IQ and Heritability, 67 PHIL.
SCI. 580 (2000).
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attributes conducive to success in competitive market economies. 30 3
Anything less would suggest that this branch of psychology is better
classified as a form of social activism than of science.
303 The correct scientific model is adversarial collaboration, in which the scientists,
rather than impugning each other's motives and refuting caricatures of each other's
positions, identify the points on which they agree and disagree and the findings that
would induce them to change their minds. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Experiences of
Collaborative Research, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 723, 729-30 (2003). We would change our
minds, and suspect many other skeptics would as well, about the legal standing of
implicit prejudice work to the degree IAT advocates could show that: (1) even if we
accept their meta-analytic estimates of the effect sizes for implicit prejudice, the data are
fully consistent with modest estimates of the prevalence of prejudice in the populations
thus far studied; (2) the predictive power of their new measures of prejudice has not been
artificially inflated by publication bias or by outliers, or simply represents the influence
of old-fashioned prejudice; and (3) most critical, their measures predict legally actionable
discrimination in realistic work settings, including subtle acts of discrimination in
subjective ratings of candidates. It would now be instructive if implicit prejudice
advocates would indicate, ex ante, what evidence would induce them to modify or
abandon their own causal and value claims.
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